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Abstract 
In response to ever-increasing societal concern, firms adopt environmental management practices 
(EMPs) to mitigate the impact of their operations on the natural environment. However, they vary 
significantly in the number and types of practices they adopt, and in the environmental 
performance derived from that adoption. While prior research has explored various drivers of 
firm environmental activity and the impact of that activity on firm performance, there is limited 
understanding of what drives variation in adoption between firms and how that variation impacts 
operational decisions. I focus my dissertation on these two questions and execute my 
investigation through three essays. 
In the first essay, I evaluate which stakeholders exert more/less influence on EMP adoption 
decisions. Using panel data from 2002 to 2013, which includes 880 firms, 258 industries, and 8 
sectors, and Hierarchical Linear Modeling, I find that the passage of time, firm-unique choices, 
and industry membership explain 40%, 26%, and 34% of the observed variation between firms 
respectively. The results suggest that stakeholders which influence firms directly (firm - 26%), 
such as customers and investors, are almost as influential to EMP adoption choices as regulators, 
who influence firms through industry regulation (industry - 34%). The results highlight the 
important role non-regulatory forces play in motivating firms to increase environmental activity 
and their potential role in future efforts to motivate improved environmental performance. 
I next examine a new source of variation in EMP adoption, a spill or pollution (SP) 
controversy. Such controversies are increasingly common. Because EMP adoption directly drives 
environmental performance, understanding how firms respond to SP controversies (escalate or 
de-escalate adoption) is of importance to both society and regulators. Using a unique panel data 
from 2002 to 2013, I show that in the absence of a SP controversy, firms steadily adopt more 
EMPs each year. However, in the year following a SP controversy, they de-escalate adoption and 
this effect seems to persist for up to 3 years. I also observe that high sustainability firms do not 
de-escalate adoption following a SP controversy, highlighting the critical role of sustainability 
leadership to driving environmental performance. 
In the final essay, I investigate how poor environmental performance can impact firms in 
surprising, yet important ways. I specifically investigate whether experiencing an environmental 
controversy impacts a subsequent, seemingly-unrelated operational decision, the timing of a 
product recall. Using a panel dataset covering 2002 to 2013, which includes recalls from the five 
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primary recalling industries (auto, pharma, medical device, food, and consumer products), and 
survival modeling, I find that experiencing environmental controversy, or more controversies, 
causes firms to postpone the product recall decision. This impact is consistent across each 
recalling industry. I also find that as the controversy ages, its impact on the recall decision 
diminishes, suggesting the recent controversies will have a greater impact on operational 
decisions than older controversies.  
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Chapter 1 - Dissertation Overview 
As a function of their operations, firms of all types negatively impact the natural environment. 
They do this through some combination of energy and natural resource consumption and 
operational waste emission into the air, soil, and water. For instance, all firms consume energy, 
which is often produced at fossil fuel burning power plants. The burning of fossil fuels emits 
greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, and water vapor) into 
the atmosphere, which in turn is believed to contribute to global warming and climate change.1 
Experts estimate that by 2030, global warming will cause an additional 250,000 deaths annually 
around the globe, as well as increase annual healthcare spending in the U.S. by $2 billion - $4 
billion.2 The burning of fossil fuels also generates other harmful emissions, including sulfur and 
nitrogen oxides which contribute to smog and acid rain, microscopic particulate matter, 
radioactive material, and heavy elements such as mercury, arsenic, and others. These power 
plants also consume large quantities of water. In the U.S., fossil-fuel powered plants produce 
approximately 65% of all electrical power3 and annually emit 2.8 billion tons of carbon dioxide.4 
Manufacturing firms generate additional environmental impacts through production resource 
consumption and waste generation. Production resources are obtained from the natural 
environment and may be non-renewable, such as fossil fuels, minerals, and water. Production 
wastes, which may be hazardous or non-hazardous, are often emitted directly into the air, land-
filled, released into local waterways as waste water, poorly contained and leak into the soil (and 
possibly the watershed), or released into the environment through a myriad of other paths. The 
impact of pollution on the planet and population is significant. Experts estimate that pollution 
causes 100 million deaths annually around the globe5, 3 million of which are children under the 
age of five.6 In the United States alone, environmental spill and pollution events such as Love 
canal, Three-mile island, the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Alaska, and the BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, require significant financial resources for clean-up, while leaving the environment 
permanently scarred. For example, the BP Oil Spill discharged more than 4.5 million barrels of 
                                                          
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report Climate Change 2007: Climate Change 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability 
2 World Health Organization (WHO) 2017 Fact Sheet 
3 https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states 
4 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071114163448.htm 
5 World Health Organization. "Climate change and health." 2014. Web Accessed April 25, 2015 
6 Blacksmith Institute, Green Cross. "The World's Worst Pollution Problems: The Top Ten of the Toxic 
Twenty." Web Accessed April 25, 2015 
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toxic oil in the Gulf of Mexico and affected over 8000 species of flora and fauna. It was also 
responsible for eleven deaths and cost BP $18.7 billion, the largest corporate settlement in U.S. 
history. Even non-manufacturing firms consume natural resources and generate harmful 
emissions. For example, transportation firms generate hazardous air emissions, mining firms 
consume water and generate hazardous wastes which often pollute the soil, groundwater, and 
local waterways, and construction firms consume natural resources while generating production 
wastes, which are often landfilled. 
To reduce the impact of their operations, or supply chain, on the natural environment, firms 
adopt operational changes called natural environmental management items (Aragon-Correa 
1998), environmental technologies (Klassen & Whybark 1999), environmental actions (Banerjee 
2001), and environmental management practices (Yang et al. 2011, Delmas & Toffel 2008, 
Montabon et al. 2007, Delmas & Toffel 2004, Anton et al. 2004, Sroufe et al. 2003, Khanna & 
Anton 2002). Consistent with recent literature, I refer to these operational changes as 
“environmental management practices” (EMPs) and their usage by a firm as “EMP adoption”. 
Examples of EMPs firms adopt include process and technology changes, revised management 
systems and policies (such as implementing KPIs), revised governance structures (such as placing 
environmental leaders in senior roles), participation in external partnerships designed to address 
environmental issues, commitment to environmental protocols (such as the Ceres Valdez 
principles), and managing supplier emissions (such as through scorecards). 
My data shows that U.S. firms, on average, steadily adopt more EMPs each year (Figure 1.1), 
with consistent increases occurring across a variety of sectors representing the broad spectrum of 
U.S. economic activity (Figure 1.2). However, despite such encouraging increases in “average” 
adoption, a deeper investigation reveals significant variation in the number of EMPs individual 
firms adopt, even firms within a common industry. While some firms adopt many EMPs, others 
adopt few, if any. This pattern of variation exists across all years in the panel and the magnitude 
of the variation increases over time (Figure 1.3 – the boxes represent min and max levels of 
adoption for each year). 
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Figure 1.1 – Average firm-level adoption of EMPs (2002 – 2013) 
 
Figure 1.2 – Average firm-level adoption of EMPs (by Sector) 
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Figure 1.3 – Variation in firm-level adoption of EMPs 
 
Two broad streams of research investigate EMP adoption. The first examines why firms adopt 
EMPs and the second investigates causes and consequences of EMP adoption. As to the first 
stream, environment management researchers have attempted to address why firms adopt EMPs 
by focusing on the drivers of EMP adoption. The central premise in these studies is that various 
external and internal stakeholders (e.g., regulatory agencies, customers, competitors, employees 
etc…) exert significant pressure on firms to adopt EMPs (Sarkis et al. 2010, Ruenda-Manzanares 
et al. 2008, Buysse & Verbeke 2003, Banerjee et al. 2003, Madsen & Ulhoi 2001, Henriques & 
Sadorsky 1996). According to these researchers, firms adopt EMPs to comply with existing 
regulations, avoid penalties, and as a signal to pacify relevant stakeholder groups. An important 
outcome from the second stream of research is that EMP adoption is positively associated with 
superior environmental (Anton et al. 2004, Klassen & Whybark 1999, Potoski & Prakash 2005, 
Toffel 2005, King & Lenox 2002), operational (Sroufe 2003) and financial performance (King & 
Lenox 2002). Table 1.1 provides an overview of pertinent literature in this area. 
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Table 1.1 – Representative literature 
Article 
Country/ 
Industry 
Research Focus 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Results 
Hofer, Cantor & Dai 
(2012) 
North America 
(Manufacturing) 
Competitive determinants of 
EMP adoption 
Rival firms past EM 
activity 
Focal firm EMP 
adoption 
A firm’s EMP activities are driven in part by the actions of 
competitors. 
Sarkis, Gonzalez-Torre 
& Adenso-Diaz (2010) 
Spain 
(Auto industry) 
Impact of environmental 
training on EMP adoption 
Stakeholder Pressure EMP adoption 
Environmental training mediates the relationship between stakeholder 
pressures and EMP adoption. 
Delmas & Toffel 
(2008) 
United States 
(Heavy polluting 
industrial sectors) 
Influence of influential 
corporate departments on EMP 
adoption 
Stakeholder pressure EMP adoption 
Differences in the influence of corporate departments lead facilities to 
prioritize different external pressures and thus adopt different EMPs. 
Zhang, Bi, Yuan, Ge, 
Liu & Bu 
(2008) 
China 
(Chemical 
manufacturers) 
Influence of various external 
stakeholder on EMP adoption 
Stakeholder pressure EMP adoption 
Pressures from supply chain partners, customers, and communities 
influence firms to increase EMP adoption. 
Regulatory influence reduces with increased compliance. 
Potoski & Prakash 
(2005) 
United States 
(Manufacturing) 
Relationship between ISO 
14001 and environmental 
performance 
ISO 14001 
certification 
TRI emissions 
Certified ISO 14001 facilities reduce their emissions greater than 
non-certified facilities. 
Anton, Deltas & 
Khanna 
(2004) 
United States 
(S&P 500 firms) 
Motivation to adopt EMPs and 
the impact of EMPs on 
environmental performance. 
Stakeholder pressure 
EMP adoption 
 
 
EMP adoption & 
TRI emissions 
Liability threats and pressures from consumers, investors and the 
public motivate EMS adoption. 
A more comprehensive EMS leads to lower toxic emissions per unit 
output. 
Sroufe 
(2003) 
United States 
(Manufacturing) 
Relationship between 
environmental activity and 
operational performance 
EMP adoption 
Operational 
performance 
Increased EMP adoption leads to improved operational performance. 
Khanna & Anton 
(2002) 
United States 
(S&P 500 firms) 
Factors that explain the 
diversity in the EMSs adopted 
by firms 
Stakeholder pressure 
 
 
EMP adoption 
The threat of environmental liabilities, high costs of compliance, 
market pressures, and public pressures on firms create incentives for 
adopting a more comprehensive EMS. 
King & Lenox 
(2002) 
United States 
(Manufacturing) 
Identify locus of profitable 
pollution reduction 
On-site vs. off-site 
treatment of toxic 
emissions 
ROA, Tobin’s q 
Waste prevention leads to financial gain, but reactive approaches to 
reducing pollution do not. 
King & Lenox 
(2001) 
United States 
(Manufacturers) 
Impact of Lean production on 
environmental performance 
ISO 9001 
Max. invention levels 
EMP adoption 
TRI emissions 
Waste treatment 
Firms that deploy lean are more likely to adopt ISO 14001, reduce 
waste generation, and reduce hazardous emissions. 
Klassen 
(2001) 
United States 
(Furniture 
manufacturing) 
Impact of leadership 
environmental orientation on 
EMP adoption 
Leaderships views on 
environmental 
responsibility 
EMP adoption 
(proactive vs. 
reactive) 
More optimistic leadership orientation leads to proactive adoption of 
EMPs and vice versa. 
 
Klassen & Whybark 
(1999) 
United States 
(Furniture 
manufacturing) 
Relationship between 
pollution prevention and firm 
performance 
EMPs adopted 
(prevention vs. 
control) 
Operations 
performance 
TRI emissions 
The adoption of pollution prevention techniques improves both 
operational and environmental performance. 
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Regardless of the intense pressure firms feel to adopt EMPs from society and other 
environmental stakeholders, and the tremendous value they derive from adoption, the data shows 
that firms vary significantly in the number of EMPs they adopt. Further, while existing research 
has spent considerable effort investigating the causes and consequences of adoption, very little 
effort has been expended on understanding variation in adoption across firms. Investigating the 
magnitude and causes of variation can provide important insights into firm choices regarding 
EMP adoption, as well as how those choices impact firm performance and operational decision 
making. Such insights could be useful in the development of new or revised approaches to 
increase adoption and improve firm environmental performance. In this dissertation, I investigate 
variation in firm environmental activity (as proxied by EMP adoption) from two perspectives, i.e. 
what contributes to variation and how poor environmental performance, shown by prior 
researchers to be a consequence of variation in adoption, impacts operational decision-making. I 
conduct the investigation through three (3) essays, each of which individually contributes to the 
broader issue of variation in EMP adoption (Figure 1.4). 
Figure 1.4 – Dissertation structure 
 
I begin by examining antecedents to the adoption of EMPs and the associated variation in 
adoption across firms. In Chapter 2, “Environmental Management Practice Adoption: Explaining 
heterogeneity among firms using Hierarchical Linear Modeling,” I investigate how stakeholders, 
firm characteristics, and industry attributes contribute to variation in EMP adoption. More 
specifically, I address two questions: (1) which stakeholders seem to have greater (or lesser) 
influence on firm-level decisions regarding the adoption of EMPs and (2) which specific firm 
characteristics and industry attributes support or hinder EMP adoption. As to the first question, it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Do environmental 
controversies affect the 
product recall decision? 
EMP Adoption 
Antecedents 
EMP Adoption 
Process 
Chapter 2 
EMP adoption: 
Explaining heterogeneity 
using HLM  
Performance 
Outcomes 
Dissertation and on-going research focus 
Chapter 3 
The impact of a spill or 
pollution controversy on 
firm environmental activity 
Secondary Impacts 
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is clear that a wide variety of stakeholders influence firm choices regarding the adoption of 
EMPs, including regulators, NGOs, customers, supply chain partners, investors, local 
communities, and firm employees, among others. However, while each of these stakeholders 
exert influence, it is unknown which stakeholder(s) provide greater (or lesser) influence. Such 
knowledge would be useful for developing new or revised approaches to increase firm-level 
adoption of EMPs. As to the impact of firm characteristics and industry attributes on variation in 
EMP adoption, researchers have shown that, (1) firms adopt in response to regulation (Sarkis et 
al. 2010, Delmas & Toffel 2004), competition (Henriques & Sadorsky 1996), and pressure from 
other stakeholders, including non-governmental agencies (Lawrence and Morell 1995), and (2) 
firms differ in organizational characteristics (e.g., resource availability) and needs directly related 
to adoption (Sharma et al. 1999). However, it is unclear which specific firm characteristics help 
or hinder adoption or whether other industry attributes contribute to variation in adoption. 
Understanding which firm characteristics matter is of importance to firm leaders who are 
beginning the journey toward environmental excellence. Understanding which industry attributes 
matter helps quantify the importance of regulation to variation in EMP adoption, as compared to 
other options for increasing adoption, such as direct pressure on firms or self-regulation 
approaches, such as ISO 14000 or the Carbon Disclosure Project.  
To examine these questions, I use panel data that spans a 12-year period from 2002 to 2013, 
and includes 880 firms from 258 industries and 8 sectors which represent the broad spectrum of 
U.S. economic activity. To accommodate the multi-level nested data structure, I use Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush 1992). Results from rigorous empirical analysis 
show that the passage of time, firm-unique choices and characteristics, and industry membership 
account for 40.0%, 25.7%, and 34.3% respectively of the aggregate variance in EMP adoption. 
The results suggest that stakeholders that influence firms directly (25.7% of total variance 
explanation) are almost as important to firm adoption decisions as regulators, who influence firms 
through the industry in which the firm competes (34.3%). Results from examining industry 
attributes show that regulation and competition positively impact adoption, while industry 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity negatively impact adoption. This suggests that as 
environmental uncertainty increases, firms adopt fewer EMPs, i.e. firms do not see the adoption 
of EMPs as necessary to grow the firm, address industry instability or handle industry 
complexity. Results from examining firm characteristics show that firm size, profitability, 
available labor, and prior experience adopting a quality management system (such as lean, TQM 
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or Six Sigma) or ISO9000 are positively related to adoption, while available capital is unrelated 
to adoption. Beyond identifying important antecedents to adoption, the results show that firms 
can be environmentally proactive without excess capital, an encouraging finding for firm leaders 
who inaccurately assume that it is expensive to pursue a proactive environmental strategy. 
While it is clear that environmental stakeholders, firm characteristics and industry attributes 
play important roles in explaining variation in firm environmental activity, in Chapter 3, “The 
impact of a spill or pollution controversy on firm environmental activity,” I investigate another 
source of variation, a spill or pollution controversy. Such controversies are increasingly common 
and given the direct connection between EMP adoption and improved firm environmental 
performance, understanding how firms respond to such controversies (escalate or de-escalate 
adoption) is of importance to both society and regulators. A spill or pollution event, and the 
subsequent media controversy, reflects a failure of a firm’s environmental management system 
(EMS), much as a product quality failure reflects a failure of a firm’s quality management 
system. Given that an EMS is comprised of the EMPs a firm has adopted prior to the spill or 
pollution event, the spill or pollution controversy is an indictment of that embedded base of 
EMPs. My first objective in the study is to understand how firms respond to such controversies, 
i.e. do they escalate adoption to make the EMS more robust or do they de-escalate (or pause) the 
annual increases they pursue in the absence of a controversy as a way to secure time to analyze 
root cause and identify weaknesses with the current environmental strategy before adopting more 
EMPs. In addition to examining the direct relationship between a spill or pollution controversy 
and EMP adoption, I also examine whether the controversy severity, firm size, firm sustainability 
performance or an industry’s environmental risk profile moderate the direct relationship. 
Using a unique panel data from 2002 to 2013 representing over 400 publicly-traded US 
manufacturing firms, and rigorous econometric methods, I show that in the absence of a spill or 
pollution controversy firms in all sectors steadily adopt more EMPs each year. However, 
following a spill or pollution controversy firms de-escalate adoption and this effect seems to 
persist for up to 3 years. It is important to note that de-escalation does not equate to a reduction in 
the number of EMPs the firm adopted in the prior year. Rather, it is a slowdown in annual 
increases in adoption and a reduction in the number of EMPs the firm would have adopted in the 
absence of a controversy. I also find that while experiencing more severe controversies or more 
controversies individually leads to a greater slowdown, they do not jointly affect the number of 
EMPs a firm adopts. Finally, I observe that high sustainability firms do not de-escalate adoption 
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following a spill or pollution controversy, suggesting that such firms respond differently to spill 
and pollution controversies than other firms. The results have negative implications for short- and 
long-term environmental performance, especially because firms do not seem to recover from the 
slowdown in future years. They also shed light on a commonly held belief that firms escalate 
adoption in response to an environmental controversy, perhaps to strengthen their environmental 
management system or achieve legitimacy in their stakeholders’ eyes. Instead, firms (in 
aggregate) de-escalate adoption following a controversy and this behavior persists over time, 
potentially resulting in a complete pause in adoption. The results also indicate that factors other 
than stakeholder or institutional pressure, the primary theoretical lenses from which EMP 
adoption has been studied previously, influence firm decisions regarding adoption (Delmas 2001, 
Delmas & Toffel 2008, Reuter et al. 2010, Sarkis et al. 2010, Foster et al. 2000, Hofer et al. 
2012). Finally, the results demonstrate that sustainability performance plays a critical role in how 
firms respond to spill and pollution controversies, with potential important implications for firm 
environmental performance. 
Beyond understanding what drives variation in firm environmental activity, I am also 
interested in understanding how firm EMP adoption choices, and associated environmental 
performance, impact operational decision making. In the final essay, “Do environmental 
controversies affect the product recall decision?”, I investigate how an environmental 
controversy impacts a seemingly-unrelated operational decision, the timing of a product recall. I 
specifically investigate whether firms who have experienced prior spill and pollution 
controversies, and the associated fallout from such socially toxic events, choose to accelerate or 
decelerate a subsequent voluntary product recall, another socially toxic event. Firm leaders may 
decelerate a recall out of belief that delaying the recall presents the least risk to their careers or 
they may accelerate the recall decision to couple the controversy and recall bad news, thereby 
reducing the informativeness of the recall bad news and its negative impact on the firm. Finally, I 
investigate whether the impact of environmental controversy on operational decision making 
dissipates as the time since the most recent controversy increases. 
To test the research hypotheses, I compiled a unique dataset by combining environmental 
controversies from Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 database with an expansive voluntary recall 
dataset gathered through numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and web-
scraping of U.S. regulatory websites. The final sample includes 120 publicly traded firms from 59 
4-digit SIC code industries. It also includes 154 environmental controversies and 4355 product 
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recalls representing all major recall industries, including automotive, medical device, 
pharmaceutical, food, and consumer products. Using survival modeling, I find that experiencing 
prior environmental controversy, or more controversies, causes firms to delay the product recall 
decision by almost 50%. I also find that the impact of the controversy on the recall decision 
diminishes as the controversy ages, suggesting the recent controversies will have a bigger impact 
on operational decisions than older controversies. However, the rate of decay is extremely slow. 
Finally, I find that the recall postponement effect is consistent across all recalling industries, but 
most pronounced in the consumer products and auto industries. The research offers several 
important contributions. We contribute to the environmental management literature by showing 
that environmental performance affects a firm’s managerial decision making related to product 
quality. We contribute to the product recall literature by identifying a common leading indicator 
of recall timing across all U.S. recalling industries (auto, pharma, medical device, food, and 
consumer products). In fact, this study is perhaps the broadest recall study to-date. Finally, we 
contribute to information disclosure literature by showing that firms prefer to decouple bad news 
announcements. 
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Chapter 2 - Environmental Management Practice 
Adoption: Explaining heterogeneity among firms 
using Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
2.1 Introduction 
Highly visible environmental events in the U.S. and around the world over the past years 
highlight the significant risks business operations can pose to the natural environment. Examples 
include the Union Carbide gas leak in Bhopal, India, the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Alaska, and 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. These events have brought increased 
attention and accountability to firms for the impact their operations have on the natural 
environment. Evidence suggests that adopting environment management practices (EMPs), which 
broadly include practices, policies, and procedures designed to reduce the impact of a firm’s 
operations on the natural environment, has increased steadily over the past decade, potentially in 
response to increased attention. By adopting EMPs, firms not only signal that they are 
environmentally responsible, but they also reap ancillary benefits associated with adoption such 
as superior environmental (Anton et al. 2004, Klassen & Whybark 1999, Potoski & Prakash 2005, 
Toffel 2005, King & Lenox 2002), operational (Sroufe 2003) and financial performance (King & 
Lenox 2002). 
Despite such proven benefits, researchers have found that firms vary significantly in the 
number of EMPs they adopt (Sarkis et al. 2010, Delmas & Toffel 2004, Henriques & Sadorsky 
1996, Sharma et al. 1999). While they concur that one source of variation is time (King et al. 
2005, Delmas 2003), possibly due to increased public pressure over time,7 there is a lack of 
consensus on other sources and the relative importance of each source to the adoption decision. 
To address this question, existing studies have used institutional, organizational, and stakeholder 
theories to identify and analyze how factors external and internal to the firm impact EMP 
adoption. They conclude that adoption varies because; (1) firms adopt in response to regulation 
(Sarkis et al. 2010, Delmas & Toffel 2004), competition (Henriques & Sadorsky 1996), and 
pressure from other stakeholders, including non-governmental agencies (Lawrence & Morell 
1995) and (2) firms differ in organizational characteristics (e.g., resource availability) and needs 
directly related to adoption (Sharma et al. 1999). In fact, organizational characteristics may also 
                                                          
7 http://www.people-press.org/2018/01/25/economic-issues-decline-among-publics-policy-priorities/ 
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be responsible for the customized EMP adoption decisions a firm makes in response to 
institutional pressures common to broad groups of firms (Delmas and Toffel 2008). An 
overarching conclusion from this research is that in addition to time, variation in adoption exists 
across industries because of differences in institutional pressures (e.g., regulation and 
competition), and among firms within a common industry because of a firm’s unique 
organizational characteristics and experiences. 
While a considerable amount of literature has examined the drivers of EMP adoption and 
broadly identified the sources of variation, a comparable estimate of their importance is missing 
in part because most studies evaluating adoption are conducted at the firm level in one industry, 
where firms encounter similar regulatory rules and external stakeholder pressures (Sarkis et al 
2010, Christmann 2004). Even studies with multiple industries include a narrow set of firm 
characteristics from a few industries. While these studies are insightful and indicate the 
importance of both firm and industry specific effects to EMP adoption decisions, they do not 
allow us to draw useful conclusions about which source of heterogeneity (time, firm or industry) 
is relatively more important. The importance of identifying sources of variation and estimating 
their relative impact is well established in management literature, where researchers have 
concluded that variation attributed to different sources necessitates distinct firm and regulatory 
responses (Misangyi et al. 2006; McGahan and Porter 1997; 2002). Extending this logic to our 
context, we contend that if we find that firm-specific characteristics explain a larger proportion of 
the variation, then tactics directed at individual firms, such as incentives, should play a central 
role in efforts to increase EMP adoption. Alternately, if industry attributes dominate, then tactics 
directed at the industry, such as regulation, should play a central role.  
In this study, we focus on two inter-related issues. First, we conceptually identify distinct 
sources of variation in EMP adoption among firms and empirically estimate their relative 
importance. Based on extant literature, we recognize three sources of variation; temporality 
(variation over time), firm-specific choices and characteristics, and industry membership. Second, 
we review existing literature to identify individual firm characteristics and industry attributes that 
influence EMP adoption. We refer to these characteristics and attributes as “strategic factors” and 
subsequently test whether, and to what extent, they impact EMP adoption. Our study is primarily 
descriptive in nature and seeks to explain an observed phenomenon (i.e. variation in EMP 
adoption) using insights gleaned from existing literature. While we do not hypothesize, we 
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outline expected relationships between strategic factors and EMP adoption. A similar approach 
has been used by strategy researchers (Misangyi et al. 2006; McGahan and Porter 1997; 2002). 
To examine our assertions, we use panel data that spans a 12-year period from 2002 to 2013, 
and includes 880 firms, 258 industries, and 8 sectors which represent the broad spectrum of U.S. 
economic activity. To accommodate the multi-level nested data structure, we use Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush 1992). Empirical results show that temporality, 
firm, and industry account for 40.0%, 25.7%, and 34.3% of the aggregate variance in EMP 
adoption respectively. Results from the analysis of firm strategic factors show that firm size, 
profitability, available labor, and prior experience adopting management practices (such as ISO 
9000, lean, TQM, and Six Sigma) support EMP adoption. Results from the analysis of industry 
strategic factors show that while regulation and competition support adoption, munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity hinder EMP adoption. 
These results make critical theoretical and practical contributions. First, to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first study to identify temporality, firm-specific choices and characteristics, 
and industry membership as distinct sources of variation in EMP adoption and to empirically 
assess their relative importance. While the significant level of variation explained by industry 
membership (34%) suggests that initiatives targeted at industries (e.g., regulation) will play an 
important role in future efforts to increase adoption, the high percentage of variation explained by 
firm specific choices and characteristics (26%) suggests that initiatives targeted directly at firms 
(e.g., incentives) should also play a prominent role in those efforts. Second, by including both 
firm characteristics and industry attributes in one study, we integrate disparate results from 
numerous prior studies conducted at different units of analysis. Identifying which firm strategic 
factors support adoption is important to practitioners who desire to implement proactive 
environmental management strategies. Understanding which industry strategic factors influence 
adoption provides explanation for how a firm’s competitive environment influences adoption. 
Third, our findings are more generalizable than previous studies because we evaluate a broader 
set of EMPs, use secondary data covering twelve years, and include numerous companies from 
multiple industries and sectors representing the full spectrum of U.S. economic activity. Prior 
studies investigated a small set of EMPs, used cross-sectional, primary data, and investigated 
firms in narrowly defined industries or sectors, such as furniture manufacturing (Klassen & 
Whybark 1999), chemicals (Christmann 2004), or automotive (Sarkis et al. 2010). Finally, the 50 
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EMPs included in this study encompass all aspects of environmental management and provide a 
broad-based instrument useful for future researchers conducting research in this area.  
2.2 Literature review  
Academic literature related to EMPs has grown exponentially over the last two decades. We 
conduct an in-depth review of this literature and highlight implications most relevant to our study. 
To our surprise, we find that despite numerous published articles there is no agreed upon 
conceptual or empirical definition of EMPs, although multiple descriptions and measurements 
exist. As such, we leverage the literature review to develop a definition of EMPs as “any activity 
undertaken by a firm to reduce the impact of their operations, or supply chain, on the natural 
environment.” This definition is similar to Montabon et al.’s (2007) definition but broadened to 
capture firm activities other researchers view as EMPs and reflect that EMPs “pertain to diverse 
foci, represent different resource commitments and target a wide range of goals and objectives” 
(Sroufe et al. 2002). 
To draw meaningful insights from continuously expanding literature, we organize our 
discussion of existing studies by their “thematic focus” and the “theoretical lens” used (Table 
2.1). Thematically, the majority of studies focus either on the performance consequences of EMP 
adoption or drivers (i.e. antecedents) of EMP adoption. There is strong support for a robust and 
positive relationship between EMP adoption and various measures of performance, including 
environmental (Anton et al. 2004, Klassen & Whybark 1999, Potoski & Prakash 2005, Toffel 
2005), operational (Montabon et al. 2007) and financial (Jacobs et al. 2010). However, there is 
less concurrence about the antecedents of EMP adoption because studies vary by whether they 
include factors internal or external to the firm and the unit of analysis. For instance, internal 
factors studied include firm size (Hofer et al. 2012, Delmas & Toffel 2008, King et al. 2005), 
profitability (Hofer et al. 2012), and prior experience adopting management practices (Yang et al. 
2011), while external factors studied include regulation (Banerjee et al. 2003, Bansal & Roth 
2000), competition (Hofer et al. 2012, Khanna & Anton 2002), uncertainty and complexity 
(Gatigon & Robertson 1989, Ettlie 1983). Moreover, many of these factors have been studied 
independently, at the firm or industry level of aggregation, making a comparison across studies 
challenging due to differing units of analysis. 
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Table 2.1 - Literature review 
 
From a “theoretical” perspective, EMP adoption is evaluated primarily through the lens of 
institutional, stakeholder, and organizational theories. Institutional theory emphasizes the role of 
social and cultural pressure on organizations, which in turn influences organizational practices 
and structures (Scott 1992). It suggests that firms obtain legitimacy by conforming to the 
dominant practices within their organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In the context 
of EMPs, the institutional logic, in conjunction with stakeholder theory, suggests that firms adopt 
EMPs primarily in response to pressure exerted on them by various internal and external 
Thematic Focus 
Performance consequences of EMP adoption: 
 Environmental Performance Anton et al. 2004; King & Lenox 2002; Klassen & Whybark 1999; 
Melnyk 2003; Potoski & Prakash 2005; Toffel 2005; Zhu & Sarkis 
2004 
 
 Operational Performance Melnyk 2003; Montabon, 2007; Sroufe 2003; Zhu & Sarkis 2004 
 
 Financial Performance Jacobs et al. 2010; King & Lenox 2002 
 
Antecedents from Unit of Analysis of EMP Adoption: 
 Firm as unit of analysis Delmas & Toffel 2008; Hofer et al. 2012; King et al. 2005; Yang et 
al. 2011 
 
 Industry as unit of analysis Ettlie 1983; Banerjee et al. 2003; Bansal & Roth 2000; Gatigon & 
Robertson 1989; Hofer et al. 2012; Khanna & Anton 2002 
 
 Time Trends Delmas 2003; King et al. 2005 
 
Theoretical Lens 
 Institutional Theory  
(e.g. institutional pressure) 
Banerjee et al. 2003; Buysse & Verbeke 2003; Henriques & 
Sadorsky 1996; Jennings & Zandbergen 1995; Madsen & Ulhoi 
2001; Ruenda-Manzanares et al. 2008; Sarkis et al. 2010 
 
 Organizational Theory 
(e.g. Resource dependence, 
RBV) 
Bansal & Roth 2000; Banerjee et al. 2003; Delmas and Toffel 2008; 
Gavronski et al. 2008; Gavronski et al. 2013; Khanna & Anton 
2002; Paulraj 2009 
 
 Stakeholder Theory Banerjee et al. 2003; Henriques & Sadorsky 1996; Madsen & Ulhoi 
2001; Ruenda-Manzanares et al. 2008 
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stakeholder groups, such as employees, managers, competitors, customers, investors, and 
regulatory agencies, among others (Sarkis et al. 2010, Ruenda-Manzanares et al. 2008, Banerjee 
et al. 2003, Madsen & Ulhoi 2001, Henriques & Sadorsky 1996). This view was first espoused by 
Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) to explain that firms in each industry adopt similar practices 
because regulations and regulatory enforcement, the main impetuses for EMP adoption, were 
similar within an industry. In sum, most institutional theorists agree that firms within an industry 
would be relatively similar in the adoption of EMPs, whereas firms in different industries would 
vary in the adoption of EMPs because they face different institutional pressures.   
Other researchers (e.g. neo-institutional theorists) argue that the interpretation of institutional 
pressure should be contingent on an organization’s characteristics because it may get transformed 
as it crosses organizational boundaries (Delmas & Toffel 2008). Strategy scholars agree with this 
assessment and use organizational theories, such as resource dependence and resource-based 
view, to show that firms have different organizational characteristics (e.g. resources, capabilities) 
and may have different needs (Bansal & Roth 2000, Banerjee et al. 2003, Gavronski et al. 2013, 
Gavronski et al. 2008, Paulraj 2009, Khanna & Anton 2002). These differences in resource 
endowments may result in firms responding differently to similar institutional and stakeholder 
pressures, even when interpreted objectively, leading to heterogeneity in EMP adoption among 
firms even within a common industry.  
In summary, our literature review indicates that heterogeneity in EMP adoption among firms 
is pervasive and has several unique underlying sources. These sources can be broadly grouped 
into temporality, firm-specific choices and characteristics, and industry membership. However, 
despite a large number of studies, there is no systematic examination of the sources of variation 
and their relative influence on adoption. Given that our aim is to empirically estimate the relative 
influence of the three sources on EMP adoption, we focus our literature review on the antecedents 
of EMP adoption and use theory in an ex post manner to explain whether institutional pressures or 
organizational characteristics explain more or less variation in EMP adoption.  
2.2.1 Sources of heterogeneity in EMP adoption  
Here, we briefly outline the motivation, gleaned from literature, for including each source of 
variation. 
Temporality: Conventional wisdom and empirical evidence indicates that EMP adoption by firms 
has increased significantly over time, likely because of increasing societal awareness and related 
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regulatory requirements. For instance, ISO 14000 certificates grew from less than 20,000 in 1999 
to over 250,000 in 2012 worldwide8 (Castka & Corbett 2015). Similarly, ISO 14001 penetration 
in UN member countries grew from 22% to 70% between 1996 and 2006, (Delmas & Montes-
Sancho 2011, p.109). Similar positive temporal trends have been observed in US firms (Su et al. 
2015). Thus, time should account for a substantial portion of the observed variation in EMP 
adoption between firms.  
Firm:  Stakeholder theory posits that the only responsibility of firm managers is to serve the 
interests of stakeholders (Freeman 1984). The resource-based-view of the firm (RBV; Barney 
1991) posits that firms realize competitive advantage by making decisions which combine 
resources and capabilities, which are heterogeneously distributed between firms, in unique ways. 
Taken together, we understand that stakeholders define success and firms realize success by 
making decisions which maximize existing resources and capabilities. The natural-resource-
based-view of the firm (Hart 1995) builds on RBV by pointing out that competitive advantage 
can also be realized by combining resources and capabilities in ways which reduce a firm’s 
impact on the natural environment, i.e. adopting EMPs. Thus, environmental stakeholders 
constitute a unique source of requirements and firms adopt EMPs in response to these 
requirements. But, while some environmental requirements are common to all firms in an 
industry (ex. regulation), other requirements are firm-specific, such as those emanating from 
investors, customers, local communities, and employees. Adoption choices made in response to 
these firm-specific requirements, as supported/constrained by existing resources and capabilities, 
should constitute a unique source of heterogeneity in EMP adoption between firms. 
Industry: As explained above, institutional pressures differ across industries, and firms belonging 
to different industries face different regulatory pressures. Research linking EMP adoption with 
regulation (Bansal & Roth 2000, Lampe et al. 1991, Lawrence & Morell 1995, Post 1994, 
Vredenburg & Westley 1993, Marcus & Geffen 1998) and competitive intensity (Hofer et al. 
2012, Marcus & Geffen 1998) clearly shows that these industry attributes impact EMP adoption. 
Although it is difficult to generalize the results of these studies, it is clear that industry attributes 
should explain some portion of the observed heterogeneity in EMP adoption. 
                                                          
8 http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_survey_executivesummary.pdf, last accessed November 18, 2013 
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2.2.2 Strategic factors 
Strategic factors are unique firm characteristics and industry attributes expected to impact EMP 
adoption, and as such, should help explain which specific aspects of the firm and industry 
contribute to variation in EMP adoption. To identify a robust set of strategic factors, we 
investigate both the EMP and innovation adoption literatures. We include the innovation adoption 
literature because EMPs are administrative and technological innovations (Damanpour 1987). 
The results of our review are summarized in Table 2.2. As can be seen, there is varying support 
for each characteristic, with firm size included in many studies and others less frequently.  
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Table 2.2 - Firm characteristics and industry attributes – Literature review 
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EMP Adoption Literature (empirical) 
  Hofer et al. (2012) EMPs ✓+ ✓- 
        
✓ 
     
 
Yang et al. (2011) EMPs ✓ 
 
✓+ 
             
 
Delmas & Toffel (2008) EMPs ✓+ 
               
 
Ruenda-Manzanares et 
al. (2008) 
EMPs 
✓ 
          
✓+ ✓- ✓ 
  
 
Zhang et al. (2008) EMPs ✓+ ✓ 
              
 
King et al. (2005) EMPs ✓+ 
 
✓ 
             
 
Christmann (2004) EMPs ✓ 
               
 
Anton et al. (2004) EMPs 
   
✓ ✓- 
           
 
Buysse & Verbeke 
(2003) 
EMPs 
✓+ 
               
 
Khanna & Anton (2002) EMPs 
   
✓+ ✓- 
     
✓ 
     
 
King & Lenox (2001) EMPs ✓+ 
 
✓+ 
             
 
Klassen (2001) EMPs ✓ 
  
  
           
 
Christmann & Taylor 
(2001) 
EMPs 
✓+ 
 
✓   
           
 
Klassen (2000) EMPs ✓+ 
 
   
           
 
Sharma (2000) EMPs ✓+ 
 
   
           
  Aragon-Correa (1998) EMPs ✓ 
               
Innovation Adoption Literature (theoretical + empirical) 
 
Jeyoraj et al. (2006) IT ✓+ 
    
✓ ✓ 
   
✓    
  
 
Frambach & 
Schillewaert (2002)  
✓ 
         
✓    
  
 
Damanpour & 
Gopalakrishnan (1998)                
✓ 
 
 
Grover et al. (1997) 
Tech and admin 
IT 
✓+ ✓ 
    
  
        
 
Capon et al. (1992) Mfg products 
 
  ✓+ 
  
  
  
   ✓+ 
 
✓ 
 
Damanpour (1991) 
Broad (meta-
analysis)       
✓ ✓+ 
        
 
Gatigon & Robertson 
(1989) 
High-tech 
          
✓+ ✓   
  
 
Dewar & Dutton (1986) 
Footwear/food 
processing 
✓+ 
      
✓+ 
        
 
Hambrick & McMillon 
(1985) 
Mfg products 
   
✓+   
  
✓+ 
    
✓+ 
  
 
Ettlie (1983) Food industry ✓+ 
          
✓+   
  
  Kimberly & Evanisko 
(1981) 
Healthcare ✓+ 
         
✓+    
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2.2.2.1 Firm level strategic factors 
Firm size: The influence of firm size on firm behavior, performance, and structure is pervasive 
and has been identified in relation to the adoption of administrative and technological innovations 
in industries as diverse as hospitals (Moch 1976), education (Baldrige & Burnham 1975), and 
manufacturing (Ettlie et al. 1984). While theoretical arguments supporting either a negative or 
positive relationship are found in literature, empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports a 
positive association between size and adoption. Authors have noted that structural inertial forces 
associated with bureaucracies in large organizations (Hannan & Freeman 1984) negatively impact 
adoption and the inertial effect of size is found to be more prevalent in manufacturing industries 
than service industries (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour 1997). However, large size also implies 
availability of both capital and human resources, attributes expected to be positively related to 
EMP adoption (see discussion below). In addition, relative to EMPs in particular, larger firms 
may be more visible to the public and thus experience greater pressure to adopt (Brammer & 
Millington 2006, Bowen 2000). Given the overwhelming support for a positive association 
between firm size and adoption, we expect to see a positive relationship between firm size and 
EMP adoption. 
Profitability: The adoption of EMPs may require significant financial investment (Hart & Ahuja 
1996, Tate et al. 2010) and is associated with uncertain short- and long-term financial returns 
(King & Lenox 2001, 2002). Due to greater financial stability over time, more profitable firms 
should better positioned to make the required financial investments and withstand the uncertain 
financial returns associated with EMP adoption. Thus, we expect to see a positive relationship 
between profitability and EMP adoption. 
Financial resource availability (financial slack): Beyond having the financial stability to absorb 
uncertain investment returns over time, it is reasonable to posit that slack financial resources may 
be required to successfully implement EMPs. In this context, slack is defined as “resources an 
organization has beyond what it minimally requires to maintain operations” (Damanpour 1991). 
Such resources have been shown to support the implementation of organizational innovation 
(Damanpour 1991, Jeyaraj et al. 2006, Bourgeois 1981, Chakravarthy 1982), among other 
benefits. Since capital investment is required for the adoption of some EMPs (Hart & Ahuja 
1996, Tate et al. 2010), we expect financial slack to be positively related to EMP adoption. 
Labor resource availability (labor slack): Available and skilled labor is also required to 
implement EMPs, such as the labor needed to manage process and technical changes, conduct 
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risk assessments and training, manage scorecards and performance, and participate in extra-
organizational partnerships. As such, the presence of readily available labor should be positively 
associated with EMP adoption. 
Quality management system (QMS) adoption: Evidence suggests that prior adoption of a QMS, 
such as lean, TQM or Six Sigma, will be positively associated with the adoption of EMP’s. 
Quality improvement professionals leverage continuous improvement and process improvement 
techniques to eliminate system waste harmful to quality performance. These same approaches are 
used by environmental practitioners to reduce system waste harmful to the natural environment. 
While their underlying motive for eliminating waste may be different, to improve system quality 
and reduce environmental impact respectively, the improvement methods, program goals, and 
program benefits overlap. Due to such complementarities, or possibly because of a shared culture 
focused on eliminating waste, implementing a QMS may accelerate efforts to improve 
environmental performance through the adoption of EMPs. In fact, Yang et al. (2011) find such a 
relationship between the implementation of lean and EMP adoption.  
ISO 9000 adoption: We also expect that prior implementation of a management standard, such as 
ISO 9000, will be positively associated with EMP adoption. The set of EMPs a firm adopts 
collectively functions as a firm’s environmental management system (Anton et al. 2004, Khanna 
& Anton 2002, Montabon et al. 2000). Environmental management systems (EMSs), such as ISO 
14000, are tasked to identify obstacles to better environmental performance and implement 
remedies. Researchers have shown that prior adoption of ISO 9000 is positively associated with 
ISO 14000 adoption. They explain this relationship by noting that prior experience with ISO 9000 
removes uncertainty related to the relevance and value of ISO 14000 (Albuquerque et al. 2007) 
and that similar structures, motives, and economies of scope between the two standards explain 
the positive relationship (Delmas and Montiel 2008). Given the proven relationship between ISO 
9000 and ISO 14000, we expect to see a positive relationship between prior ISO 9000 adoption 
and current EMP adoption because ISO 9000 adoption removes uncertainty associated with, and 
value derived from, implementing an EMS comprised of adopted EMPs. 
2.2.2.2 Industry level strategic factors 
Environmental Risk: Production processes are relatively similar within an industry and different 
across industries. In fact, such similarities and differences form the basis of the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system used extensively by researchers to define industries (King 
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et al. 2005, King & Lenox 2001). Given the logical connection between production process type 
and environmental impact, the risk a firm presents to the natural environmental should be 
relatively homogenous within an industry and heterogeneous between industries. For instance, 
firms in mining and chemical industries pose a greater pollution risk to the air, water and soil than 
firms in automotive or food industries. Environmental risk garners attention from environmental 
stakeholders, such as regulators and NGO’s, who in turn exert influence to manage emissions 
through legislation, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Regulatory pressure has 
been shown to positively impact EMP adoption (Bansal & Roth 2000, Lampe et al. 1991, Khanna 
& Anton 2002). As such, environmental risk should be positively related to EMP adoption. 
Competition: The relationship between competition and EMP adoption has mixed support in the 
literature. Hofer et al. (2012) find that competitive rivalry between market leaders drives 
increased EMP adoption. Gatignon and Robertson (1989) find that firms in highly competitive 
industries may adopt to “keep up” with their competition to avoid a competitive disadvantage. 
However, other investigations have been inconclusive (Khanna & Anton 2002). Given this 
ambiguity, the relationship between competition and EMP adoption is not clear. Because we 
include other potential confounding factors in our model, such as environmental risk, our study 
should be able to more accurately assess the effect of competition on EMP adoption. 
Environmental uncertainty: Uncertainty in the firm’s external competitive environment has been 
shown to impact firm strategic (Keats & Hitt 1988, Kim & Lee 1988, Ward & Duray 2000) and 
operational decisions (Anand & Ward 2004). It is reasonable to extend this logic and argue that 
environmental uncertainty may influence EMP adoption decisions as well. In this study, we 
examine three dimensions frequently used to conceptualize environmental uncertainty: 
munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Dess & Beard 1984). 
Munificence is defined as the extent to which an environment can support sustained growth. 
Industry growth supports the generation of financial slack (Cyert & March 1963), which in turn 
supports the implementation of organizational innovation, among other benefits (Bourgeois 1981, 
Chakravarthy 1982). Damanpour (1987) empirically tests this relationship and finds a significant 
positive relationship with technological innovation, but not with administrative or ancillary 
innovation, which were positive but not statistically significant. This result seems logical as 
technical innovations require greater capital investments than administrative or ancillary 
innovations. Relative to EMPs, while the implementation of many EMPs requires only available 
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labor, others require some level of capital investment. As such, we expect to see a positive 
relationship between industry munificence and EMP adoption. 
Dynamism refers to the degree of instability in an industry, resulting from the rate and 
unpredictability of change in products, technologies, and demand for products (Dess & Beard 
1984). Dynamism increases uncertainty in decision making and has been shown to support 
competitive strategies based on differentiation (Ward & Duray 2000). Thus, to the extent that an 
industry is predominately populated by firms pursuing differentiation strategies, and to the extent 
that EMP adoption can enhance that differentiation, a positive relationship between dynamism 
and EMP adoption will be expected. In all other industries, we would not expect to see a 
relationship between dynamism and EMP adoption. 
Complexity refers to heterogeneity in the number, diversity, and distribution of task-environment 
elements for an industry (Aldrich 1979, Dess & Beard 1984). In this conceptualization, increased 
complexity implies an increase in an organizational requirement to process information. Thus, to 
the extent that EMP’s support information processing, a positive association would be expected 
between industry complexity and EMP adoption. Unfortunately, as a whole, EMP’s do not 
support information processing. While some EMP’s, such as the creation of an environmental 
management team or increased environmental training, may improve the ability to process certain 
environmental decisions, such decisions constitute an insignificant portion of total decision 
making within an organization. As such, we would not expect industry complexity to be 
associated with EMP adoption. 
2.3 Data and Research Method 
2.3.1 Data and sample 
We investigate EMP adoption in U.S. firms using data from several sources, including Compustat 
and two Thomson Reuter’s databases, ASSET4 and Worldscope. ASSET4, used previously in 
related academic research (Ioannou & Serefeim 2012, Cheng et al. 2014, Eccles et al. 2014), 
provides annualized data on EMP adoption (our dependent variable), ISO 9000 adoption, and 
quality management system (QMS) adoption. Worldscope, a global financial and economic 
database used previously by researchers (Hawn & Ioannou, 2016; Ioannou and Serefeim, 2012), 
is used to develop several firm measures, including size, profitability, and resource availability 
(financial and labor). Compustat provides industry data used to develop measures of munificence, 
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dynamism, complexity, and competition and data from First for Sustainability, an initiative of the 
International Finance Corporation, is used to develop a measure of industry environmental risk.  
The data covers the years 2002-2013. Because new firms enter the panel each year, the panel 
is unbalanced. The unit of analysis is firm-year. We evaluate only U.S. firms to avoid potential 
heterogeneity in EMP adoption due to differences in the way countries may value environmental 
issues, and public firms, because financial information for such firms is federally mandated and 
readily available. Industries are defined by 4-digit SIC codes.9 Our final sample includes 880 
firms from 258 industries and 8 sectors representing the full spectrum of U.S. economic activity.  
2.3.2 Research method 
We use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to evaluate our research hypotheses.10 In our data, 
measures of EMP adoption over time are uniquely nested within firms, which are uniquely nested 
within industries. The nested structure implies that observations across levels are not independent, 
i.e. while EMP adoption over time is likely to be more similar within a specific firm, it may vary 
systematically across firms within a common industry. In essence, our data has three 
hierarchically embedded levels and HLM is particularly suited to analyze such a data structure. It 
allows us to fully address non-independence between levels and at the same time assesses the 
relative importance of each level (Misangyi et al. 2006, Bryk & Raudenbush 1992). Other 
approaches used to analyze nested data include variance components analysis (VCA) and analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). However, these methods assume independence between observations, an 
assumption violated in our data. HLM has been used in diverse settings, such as education (Lee 
2000), healthcare (McDermott & Stock 2011) and business (Misangyi et al. 2006), and our 
empirical approach draws heavily upon these studies.  
2.3.3 Variable measurement 
2.3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
EMP adoption measures the extent of a firm’s environmental management activity and is 
operationalized as a ratio of the EMPs a firm adopts in a given year to the number of EMPs the 
firm could have adopted. An EMP is defined as any “activity undertaken by a firm to reduce the 
impact of their operations, or supply chain, on the natural environment.” This definition is 
                                                          
9 https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html 
10 All analyses were completed using R, version 3.3.1 
. 
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similar to Montabon et al.’s (2007) definition, but slightly more inclusive to reflect the views of 
other authors who consider EMPs to include activities beyond his definition (e.g. Hofer et al. 
2012, Anton et al 2004, Klassen 2001). Prior studies have operationalized EMP adoption using a 
single item, such as ISO 14000 (Delmas and Toffel 2008, King & Lenox 2001), a single, multi-
item construct (Ruenda-Manzanares et al. 2008, Christmann 2004), several multi-item constructs 
(Sarkis et al. 2010, Klassen 2001) or a count of environmental management practices (Anton et 
al. 2004, Khanna & Anton 2002), where the largest set of EMPs included 33 practices. We 
calculate a ratio because it effectively captures the broad differences in environmental activity 
across firms, while supporting accurate comparisons between firms. Our full EMP evaluation set 
consists of 50 practices which capture the wide variety of activities firm undertake to manage 
their environmental impact. In developing this set, we identified practices which matched our 
adopted definition and had limited or no missing data. The number of EMPs a firm could have 
adopted was established by 4-digit SIC industry. If at least one firm in an industry adopted a 
particular EMP, it was included in the set of available EMPs for all firms in that industry. 
2.3.3.2 Sources of heterogeneity 
Temporality: Captures the ability of time to explain heterogeneity in EMP adoption between 
firms. Because temporal variation could include both longitudinal year-over-year changes and 
cross-sectional within-year changes, we estimate the effect of each of these “temporal” effects 
separately (Misangyi et al. 2006). We label year-over-year effect as “time”, and within-year 
fluctuation in adoption as “year”.  
Firm:  Captures the explanatory power of firm-specific choices, made in response to stakeholder 
pressure and supported/constrained by available resources and capabilities, to explain 
heterogeneity in EMP adoption between firms. Firm actions, i.e. EMP adoption, are measured at 
the corporate level because decision making relative to EMP adoption is often the result of 
corporate directives. 
Industry:  Captures the ability of industry attributes to explain heterogeneity in EMP adoption 
between industries. We operationalize industry using 4-digit SIC codes, an approach shown by 
previous environmental researchers to capture unique aspects of the industry which may be 
relevant to EMP adoption, such as regulation and competition (King et al. 2005, King & Lenox 
2001).  
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2.3.3.3 Firm level strategic factors 
Firm size: We measure firm size as the natural log of net sales (Hofer et al. 2012, Delmas & 
Toffel 2008). As robustness checks, we also measure firm size as the natural log of total 
employees (King et al. 2005, King & Lenox 2001) and natural log of total assets (Zhang et al. 
2008). To control for fundamental differences in firm size across industries, we normalize each 
variable in a given year across all firms in the same industry (Modi & Mishra 2011).  
Profitability:  We measure profitability as the natural log of return on assets (Zhang et al. 2008). 
As a robustness check, we also measure profitability as the natural log of return on sales (Hofer et 
al. 2012). To control for fundamental differences in profitability across industries, we normalize 
each variable in a given year across all firms in the same industry (Modi & Mishra 2011). Since 
there could be a delay in how profitability influences EMP adoption, i.e. profitability in period t-1 
may impact EMP adoption in period t, we evaluate both a lagged and unlagged relationship. Both 
approaches produce similar results. We present only the lagged results in result tables. 
Financial resource availability (financial slack): Measures financial assets readily available for 
investment in EMP adoption. This conceptualization of financial slack has been called available 
or unabsorbed slack by researchers and operationalized using the current ratio, i.e. total 
assets/total liabilities (Chandler 2008, Geiger & Cashen 2002, Singh 1986). As a robustness 
check, we also conceptualize financial slack as recoverable or absorbed slack, which are excess 
costs of the firm that can be utilized to take advantage of new opportunities (Bourgeois & Singh 
1983). It is measured as selling, general and administrative expense (SG&A) divided by net sales 
(Bourgeois & Singh 1983, Gieger & Cashen 2002, Bromiley 1991). To control for fundamental 
differences in capital requirements across industries, we normalize each variable in a given year 
across all firms in the same industry (Modi & Mishra 2011). 
Labor resource availability (labor slack):  Measures labor resources readily availability to 
support EMP adoption. This firm characteristic has been termed labor intensity in the literature 
and operationalized as total employees/total assets (Dewenter & Malatesta 2001) and total 
employees/net sales (Dewenter & Malatesta 2001, Norton 1988, Trostel & Nichols 1982). We 
include the latter operationalization in result tables but evaluate the former as a robustness check. 
To control for fundamental differences in labor requirements across industries, we normalize each 
variable in a given year across all firms in the same industry (Modi & Mishra 2011). 
Quality Management System (QMS) adoption: Measures whether the firm has adopted and is 
actively using lean, total quality management (TQM), or Six Sigma. It is operationalized as a 
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binary measure (0 = no, 1 = yes). Since we expect a delay in the impact of QMS adoption on 
EMP adoption, we match QMS adoption in period t-1 with EMP adoption in period t. 
ISO 9000 adoption: Measures whether the firm has implemented and is using ISO 9000. It is 
operationalized as a binary measure (0 = no, 1 = yes). Since we expect a delay in the impact of 
ISO 9000 adoption on EMP adoption, we match ISO 9000 adoption in period t-1 with EMP 
adoption in period t. 
2.3.3.4 Industry level strategic factors 
Environmental risk:  Measures the level of risk an industry presents to the natural environment, 
and by proxy, the level of attention an industry receives from environmental stakeholders, such as 
regulators and NGO’s. It is operationalized as low/medium/high by using the environmental and 
social risk assessments completed by First for Sustainability (FFS), an initiative of the 
International Finance Corporation.11 FFS completes these assessments to support financial 
institutions in managing environmental and social risks associated with their investments. The 
assessments are completed at a macro-industry level and are mapped manually by the authors to 
the industries used in the current study. 
Competition:  Measures the relative level of competition in an industry and is operationalized 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (Hofer et al. 2012, Khanna & Anton 2002). High 
industry concentration (high HHI) indicates that market leadership (share) is concentrated within 
a relatively small group of firms and implies low competitive rivalry. 
Munificence:  Munificence is defined as the extent to which an industry can support sustained 
growth. It is operationalized per Keats & Hitt (1988), using gross revenue as a measure of growth 
and calculated for the 5-year period immediately preceding, and including, the year of analysis.  
Dynamism: Dynamism is the degree of instability in an industry, such as in products, 
technologies, and demand for products, that is difficult to predict (Dess & Beard 1984). It is 
operationalized per Keats & Hitt (1988), using volatility in gross revenue and calculated for the 5-
year period immediately preceding, and including, the year of analysis.  
Complexity: represents the heterogeneity in the number, diversity, and distribution of task-
environment elements for an industry (Aldrich 1979, Dess & Beard 1984). It is operationalized 
per Keats & Hitt (1988) and calculated for the 5-year period immediately preceding, and 
including, the year of analysis.  
                                                          
11 See www.firstforsustainability.org for the actual assessments. 
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2.3.4 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. In examining the 
correlations, we find that measures of firm size, profitability, labor availability, and prior 
adoption of management practices are positively correlated with EMP adoption. This suggests 
that large and more profitable firms, and firms with available labor and prior adoption experience, 
are likely to adopt more EMPs. In contrast, slack financial resources are not correlated with EMP 
adoption, suggesting that available capital may not be a necessary prerequisite to adoption. 
Relative to industry attributes, we see that environmental risk, competition, and munificence are 
positively correlated, and complexity is negatively correlated, with EMP adoption. The results 
suggest that adoption may increase in industries which pose a greater risk to the environment, are 
more competitive, are more munificent, and/or are less complex. 
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Table 2.3 - Descriptive statistics 
  Label Description Measurement Min Max Mean St. Dev. 
Dependent variable            
 
EMP EMP Adoption 
Fraction of applicable EMPs adopted by a firm in time period  
t, for firm i, in industry j and sector k 
0.00 0.98 0.23 0.25 
Firm characteristics            
 
firmSIZE_1 Net sales Natural log of net sales/revenues 3.91 19.98 14.95 1.69 
 
firmSIZE_2 Total employees Natural log of total employees 2.95 14.60 8.86 1.79 
 
firmSIZE_3 Total assets Natural log of total assets 4.86 20.84 15.53 1.63 
 
firmPRFT_1 Return on Assets Return on assets (prior year) -84.96 88.87 6.73 9.52 
 
firmPRFT_2 Return on Equity Return on equity (prior year) -372.45 643.55 15.78 43.66 
 
firmPRFT_3 Operating Margin Operating margin (prior year) -270.54 350.34 15.57 18.34 
 
firmCAP_1 Available slack Current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) 0.28 20.50 2.00 1.50 
 
firmCAP_2 Recoverable slack SG&A/annual sales 0.15 6.49 0.25 0.25 
 
firmLBR Labor Intensity Total employees/total assets 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 
 
firmISO ISO 9000 adoption Adoption of ISO 9000 (prior year) 0 1 0.20 0.33 
 
firmQMS QMS adoption Adoption of a Quality Management System (prior year) 0 1 0.17 0.32 
Industry attributes           
 
indRISK Environmental risk Environmental & social risk connected to an industry 0 2 0.91 0.92 
 
indCOMPT Competition Industry concentration (high concentration = low competition) 117.89 7394.04 1694.46 1199.57 
 
indMUN Munificence Ability of industry to support sustained growth 0.62 1.55 1.05 0.07 
 
indDYN Dynamism Unpredictability of environmental change 1.00 1.36 1.03 0.02 
  indCOMPX Complexity Heterogeneity in task environment elements 0.08 4.09 0.98 0.29 
 
 
  
30 
 
Table 2.4 - Correlations for all variables used in the study 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Dependent variable                                  
1 EMP 1 
                Firm characteristics                                  
2 firmSIZE_1 0.50* 1 
               3 firmSIZE_2 0.42* 0.78* 1 
              4 firmSIZE_3 0.40* 0.86* 0.55* 1 
             5 firmPRFT_1 0.08* 0.16* 0.14* 0.05 1                         
6 firmPRFT_2 0.06* 0.09* 0.07* 0.02 0.23* 1 
           7 firmPRFT_3 0.09* 0.11* 0.02 0.07* 0.13* 0.09* 1                     
8 firmCAP_1 0.12 0.36* 0.28* 0.35* 0.03 -0.02 -0.07* 1 
         9 firmCAP_2 0.10 0.29* 0.12* 0.20* -0.19* -0.07* -0.31* 0.22* 1 
        10 firmLBR 0.08* 0.05* 0.6* -0.34* 0.09* 0.05* -0.02 0.02 0.06 1               
11 firmISO 0.24* -0.06* -0.03* -0.10* 0.05* 0.02* 0.03* 0.19* -0.04 0.06 1 
      12 firmQMS 0.32* 0.11* 0.14* 0.08* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.24* 1           
Industry attributes                                 
13 indRISK 0.21* -0.02 -0.31* 0.07* -0.09 -0.05* -0.02 0.10* -0.14* -0.42* 0.22* 0.20* 1 
    14 indCOMPT 0.05* 0.10* 0.24* -0.05* 0.04* 0.02 0.01 -0.03* -0.06* 0.32* 0.05 0.10 -0.20* 1 
   15 indMUN 0.09* 0.01 -0.06* -0.01 0.12* 0.08* -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.06* 0.02* -0.05* 0.09* -0.06* 1 
  16 indDYN -0.00 -0.07* -0.21* -0.02 -0.07* -0.03* 0.02 0.02 -0.16* -0.21* 0.08 0.02 0.23* 0.07* -0.32* 1 
 17 indCOMPX -0.02* -0.04* 0.02 -0.05* 0.03 -0.03* 0.03 0.04* 0.02 0.07* 0.06* 0.01 -0.04* 0.16* -0.20* 0.03 1 
* p < 0.05  
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2.4 Data Analysis and Results 
We conduct our investigation in two parts using HLM; (1) a multilevel analysis and (2) a strategic 
factor analysis. In the multilevel analysis, we quantify the contribution of temporality (year + 
time), firm-unique choices and characteristics, and industry membership to explaining 
heterogeneity in EMP adoption. In the strategic factor analysis, we explore the relationship 
between specific firm characteristics and industry attributes, and EMP adoption.  
2.4.1 Multilevel analysis 
Following the approach taken by Misangyi et al. (2006), we conduct this analysis in two steps. 
We first partition observed variation in EMP adoption into the three nested levels of the data 
hierarchy, i.e. temporal, firm, and industry (Levels 1, 2, and 3 in HLM vernacular) and then 
partition the temporal (Level 1) variation into its constituent parts, i.e. “time” (year-over-year 
component) and “year” (within-year component). The final analysis thus allocates variation in 
EMP adoption across four unique sources; year, time, firm, and industry.  
In step one, we estimate a series of ‘unconstrained’ (no predictors) equations. In the Level 1 
analysis, firm EMP adoption at each time period is modeled as a function of mean EMP adoption 
for the firm across all time periods, plus a random error: 
Ytij = Π0ij + etij (1a) 
where the indices t, i, and j denote time, firm, and industry respectively. There are 
t = 1, 2,…, Tij time periods within firm i and industry j; 
i = 1, 2, …, Ij firms within industry j; 
j = 1, 2, …, J industries in the sample; and  
 
where Ytij is EMP adoption in period t, for firm i, within industry j; Π0ij is the mean EMP 
adoption across the entire panel for firm i within industry j; and etij is the time-level random error, 
which captures variance across time. The model assumes etij is normally distributed with a mean 
of 0 and a variance of σ2. 
 
At Level 2, mean EMP adoption over time for a specific firm, Π0ij (from equation 1a), is 
modeled as the dependent variable, varying randomly around some industry mean: 
Π0ij = β00j + rij (1b) 
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where β00j is mean industry adoption for industry j. The error term, rij, represents variation 
between firms within a specific industry and is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 
0 and a variance of τΠ. 
 
At Level 3, mean EMP adoption for an industry, β00j (from equation 1b), is modeled as the 
dependent variable, varying randomly around the grand mean: 
β00j = γ000 + μj (1c) 
where γ000 is the grand mean for EMP adoption. The error term, μj, represents variation between 
industries and is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of τβ. 
 
After performing chi-square tests to establish that σ2, τΠ, and τβ are statistically significant, we 
calculate the contribution of each source to explaining heterogeneity in EMP adoption as follows;  
(1) temporality = σ2/( σ2 + τΠ + τβ) 
(2) firm = τΠ/( σ2 + τΠ + τβ) 
(3) industry = τβ/( σ2 + τΠ + τβ) 
 
In step two, we partition temporal variation into ‘time’ and ‘year’ components by 
incorporating year dummies in the temporal level of analysis as shown in equation 2. 
Ytij = Π0ij + Π1ij(Year)1ij + etij   (2) 
Π0ij = β00j + rij  
β00j = γ000 + μj 
 
where Π1ij represents Year effects and Year is a matrix of dummy variables coded for each year in 
the study for firm i within each industry j. Π0ij now represents mean EMP adoption (across time) 
for firm i within industry j, after controlling for the effect of Year, and etij is the variance across 
time remaining after controlling for Year effects. This revised model assumes etij is normally 
distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of τΠΠ. β00j, γ000, rij, and μj, are all as described 
previously. After estimating equation 2, we calculate the variance explanation attributable to 
‘year’ as; σ2 - τΠΠ/( σ2 + τΠ + τβ). We then calculate the variance explanation attributable to ‘time’ 
by subtracting ‘year’ from the total temporal variation observed in the unconstrained model, i.e. 
time (%) = temporal (%) - year (%).  
The results from estimating Equations 1a – 1c are presented in top panel of Table 2.5. We 
find that temporality accounts for 40.0% of the total observed variation in EMP adoption, 
whereas firms and industries account for 25.7%, and 34.3% respectively. Our analysis using 
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Equation 2 shows that ‘year’ and ‘time’ account for 8.6% and 31.4% of the total temporal 
variation respectively. The summarized results are presented in bottom panel of Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 - Allocating variance in EMP adoption using multi-level analysisa 
    Variance   d.f. Chi-sq 
Unconditional Model         
  Level 1 variance (across time)  0.0291       
  Level 2 variance (between firms) 0.0187 *** 879 5728.9 
  Level 3 variance (between industries) 0.0249 *** 257 553.8 
            
  Percentage of total variance across time 40.03%       
  Percentage of total variance between firms 25.72%       
  Percentage of total variance between industries 34.25%       
            
Model Incorporating Year Effects at Level 1         
  Level 1 variance (across time)  0.0046       
  Level 2 variance (between firms) 0.0225 *** 879 4609.1 
  Level 3 variance (between industries) 0.0261 *** 257 429.9 
            
  Total variance explained by year effects 8.65%       
a Significant at *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.1 
 
Variance explained (by category)a 
Time 31.4% (28.8%) 
Year 8.6% (15.1%) 
Firm 25.7% (26.0%) 
Industry 34.3% (30.1%) 
a Importance of effects may not be linearly related to the percentage of variance explained. As such, we compute 
relative importance using the square roots of the variance estimates following Brush and Bromiley (1997) approach. 
The results are provided in brackets. 
2.4.2 Strategic factor analysis 
We next explore which theoretically relevant firm and industry level strategic factors influence 
EMP adoption. Determining into which HLM equation 1(a) – 1(c) each strategic factor should be 
entered is a function of whether the strategic factor represents a firm characteristic or an industry 
attribute and whether it varies over time, varies cross-sectionally (across firms or industries), or 
varies both over time and cross-sectionally. To determine whether the strategic factor varies over 
time, cross-sectionally or both, we follow Misangyi et al. (2006) and use inter-class correlation 
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(ICC). ICC is computed as the ratio of cross-sectional variance to total variance, with total 
variance being the sum of variance over time and cross-sectional variance (James 1982, Bleise 
2000). If a strategic factor varies primarily over time (i.e. low ICC score), we refer to it as 
“transient” and enter into equation 1(a). If a strategic factor displays primarily cross-sectional 
variance (i.e. high ICC score), we refer to it as “stable” and enter it into either equation 1(b) or 
1(c), depending on whether it represents a firm characteristic or industry attribute respectively. If 
a strategic factor exhibits both transient and stable variation (moderate ICC score), it is entered 
into equation 1(a) and either 1(b) or 1(c). To classify strategic factors as transient, stable or both, 
we use the same cutoffs for ICC scores as previous researchers: variables with ICC scores of 0.10 
or less are treated as transient, 0.70 and above as stable, and between 0.10 and 0.70 as both 
(Misangyi et al. 2006). Results from the ICC analysis are provided in Table 2.6, where the last 
column shows how each factor was included within the strategic factor analysis. 
Table 2.6 - Transient and stable variation (ICC analysis) 
 
Variance 
over time 
(A)1 
Cross-
sectional 
variance (B)2 
ICC3 
(B/A+B) 
Factor 
type4 
Firm characteristics 
    
 
firmSIZE_1 75.054*** 28.875*** 0.278 Both 
 
firmPRFT_1 11.254*** 7.384*** 0.395 Both 
 
firmCAP_1 3.891+ 27.850*** 0.877 Stable 
 
firmLBR 7.379* 29.455*** 0.800 Stable 
 
firmISO 0.234** 0.801*** 0.774 Stable 
 
firmQMS 0.218** 0.699*** 0.763 Stable 
Industry attributes 
  
  
 
 
indRISK 0.014 55.576*** 0.999 Stable 
 
indCOMPT 0.010** 0.810*** 0.987 Stable 
 
indMUN 0.483*** 0.108*** 0.182 Both 
 
indDYN 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.464 Both 
  indCOMPX 0.525*** 1.794*** 0.774 Stable 
a Significant at *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.1; p-values are based on chi-square distribution  
1Variation in the subject variable across the years in the panel (Misangyi et al. 2006) 
2Variation in the subject variable within year, across the aggregate level of analysis (Misangyi et al. 2006) 
3Inter-class correlation analysis (James 1982, Bleise 2000) 
4Both = Stable & Transient. 
The following equations summarize the prior discussion and are evaluated using HLM to 
complete the strategic factor analysis: 
Ytij = Π0ij + Π1ij(firm_SIZE) + Π2ij(firmPRFT) + Π3ij(indMUN)  
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 + Π4ij(Dynamism) + etij (3a) 
Π0ij = β00j + β01j(firm_SIZE) + β02j(firmPRFT) + β03j(firmCAP) + β04j(firmLBR) 
 + β05j(firmISO) + β06j(firmQMS) + rij (3b) 
β00j = γ000 + γ001(indMUN) + γ002(indDYN) + γ003(indCOMPX) + γ004(indCOMPT)  
+ γ005(indRISK) + μj (3c) 
 
In this model, the intercept of equation 3a, Π0ij, represents mean adoption for firm i within 
industry j, adjusted for the effect of time-level predictors of EMP adoption. The intercept of 
equation 3b, β00j, represents mean industry adoption for industry j, adjusted for the effect of firm-
level predictors of EMP adoption. The intercept of equation 3c, γ000, represents the grand mean, 
adjusted for the effect of industry-level predictors of EMP adoption. Ytij is as described 
previously. Each level of analysis also has its own unique random error term, as before: etij 
represents across-time residual; rij represents across-firm residual; and μj represents across-
industry residual.  
Results from estimating Equations 3a – 3c are provided in Table 2.7, where each section 
represents a level in the nested hierarchy and shows how strategic factors at that level explain 
variation in EMP adoption at that level. The columns show the incremental change as blocks of 
factors are entered in a stepwise manner. For ease, we interpret only the coefficients of the 
complete model provided in Column 3. The first section (Level 1) shows which transient factors 
explain variation in EMP adoption. The second section (Level 2) shows which stable firm factors 
explain variation in EMP adoption. The third section (Level 3) shows which stable industry 
factors explain variation in EMP adoption. 
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Table 2.7 - Strategic factor analysis 
  Model   1     2     3   
Level 1 (Temporal)   
 
    
 
    
  
 
(Intercept) 0.22 (0.01) *** 0.18 (0.01) *** 0.26 (0.02) *** 
 
firmSIZE_1 0.13 (0.00) *** 0.13 (0.01) *** 0.14 (0.01) *** 
 
firmPRFT_1 0.01 (0.00) + 0.00 (0.00)   0.00 (0.00) 
 
 
indMUN -0.44 (0.05) *** -0.47 (0.05) *** -0.44 (0.06) *** 
 
indDYN -0.24 (0.16)   -0.30 (0.15) * -0.24 (0.12) * 
Level 2 (Firm)                   
 
firmSIZE_1   
 
  0.04 (0.01) *** 0.04 (0.01) *** 
 
firmPRFT_1   
 
  0.01 (0.00) * 0.01 (0.00) * 
 
firmCAP_1   
 
  0.00 (0.00)   0.00 (0.00) 
 
 
firmLBR   
 
  0.02 (0.00) *** 0.02 (0.00) *** 
 
firmISO   
 
  0.08 (0.01) *** 0.06 (0.01) *** 
 
firmQMS   
 
  0.22 (0.01) *** 0.14 (0.01) *** 
Level 3 (Industry)                   
 
indRISK   
 
    
 
  0.06 (0.00) *** 
 
indCOMPT   
 
    
 
  0.00 (0.00) *** 
 
indMUN   
 
    
 
  -0.40 (0.10) *** 
 
indDYN   
 
    
 
  -1.45 (0.31) *** 
 
indCOMPX   
 
    
 
  -0.08 (0.02) *** 
Variance Components                   
Level 1(Time)   0.03 ***   0.03 ***   0.03 *** 
Level 2(Firm)   0.02 ***   0.02 ***   0.02 *** 
Level 3(Industry)   0.02 ***   0.02 ***   0.02 *** 
  Sample Size (N)   7152     7152     7152   
  F-Statistic   301.3 ***   192.1 ***   143.2 *** 
Significant at *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.1; p-values are based on chi-square distribution. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses 
Firm and industry variables are aggregated at the firm and industry level, respectively, before entering the model. 
Temporal level variables are not aggregated. 
Level 1 results show that firm size is positively associated, and industry munificence is 
negatively associated, with EMP adoption over time. These results imply that increases in firm 
size and decreases in industry munificence over time are associated with increases in EMP 
adoption. Level 2 results show that with the exception of capital availability (firmCAP_1), all 
firm characteristics are positively associated with EMP adoption. Level 3 results show that 
industry environmental risk and competition are positively associated, and munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity are negatively associated, with EMP adoption. With the exception of 
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the negative industry relationships, results are generally aligned with our expectations, as 
discussed previously. We discuss these results further in the Discussion section. 
2.4.3 Post hoc analysis 
Prior researchers have shown that EMPs can vary in purpose and performance impact (Klassen & 
Whybark 1999, Montabon et al. 2007). Such differences may impact adoption decisions and 
could mean that conclusions depend on the type of EMP. We thus repeat our multilevel analyses 
by type of EMP. To capture and isolate the impact of these differences in past research studies, 
researchers created EMP categorization schemes. Examples include whether the EMP addresses 
pollution prevention, pollution control or product stewardship (Hart 1995, Bansal 2005), 
addresses pollution prevention, pollution control or a management system (Klassen & Whybark 
1999), or whether it is directed externally or internally (Matten & Moon 2008). One useful 
scheme that has been used in prior research categorizes EMPs as operational, tactical or strategic 
(Montabon et al. 2007, Hofer et al. 2012). Operational practices are internally focused and 
generally pertain to firm operations. Tactical practices fall between operational and strategic 
practices and can be internally or externally focused. Strategic practices are usually externally 
focused and define a firm’s environmental posture to key stakeholders. Results from the post hoc 
analysis are reported in Table 2.8. As can be seen, significant differences exist between types of 
EMPs, with respect to the power of temporality (Time + Year), firm, and industry to explain 
variation in adoption. Firm-unique choices and characteristics primarily explain the adoption of 
operational practices, temporality primarily explains the adoption of tactical practices, and 
industry primarily explains the adoption of strategic practices. These results are discussed in 
greater detail in the Discussion section. 
Table 2.8 - Variance explained (by category and Type of EMP)a, b  
  Combined Operational Tactical Strategic 
Time 31.4% 22.1% 39.8% 19.1% 
Year 8.6% 6.3% 12.0% 7.8% 
Firm 25.7% 42.8% 17.9% 25.1% 
Industry 34.3% 28.8% 30.4% 48.0% 
 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we first identified unique sources of heterogeneity in EMP adoption across firms 
and examined their relative importance. We subsequently tested which firm characteristics and 
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industry attributes contribute to explaining the heterogeneity. In the sections below, we highlight 
the contributions of our results and underscore their importance to theory, practicing managers, 
and regulatory agencies. 
2.5.1 Discussion 
Our study makes four important contributions. First, we empirically examine an implicit but 
untested observation that EMP adoption varies among firms, and this variation may have distinct, 
unique sources. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to broadly test the accepted 
conventional wisdom that heterogeneity in EMP adoption has distinct sources. The results from 
empirical analysis show that temporality, firm-unique choices and characteristics, and industry 
membership account for 40.0%, 25.7%, and 34.3% respectively of the aggregate variance in EMP 
adoption. In addition to determining relative importance of each source based on total variance, 
we evaluate relative importance using Brush and Bromiley’s (1997) approach, who argue that 
using the square roots of the estimated variances provides a more accurate assessment. These 
results are quite similar (bottom panel of Table 2.5), with temporality, firm, and industry now 
accounting for 43.9%, 26.0%, and 30.1% of the variance in EMP adoption respectively.  
We find that temporality has the largest explanatory power. This is not surprising given the 
ever-increasing pressure firms feel from regulators, NGOs, concerned citizens, and various other 
stakeholders to be environmental responsible. It is also not surprising that industry plays such a 
significant role, since industry regulation has been shown previously, and in the current study, to 
positively impact EMP adoption. Of potential surprise is the large explanatory power of firm-
unique choices and characteristics. An important implication is that stakeholders who influence 
firms directly (such as customers, investors, firm employees, firm leaders, and local communities) 
are almost as important to EMP adoption decisions as regulators, who influence through industry 
regulation. 
In a subsequent post hoc analysis, we evaluate how temporality, firm, and industry 
differentially impact the adoption of different types of EMPs. We find that operational decisions 
are primarily driven by firm-unique choices and characteristics, while strategic decisions are 
primarily driven by industry membership. This is an interesting result with important 
implications. It suggests that a firm’s environmental strategy is heavily influenced by industry 
membership. This is not particularly surprising given the strong influence of institutional pressure 
on firm environmental behavior, as discussed previously. It also suggests that the operational 
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choices a firm makes are primarily driven by the firm itself, as influenced by stakeholders who 
influence the firm directly and constrained/supported by firm characteristics. Given that 
operational changes likely have a more immediate impact on environmental performance, the 
results further highlight the central role firm-direct stakeholders should play in future efforts to 
increase EMP adoption and improve environmental performance. 
 Second, we demonstrate that not all firm characteristics and industry attributes matter to EMP 
adoption. Specifically, by simultaneously evaluating a broad set of firm and industry factors we 
determine which matter most to adoption and explain whether the effect is on EMP adoption over 
time (temporal effect), EMP adoption across firms or industries (cross-sectional effect), or both. 
As to firm characteristics, we show that firm size is positively associated EMP adoption over 
time. This suggests that as firm grow over time, they adopt more EMPs. We also show that firm 
size, profitability, labor availability, and prior experience adopting management practices (quality 
management systems and ISO 9000) are positively associated with EMP adoption. Surprisingly, 
we find that capital availability is not significantly associated with EMP adoption, implying that a 
firm’s capital resources are not a prerequisite for EMP adoption. To ensure that our results are not 
driven by our operationalization of firm size, profitability, capital availability, and labor 
availability, we repeat our analysis using alternate measures for these firm characteristics, as 
described in Section 3.3.3. Results using these alternate measures (not included here) are 
essentially identical to the original results. The summary implications for managers adopting 
EMPs are that resource stability helps, available labor is essential, prior experience with ISO 
9000 or a quality management system also helps, and much can be done without deep pockets.  
As to industry attributes, we find that industry munificence is negatively associated with 
EMP adoption over time (Table 2.7, panel 1). This suggests that firms in low growth-potential 
industries adopt fewer EMPs over time. We also find that industry risk and competition are 
positively associated, and munificence, dynamism, and complexity are negatively associated, 
with EMP adoption (Table 2.7, panel 3). While the positive associations are consistent with our 
expectations, the negative associations were a surprise. As explained previously, munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity are three dimensions of environmental uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty in 
a firm’s competitive landscape. The results suggest that as environmental uncertainty increases, 
firms adopt fewer EMPs, i.e. firms do not see the adoption of EMPs as necessary to grow the 
firm, address industry instability or handle industry complexity. Said differently, the implication 
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is that EMPs are an afterthought when environmental uncertainty is high, but a higher priority 
when industry growth slows and when industries become more stable and/or less complex. 
The overarching conclusion from the strategic factor analysis is that the relationships between 
strategic factors and EMP adoption are more nuanced and complicated than previously 
understood. One way to interpret the results is to understand how much flexibility management 
has in making the adoption decision. Industry attributes, for instance, act as external mandates 
(e.g., competition and risks firms face), leaving management little flexibility to decide what to 
adopt and how much to adopt. In contrast, management has considerable leeway in matching 
EMP adoption to firm characteristics, and perceived needs and requirements. Firm characteristics 
are more directly connected to management experiences (e.g., prior experience adopting a QMS) 
and can be more actively influenced by management decisions (e.g., making labor available), and 
thus are under management control to a larger extent. By differentiating between a mandate and a 
voluntary action, and their relative impact on EMP adoption, these results impart greater 
understanding to managers pursuing adoption, regulators designing rules, and researchers 
deciding which variables to include in future EMP adoption studies. 
Third, our findings are significantly more generalizable than previous EMP studies because 
previous studies considered only a limited number of EMPs, used survey-based cross-sectional 
data, and evaluated firms in narrowly defined industries, such as furniture manufacturing 
(Klassen and Whybark, 1999), process industries (Bannerjee et al. 2003) or general 
manufacturing (Hofer et al. 2012). In contrast, we explore a broad set of EMPs, from many firms, 
industries and sectors, over a long period of time. This allows us to demonstrate adoption trends 
over time, and partition heterogeneity in EMP adoption into unique sources, across many 
different firm, industry, and business contexts. In addition, the set of EMPs (50 practices) we 
develop for this study more comprehensively covers the broad variety of activities firms 
undertake to manage their impact on the natural environmental. Finally, we identify a relatively 
new, comprehensive, and untapped secondary dataset which could prove to be very useful to 
future environmental management researchers. 
2.5.2 Limitations and venues for future work 
While we believe that the findings are interesting and impactful, there are several limitations and 
avenues for future research. First, while we include a broad set of strategic factors, based on an 
extensive literature review, it is nevertheless an incomplete set. Future researchers could examine 
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additional factors that might be useful to various environmental stakeholders. Second, the 
influence of strategic factors on firm decisions regarding the adoption of EMPs may depend on 
the broader sector (2-digit SIC code) in which the firm competes. For example, manufacturing 
firms and service firms may respond differently to uncertainty in the competitive environment. 
Manufacturing firms impact the natural environment more significantly than service firms and 
thus the adoption of EMPs may play a more central role in managing competitive uncertainty for 
them because their stakeholders are watching them closer. However, limitations not-withstanding, 
we believe that our study makes a novel contribution to theory and practice by identifying unique 
sources of variation in EMP adoption and empirically validating our conceptual framework using 
rich panel data and an exhaustive econometric method.  
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Chapter 3 - The impact of a spill or pollution 
controversy on firm environmental activity 
3.1 Introduction 
Spill and pollution events such as the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill, Chernobyl 
Disaster and Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill have lasting economic, social and environmental 
impacts. For example, the recent Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (also known as the BP Oil Spill) 
discharged more than 4.5 million barrels of toxic oil in the Gulf of Mexico and affected over 8000 
species of flora and fauna. It was also responsible for eleven deaths and cost BP $18.7 billion, the 
largest corporate settlement in U.S. history. Similar events of varying severity are reported 
regularly in the public media and generate negative publicity for firms. As profit seeking entities, 
firms are expected to address such public controversies by presenting an appropriate set of 
actions which will reduce the possibility of similar unanticipated events from occurring in the 
future. These actions include examining the firm’s existing approach for managing its 
environment friendly management policies and practices (EMPs), and subsequently escalating or 
de-escalating adoption of EMPs in current and/or future years. 
While escalating adoption in response to a spill and pollution (SP) controversy makes logical 
sense, it requires significant investment of scarce labor and financial resources. Alternately, de-
escalating the year-over-year increases in adoption firms pursue in the absence of a controversy 
would secure time to analyze root cause and identify weaknesses with the current environmental 
strategy before adopting more EMPs. Given an uncertain relationship between increased adoption 
and reduced SP controversy risk, de-escalation could be a logical strategy. However, it is not 
clear how prevalent de-escalation might be with firm leaders or how long the effect may last. The 
net result of de-escalation is that firms adopts fewer EMPs than they would have adopted in the 
absence of a controversy and may continue adopting fewer EMPs in future years as well. De-
escalation in adoption is a salient concern because the number of EMPs a firm adopts is directly 
associated with firm environmental performance (Anton et al. 2004, Klassen & Whybark 1999, 
Potoski & Prakash 2005, Toffel 2005, King & Lenox 2002).  
In this paper, we study the relationship between a SP controversy and a firm’s resulting 
decision to escalate or de-escalate adoption of EMPs. EMPs are the techniques, policies, and 
procedures a firm uses to monitor and control the impact of its operations on the natural 
environment (Montabon et al. 2007). Specifically, we examine three questions. First, does a SP 
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controversy cause a firm to escalate or de-escalate adoption, and if so, how long does the impact 
persist? Second, how does the severity of the controversy, or number of controversies, impact this 
relationship? Finally, does firm size, firm sustainability performance or an industry’s 
environmental risk profile moderate the relationship between SP controversy and EMP adoption? 
Using a unique panel data from 2003 to 2013 representing over 400 publicly-traded US 
manufacturing firms, and rigorous econometric methods, we show that in the absence of a SP 
controversy firms in all sectors steadily adopt more EMPs each year. However, in the year 
following a SP controversy they de-escalate adoption and this effect seems to persist for up to 3 
years. It is important to note that de-escalation does not equate to a reduction in the number of 
EMPs adopted when compared to the prior year. Rather, it is a slowdown of annual increases in 
adoption and a reduction in the number of EMPs the firm would have adopted in the absence of a 
controversy. We also find that while experiencing more severe controversies or more 
controversies individually leads to greater de-escalation, they do not jointly affect the number of 
EMPs a firm adopts. Finally, we observe that firms with high environmental and social 
sustainability performance do not de-escalate adoption following a SP controversy, suggesting 
that such firms respond differently to SP controversies than most firms. These results suggest 
significant negative implications for short- and long-term environmental performance, especially 
because firms do not seem to recover from the slowdown in future years. 
Results are robust to various econometric specifications, alternate measures of key variables, 
and panel choice, and help us make several contributions to existing literature. First, we shed light 
on a commonly held belief that firms escalate the adoption of EMPs in response to an 
environmental controversy, perhaps to strengthen their environmental management system or 
achieve legitimacy in their stakeholders’ eyes. Instead, we find that firms (in aggregate) de-
escalate adoption following a controversy and that this behavior persists over time, potentially 
resulting in a complete pause in adoption. Second, results indicate that factors other than 
stakeholder or institutional pressure, the primary theoretical lenses from which EMP adoption has 
been studied previously, influence firm decisions regarding EMP adoption (Delmas 2001, Delmas 
& Toffel 2008, Reuter et al. 2010, Sarkis et al. 2010, Foster et al. 2000, Hofer et al. 2012). The 
results also demonstrate that sustainability performance plays a critical role in how firms respond 
to SP controversies, with potential important implications for on-going firm environmental 
performance. Third, we develop a more robust definition of environmental management activity, 
and an expanded set of EMPs, which synthesizes a disparate literature on the subject of EMP 
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adoption. Finally, we provide additional evidence for the viability and value of using publicly 
reported data to conduct environmental research. Such data is a valuable complement to the 
survey methods often used to conduct research in this area. It is not constrained by key informant 
or common method biases inherent in survey research (Roth 2007, Gattiker & Parente 2007), 
allows for replication studies, has a panel structure which supports the use of advanced 
econometric methods, and allows us to assess a significantly larger set of EMPs, industries, and 
firms, than prior studies. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Environment management practices  
Environment management practices encompass a variety of efforts designed to minimize the 
negative environmental impact of a firm’s operations, or its supply chain, on the natural 
environment. Examples include changes to process, product, and technology, revised managerial 
policies, environmental training, voluntary participation in environmental standards development, 
and voluntary commitments to various emission reduction protocols, among others. EMPs 
constitute one dimension of firm level corporate social responsibility (Klassen & McLaughlin 
1996). The topic of EMP adoption is informed by both the business strategy and operations 
management literatures. One of the recurring themes in the business strategy literature, the oldest 
and arguably most well-developed with respect to EMP adoption, is on exploring why firms adopt 
EMPs and identifying underlying causes of adoption. Institutional or stakeholder theories are 
frequently used to ground research questions which evaluate how pressure from various external 
and internal stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, competitors, regulatory bodies, and 
employees, among others, impact the decision to adopt (Ruenda-Manzanares et al. 2008, Banerjee 
et al. 2003, Madsen & Ulhoi 2001, Henriques & Sadorsky 1996). Broadly speaking, they find that 
while each of these stakeholders influence adoption decisions, their relative influence is context 
specific, such as dependence on specific characteristics of the firm or attributes of the industry in 
which the firm competes (Banerjee et al. 2003, Henriques & Sadorsky 1996).  
The operations management literature has also examined EMP adoption. This literature has 
more thoroughly evaluated the performance benefits emanating from adoption and found 
convincing evidence that the number of EMPs a firm adopts is positively associated with 
environmental (Anton et al. 2004, Klassen & Whybark 1999, Potoski & Prakash 2005, Toffel 
2005, King & Lenox 2002), operational (Sroufe 2003) and financial performance (King & Lenox 
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2002). A separate stream focusing on causes of adoption has found that competitive rivalry 
(Hofer et al. 2012), training (Sarkis et al. 2010), and technological integration with suppliers and 
customers (Vachon & Klassen 2006) are associated with increased adoption. 
Our review of the literature also shows that despite their distinct origins, these research 
streams have converged significantly in recent years. Although the motives for adoption may be 
similar across firms, the number of EMPs firms adopt varies greatly within and across industries, 
and performance outcomes depend on how adoption and firm performance are conceptualized 
and operationalized. For instance, EMPs have been conceptualized as environmental actions 
(Bannerjee 2001), environmental technologies (Klassen & Whybark 1999), and environmental 
management practices (Delmas & Toffel 2004, 2008, Montabon et al. 2007, Anton et al. 2004, 
Sroufe 2003), and the extent of firm involvement with environmental management has been 
measured with single item (e.g., ISO 14000) or multiple item scales ranging from a few practices 
to a maximum of 33 practices (Sroufe 2003, Montabon et al. 2007, Hofer et al. 2012). Similarly, 
firm performance has been conceptualized and operationalized along environmental (e.g., 
hazardous emissions), operational (e.g., quality, cost, lead-time, innovation), and financial (e.g., 
return on investment, sales growth, net profit) dimensions. Finally, while a handful of existing 
studies use secondary data (Montabon et al. 2007, Hofer et al. 2012), most use primary, cross-
sectional data, and evaluate a reduced set of EMPs, firms, and industries (Sarkis et al. 2010, 
Sroufe 2003, Banerjee et al. 2003, Klassen 2001, Klassen & Whybark 1999, Aragon-Correa 
1998). 
We draw a number of conclusions from our extensive literature review which helps highlight 
our contributions to the existing literature. First, while there is an expansive literature examining 
how various stakeholders’ impact a firm’s decision to adopt EMPs, there is a paucity of research 
examining how unanticipated shocks, such as a SP controversy, impact that decision. Such 
controversies may dramatically impact firm decisions regarding adoption, especially given the 
logical, although unproven, link between increased adoption and reduced SP controversy risk. 
Further, previous studies have not examined whether SP controversies have a persistent impact on 
the number of EMPs a firm adopts over time. It is also not clear whether the relationship between 
a SP controversy and EMP adoption is contingent on firm and industry characteristics. In this 
research, we examine six hypotheses which represent both direct and moderating relationships 
between a SP controversy and the number of EMPs a firm adopts. Our conceptual research 
framework is presented in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 - Research hypotheses 
 
3.2.2 Spill and pollution controversies and EMP adoption 
Previous research has shown that both positive and negative news reports can influence senior 
leaders’ actions, both in terms of firm strategy and resource allocation (Xiong & Bharadwaj 2013). 
Consider senior leader actions following the negative publicity associated with the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill, where 11 million gallons of oil were spilled when the supertanker ran aground in Alaska 
in 1989. In addition to spending $4.3 billion in clean-up, fines, and settlement costs, Exxon Mobil 
spent significant resources in upgrading its operational management system, which included both 
preventive and reactive environmental management and safety programs.12 Although most SP 
controversies are considerably smaller in scale and scope, unarguably they can significantly impact 
subsequent firm actions. Our research examines the role SP controversies play on a firm’s 
approach to managing their impact on the natural environment. 
3.2.2.1 Firm response to a spill or pollution controversy 
Firms adopt more EMPs each year because of a priori beliefs regarding the benefits of adoption 
(Figure 3.2). The adopted EMPs form the backbone of a firm’s environmental management 
system, which in turn is responsible for firm environmental performance (Anton et al. 2004). A SP 
controversy would provide contradictory evidence as to the efficacy of existing adoption decisions 
and may even challenge the beliefs underlying those decisions. Using self-justification theory, 
subjective expected utility theory, and self-presentation theory, a cross-disciplinary literature 
evaluates whether decision-makers escalate or de-escalate commitments in such situations 
(Sleesman et al. 2012). They might escalate commitment if the decision-makers tasked with 
                                                          
12 See http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/environment/emergency-preparedness/spill-prevention-and-
response/valdez-oil-spill?parentId=ef7252d1-7929-4f5c-9fa2-05404bde2a0f 
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adoption decisions following a SP controversy are the same as those who made the original 
commitments. Escalation occurs because a felt responsibility may enhance the threat of decision 
failure (Staw 1976) or the need to protect one’s self-identity (Brockner et al. 1986). Decision-
makers may also escalate commitment if the decision faces outside evaluation. Outside evaluation 
may increase the desire to “save face” and manage impressions others have of them (Brockner et 
al. 1981). Finally, decision-makers may escalate commitment if they fundamentally believe in the 
given course of action, i.e. that the adoption of EMPs will improve environmental performance 
and reduce/eliminate future SP controversies (Schulz-Hardt et al. 2009). Alternately, decision-
makers may de-escalate commitment if escalating commitment is perceived as a risky alternative. 
Risk increases loss probability (Knight 1921) and the salience of loss to decision-makers 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979, March & Shapira 1987), which in turn reduces the utility of 
escalation and increases the utility of de-escalation (Schaubroeck & Davis 1994). 
Figure 3.2 - Mean (Average) EMP adoption by year 
 
While firms experiencing each decision scenario likely exist, an answer to what most firms 
will do following a SP controversy emerges after evaluating each scenario individually. While 
decision-makers responsible for adoption decisions following a SP controversy may be the same 
as those responsible for prior adoption decisions, this likely happens infrequently since EMP 
adoption takes place over many years and decision-making responsibilities typically change over 
time. Further, while some adoption decisions may face public scrutiny, such as those publicized in 
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sustainability reports, firms publish these reports infrequently (sustainability reports are published 
30% of the time in our sample) and information shared in them is not presented in a way which 
facilitates convenient year-over-year comparison. As such, pressure on decision-makers to do as 
much or more than the prior year may be minimal. Next, while some decision-makers may believe 
that escalated EMP adoption will reduce the risk of a future SP controversy, this relationship is 
unproven. While the adoption of EMPs may indirectly reduce the risk of a SP controversy by 
improving governance, process, and procedures associated with overall environmental 
performance, there is no specific EMP, or group of EMPs, specifically designed to reduce the risk 
of a SP controversy (see Appendix A). Finally, given that enhanced adoption increases labor and 
capital investments and is associated with uncertain future returns, it would likely be considered a 
risky decision path by most decision-makers. Taken together, we contend that an SP controversy 
will result in de-escalation of EMP adoption for most firms. However, given that firms generally 
pursue annual increases in adoption each year (Figure 3.2), this does not necessarily mean that a 
SP controversy will result in reduced adoption compared to the prior year, but rather reduced 
adoption compared to what a firm would have adopted in the absence of a controversy. The 
following hypothesis represents this logic: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Spill or pollution controversies are negatively associated with 
the number of EMPs a firm adopts. 
3.2.2.2 The persistence of the firm response to a spill or pollution controversy 
While we posit that firms will de-escalate EMP adoption following a SP controversy, it is unclear 
whether the impact will persist over time. The answer has important implications because the 
longer the impact persists, the greater the potential gap between the number of EMPs a firm 
actually adopts and the number of EMPs it would have adopted in the absence of an SP 
controversy. We believe that the impact of a SP controversy on firm behavior will persist for an 
extended period of time because it may take a long time to resolve the impact of the controversy 
on the natural environment and firm, identify root cause, and make the necessary process, policy, 
and/or strategy adjustments. The literature on organizational learning and change supports this 
conclusion. A review of the news articles connected with each SP controversy suggests they 
primarily result from, (1) process failures, (2) policy/strategy failures or (3) some combination of 
both. Thus, a SP controversy signals a breakdown of existing process control structures and its 
resolution requires re-evaluation of internal routines and procedures. Such breakdowns are not 
unusual, since even the best designed processes are subject to decay (increased instability over 
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time) if not “renewed”, such as through an audit (Anand et al. 2012). However, the significant 
changes required to resolve such breakdowns often emerge at a slow pace (Plowman et al. 2007, 
Wright et al. 2004).  Since firms are likely to de-escalate adoption while they identify root cause, 
address fallout from the underlying SP event, and reassess their on-going environmental strategy 
(see H1), the pace of adoption will slow until these and other similar issues are addressed. Thus, 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The impact of spill or pollution controversies on the number of 
EMPs adopted will persist over time. 
3.2.2.3 The severity of the controversy and firm response 
In Hypothesis 1, we propose that most firms will respond to a SP controversy by de-escalating 
annual increases in adoption. We now propose that this response will be exacerbated by the 
severity of the SP controversy. On one end of the severity spectrum is negative publicity 
associated with localized spills or emissions violations that are contained to a specific plant or 
facility. They occur relatively frequently in some industries and less frequently in others and may 
involve a modest fine. On the other end of the spectrum is negative publicity associated with 
events that impact larger geographic areas and can involve very large fines and penalties (e.g. 
Exxon-Valdez oil spill, BP oil spill). Naturally, larger events require greater resources to resolve 
and manage, and thus garner a larger share of leadership attention. The attention-based view of the 
firm suggests that “firm behavior is the result of how firms channel and distribute the attention of 
their decision-makers” (Ocasio 1997). More severe controversies that garner greater leadership 
attention should be associated with more significant firm responses. In the current context, the 
more severe a SP controversy, the more pronounced the de-escalation.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The severity of the controversy will amplify the relationship 
between spill or pollution controversies and the number of EMPs a firm adopts. 
3.2.2.4 The moderating role of firm size 
While prior researchers have demonstrated a direct, positive relationship between firm size and the 
number of EMPs a firm adopts (Hofer et al. 2012, Delmas & Toffel 2008, Buysse & Verbeke 
2003), it is unclear how firm size impacts similar decisions following a SP controversy. After 
reviewing the literature, we posit that decision differences will exist between small and large 
firms, with large firms less likely than small firms to de-escalate adoption following a SP 
controversy. Large firms have more slack resources, greater control over the environment, and 
broader skillsets (Hitt et al. 1990, Whetten 1987). The slack resources would allow large firms to 
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address fallout from the environmental event without having to redirect scarce resources away 
from on-going environmental management activities. Large firms are also more bureaucratic and 
less flexible (Hitt et al. 1990, Whetten 1987); suggesting they may be more likely to continue with 
their embedded course of action, i.e. continue the current pace of adoption. Anecdotal evidence 
also suggests that large firms facing a SP controversy encounter greater attention from 
environmental stakeholders. As such, large firms may be inclined to continue the current pattern of 
annual increases in adoption in order to avoid scrutiny from these stakeholders. On the other hand, 
small organizations are said to be more innovative because they are more flexible, have a greater 
ability to adapt, and are more open to change (Damanpour 1996). As such, they may be more 
likely to revise their approach to environmental management following a SP controversy. In sum, 
because of increased resources and external stakeholder pressure, large firms will be less likely 
than small firms to de-escalate the adoption of EMPs following a SP controversy. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Firm size positively moderates the relationship between SP 
controversies and the number of EMPs a firm adopts. 
3.2.2.5 The moderating role of sustainability commitment 
Citing self-justification theory, researchers have shown that if decision-makers have experience or 
expertise in a given domain, they may escalate an existing course of action in response to negative 
feedback on that course of action as a way to justify the prior decision (Bragger et al. 2003, 
Garland et al. 1990). Similarly, decision-makers with high self-efficacy and confidence, such as 
that derived through experience, may escalate commitment when presented with negative 
feedback. Such individuals discount negative information, believing they can overcome any 
obstacles presented by the negative feedback (Judge et al. 1998). Finally, leveraging subjective 
expected utility theory, researchers have shown that decision-makers with a clear preference for a 
course of action will escalate that course of action when presented with negative feedback on that 
course of action. They escalate simply because they value, and thus prefer, the chosen course of 
action (Schulz-Hardt et al. 2009). In the current context, decision-makers in high sustainability 
firms will have gained experience and expertise in environmental and social sustainability. That 
experience and expertise should improve decision-maker self-confidence in making sustainability 
decisions (such as EMP adoption decisions); as well as create a preference for, and belief in, 
actions which support improved sustainability. As such, we contend that when high sustainability 
firms experience a SP controversy, as compared to lower sustainability firms, they will at least 
maintain their current pattern of adoption (annual increases) and potentially escalate adoption. 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): Firm sustainability performance positively moderates the 
relationship between SP controversies and the number of EMPs adopted. 
3.2.2.6 The moderating role of industry environmental risk 
Environmental risk involves temporary or permanent changes to the atmosphere, water, and land 
due to human activities, which can result in impacts that may be either reversible or irreversible. 
Firms in high risk industries experience a greater incidence of SP controversies. In fact, our data 
shows that such firms are 6 times more likely than low risk firms, and 2.5 times more likely than 
medium risk firms, to experience a SP controversy. Given the increased risk of negative 
environmental impact, firms in high risk industries also receive greater attention from regulators 
and other environmental stakeholders. Regulation, in particular, has been shown to influence 
organizational behavior, especially when it comes to adoption of environmental initiatives (Short 
& Toffel 2010). We posit that this increased experience with controversies, and increased 
scrutiny/oversight, causes firms in high risk industries to respond differentially to SP controversies 
than firms in less risky industries, with respect to escalating or de-escalating EMP adoption. For 
example, given their familiarity with environmental controversies, firms in high risk industries are 
more likely to have mature procedures for resolving the underlying SP event and for handling the 
negative publicity associated with the controversy. Thus, a SP controversy may have less impact 
on daily routines, and existing patterns of adoption, than it would for firms with less experience. 
Further, given their increased visibility, firms in high risk industries would be less inclined to take 
actions which could be perceived as counterproductive or harmful, such as de-escalating adoption. 
In sum, we expect firms in high risk industries to de-escalate adoption less than firms in lower risk 
industries, following a SP controversy. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Industry environmental risk positively moderates the relationship 
between SP controversies and number of EMPs adopted. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Data sources and sample selection 
We investigate EMP adoption in publicly-traded US manufacturing firms using data from two 
Thomson Reuter’s databases, ASSET4 and Worldscope, and First for Sustainability, an initiative 
of the International Finance Corporation. Annualized data on EMP adoption and SP controversies 
is obtained from ASSET4, a database used previously in related academic research (Ioannou & 
Serefeim 2012, Cheng et al. 2014, Eccles et al. 2014). Firm-specific information, including firm 
size and profitability, was obtained from Worldscope, a global financial and economic database 
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used previously in academic research (Hawn & Ioannou 2016). Finally, a measure of industry 
environmental risk was developed using data from First for Sustainability. In our study, we focus 
on U.S. firms to eliminate potential heterogeneity in patterns of adoption across countries, as 
different countries may value environmental issues differently, include only publicly traded firms 
because financial information is federally mandated and readily available, and focus on traditional 
manufacturing industries because firms in these industries are a primary source of environmental 
pollution (Banerjee et al. 2003). Our unit of analysis is firm-year, our data spans from 2002 to 
2013, and our sample includes 401 firms. Because new firms enter the panel each year, we have an 
unbalanced panel data structure. 
3.3.2 Dependent variable 
Number of EMPs adopted: Captures the depth and breadth of a firm’s environmental management 
activity and is operationalized as a count of the EMPs firms report adopting each year. Firm 
involvement with environmental management has been operationalized in a variety of ways by 
previous researchers, including ISO 14001 adoption (Delmas & Toffel 2008, King et al. 2005), a 
single, multi-item construct (Ruenda-Manzanares et al. 2008, Christmann 2004), several multi-
item constructs (Sarkis et al. 2010, Klassen 2001), a count of EMPs (Anton et al. 2004, Khanna & 
Anton 2002), and a count of EMPs, after adjusting for intensity of implementation (Hofer et al. 
2012). We follow these latter two approaches, since they provide the most detailed assessment of a 
firm’s involvement with environmental management. However, our measurement system offers 
advantages over prior approaches of value to environmental research. First, our set of 50 EMPs is 
the largest to-date and evaluates the full spectrum of environmental actions firms undertake to 
manage environmental performance. The largest prior set consisted of 33 activities (Hofer et al. 
2012, Montabon et al. 2007, Sroufe et al. 2002). In fact, researchers have noted that existing 
environmental research has been conducted using a limited set of EMPs and highlighted the need 
to develop a more extensive and comprehensive set of EMPs (Montabon et al. 2007). Second, 
while we capture firm involvement with a specific practice as a binary variable, our summated 
scale allows us to effectively capture the depth and breadth a firm’s involvement with 
environmental management.  To explain, 41 of our 50 practices evaluate a firm’s involvement in 
five broad approaches to improving environmental performance; implementing process 
improvement (8 EMPs), introducing KPI’s (7 EMPs), implementing improvement initiatives (11 
EMPs), implementing policies (11 EMPs), and working with suppliers/supply chain partners (4 
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EMPs). By summing the EMPs associated with each approach, we capture the depth of a firm’s 
involvement with that approach. The remaining 9 EMPs refer to stand-alone actions a firm may 
take to improve environmental performance, such as “install an environmental management team”, 
“adopt CEREZ principles”, “participate in emissions trading”, which are best measured using a 
binary scale. Thus, by summing the full set of 50 EMPs, we capture both the depth of a firm’s 
involvement with the five broad approaches, as well as the breadth of a firm’s involvement with 
environmental management. 
To arrive at our final set of EMPs, we used information obtained from Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 database. Thomson Reuters regularly reviews various public records, and reports 
adoption for a variety of EMPs using a binary scale (1=adopted, and 0=not adopted). To identify 
an appropriate set of EMPs for the current study, we were guided by three rules: to be included, a 
practice should, (1) be consistent with prior EMP literature conceptually, (2) be relevant to 
manufacturing firms, and (3) have no missing data. To meet the first criteria, we cross-checked the 
EMPs reported in the database against past literature. However, because published papers do not 
always report the measures they use, it was a challenging task. Even so, we found sufficient 
convergence across studies and it helped us narrow the list to 86 EMP practices. To meet the 
second criteria, we excluded practices that were not applicable to the firms and industries in our 
sample. Examples of such exclusions include whether the firm was a signatory of the UNEP 
Finance Initiative or the Equator Principles, both of which apply only to financial firms. This 
reduced the list of potential EMPs to 60. Finally, to meet criteria #3 we excluded any practice that 
had missing data in our panel. Our final set of 50 practices, including reported frequency of 
adoption, is presented in Appendix A. 
3.3.3 Independent variables 
Spill or pollution controversy: SP controversies represent “events published in the media linked 
to chemical, oil, and fuel spills, as well as controversies related to the overall impacts of the 
company on the environment”. They include “any of the company activities which may directly 
or indirectly pollute the environment or the surrounding area, be it air, water or soil, or cause 
pollution”. To create this variable, Thomson Reuters collects news articles from various public 
and private sources including company issued press releases, company websites, and media 
publications, for each firm. The analysts then go through each news article and remove all 
duplicate news reports. The resulting information is reported in ASSET4. 
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Spill or pollution controversy severity: To assess severity, we develop three unique measures 
using information provided in the news article attached to each controversy. They include cost, 
scope, and settlement, each of which captures a unique aspect of severity. The measures were 
developed in a systematic and rigorous manner. First, the lead author developed a conceptual 
definition of each measure. Cost (severity_cost) was defined as the “total cost of fines and 
cleanup”.  Scope (severity_scope) was defined as the geographic impact of the controversy on the 
environment, and was measured as 1 = local impact (e.g. town/city), 2 = regional impact (e.g. 
state), and 3 = broad impact (e.g. multiple states). We used no controversy = 0 as the reference 
category. Settlement (severity_settlement) was defined as the “stage” in the resolution process to 
which the controversy had progressed when made public. It was measured as 1 = spill event 
occurred, 2 = lawsuit filed, 3 = fine assessed, 4 = settlement reached. Again, no controversy = 0 
was used as the reference category. If more than one controversy occurred during the year, cost 
refers to the sum of the costs across all controversies, while“scope” and “settlement” evaluate 
the controversy with the most advanced geographic spread and stage, respectively. Second, each 
author read each article in its entirety and coded them independently following the schema 
described above. Third, the results from the coding by the three authors were compared to 
identify points of similarity and difference. In cases where two or more authors agreed in their 
coding, there was no further discussion. In the few rare cases where results differed, all three 
authors reread each of the news articles to resolve the disagreement. In total, 532 news reports 
were coded for each measure of severity. 
3.3.4 Moderating variables 
Firm size: We split our sample into two evenly sized groups based on mean annual sales across a 
firm’s entire panel. In this way, we categorized an entire firm, as opposed to each firm-year 
observation, as small or large. We chose this approach because we believe that firm behavior and 
choices regarding the natural environment will be relatively homogenous across years of the 
panel. Sales data used to develop this variable was sourced from Worldscope.  
Sustainability performance: We classify firms as high performance in the years they participate 
on a sustainability index, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), and low otherwise. 
Inclusion on a sustainability index indicates that a firm’s environmental, social, and economic 
performance is among the very best. For example, the DJSI World Index includes only the top 
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10% of eligible firms. Data used to measure participation on a sustainability index was obtained 
from ASSET4.  
Environmental risk: Measures the risk an industry poses to the natural environment, and as proxy, 
the level of attention an industry receives from environmental stakeholders, such as regulators 
and NGO’s. To measure environmental risk, we obtained environmental and social risk 
assessments compiled by First for Sustainability (FFS), an initiative of the International Finance 
Corporation, to monitor how the environmental and social risks are being managed by financial 
institutions receiving their investments.13 FFS classifies 29 sectors (collections of industries) into 
high, medium, and low risk to the natural environment.  The study authors mapped these 
assessments to industries, as defined by the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), a globally 
recognized standard similar to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system used in the US. 
The study authors separately and independently substantiated that the environmental risk was 
correctly reflected in the sector to industry to firm mapping. Because our study focuses on 
industries which pose greater environmental risk, the study sample includes only medium and 
high-risk industries. 
3.3.5 Control variables 
Consistent with prior related research, we include a number of variables to control for their 
unobserved effects on the number of EMPs a firm adopts.  
Other environmental controversies: Although SP controversies account for about 80 percent of 
all environmental controversies tracked by Thomson Reuters, firms may also experience other 
environmental controversies not related to spills and pollution events (e.g., biodiversity or 
product impact). Firms may adopt EMPs in response to these “other environmental 
controversies” and may systematically differ from each other in the number of these other 
environmental controversies they experience. Thus, we include a count of all other environmental 
controversies experienced by a firm in period t-1 (the same period as SP controversies) to control 
for this potential source of heterogeneity, using data sourced from ASSET4. 
Firm Size: Larger firms have more capital, labor and technology resources, and firm size has been 
shown previously to impact the number of EMPs a firm adopts (Hofer et al. 2012, Delmas & 
                                                          
13 See www.firstforsustainability.org for the assessments. 
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Toffel 2008, Christmann 2004). To control for such resource heterogeneity, we use the natural 
log of corporate sales (Hofer et al. 2012) using data sourced from Worldscope. 
Others: As additional controls, we include year dummies, sustainability performance, and 
industry environmental risk. We also include industry dummies for certain robustness checks. 
In examining our data, we find that all firms in our panel adopt more EMPs each year, from 
an average of 3.6 EMPs per firm in 2002 to 19.5 EMPs in 2013 (the center line in Figure 3.2). 
These increases are observed whether a firm experienced a SP controversy (bottom line in Figure 
3.2) or not (top line in Figure 3.2). This is not surprising since environmental management has 
garnered increased attention over the last few decades, culminating with the recent Paris 
Agreement on climate change.14  
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for all variables in the analyses are provided in 
Table 3.1. We find that firm size and sustainability performance are positively correlated, and 
environmental risk is negatively correlated, with the number of EMPs a firm adopts. This 
suggests that large firms and firms highly committed to sustainability adopt a higher number of 
EMPs, while firms in industries which present higher risk to the natural environment adopt fewer 
practices. We also observe that firm size is positively correlated with our various measures of 
controversy, suggesting that large firms have more SP controversies, as well as other 
environmental controversies. Finally, we notice that two measures of controversy severity, scope 
(severity_scope) and settlement (severity_settlement), as well as our binary (controversy) and 
count (cumulative controversies) measures of controversy, are highly correlated with each other, 
suggesting overlap in their ability to uniquely characterize a SP controversy. 
                                                          
14 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php 
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Table 3.1 - Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
  Mean Min Max StdDev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 EMP adoptiont 12.70 0 46 12.29 1.00 
           
2 
Other environmental 
controversiest-1 
0.04 0 5 0.27 0.14* 1.00 
          
3 Firm sizet 15.00 3.69 19.89 1.63 0.51* 0.18* 1.00 
         
4 
Sustainability 
commitmentt 
0.14 0 1 0.35 0.58* 0.10* 0.37* 1.00 
        
5 Environmental riskt 1.68 1 2 0.47 -0.03 0.02 -0.11* -0.07* 1.00 
       
6 Controversyt-1 0.09 0 1 0.28 0.24* 0.24* 0.31* 0.13* 0.08* 1.00 
      
7 Cum controversiest-1 0.15 0 15 0.65 0.23* 0.38* 0.31* 0.12* 0.08* 0.73* 1.00 
     
8 Cum controversiest-2 0.14 0 9 0.60 0.21* 0.34* 0.32* 0.09* 0.08* 0.41* 0.61* 1.00 
    
9 Cum controversiest-3 0.14 0 9 0.58 0.20* 0.30* 0.31* 0.06* 0.08* 0.33* 0.54* 0.63* 1.00 
   
10 Cum controversiest-4 0.13 0 9 0.54 0.17* 0.33* 0.32* 0.05* 0.08* 0.32* 0.54* 0.52* 0.60* 1.00 
  
11 Severity_costt-1 $15.9M 0 $27B $516M 0.04* 0.08* 0.07* 0.05* 0.02 0.10* 0.15* 0.06* 0.06* 0.15* 1.00 
 
12 Severity_scopet-1 0.16 0 3 0.57 0.26* 0.28* 0.32* 0.16* 0.07* 0.93* 0.80* 0.48* 0.39* 0.38* 0.15* 1.00 
13 Severity_settlementt-1 0.24 0 4 0.85 0.23* 0.24* 0.28* 0.14* 0.07* 0.91* 0.74* 0.43* 0.38* 0.37* 0.12* 0.86* 
*p<0.05  
  
58 
 
3.4 Empirical approach and results 
3.4.1 Empirical approach 
We investigate the relationships in our study using fixed-effect (FE) negative binomial regression 
(using Stata’s xtnbreg command). We have repeated observations for firms over an eleven-year 
period, and the data structure is an unbalanced panel with a negative binomial distribution. Given 
the nature of our data, we considered a number of alternate methods, including ordinary least 
squares (OLS), Poisson, General Estimating Equation (GEE), and random-effects (RE) negative 
binomial regression. OLS regression is not appropriate because it requires assumptions about the 
variance that are not likely to be met (Gardner et al. 1995). Poisson regression is a single 
parameter model which assumes the mean and variance of the dependent variable are equal. In our 
data, the ratio of variance to mean is 14.5, suggesting significant over-dispersion. The negative 
binomial distribution specifically adds a second parameter to account for this over-dispersion and 
hence is likely a better match for our data structure (Gardner et al. 1995). GEE regression is 
another method appropriate to analyze over-dispersed count data when autocorrelation and 
unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity may be present (Greene 2012, Di Gregorio & Shane 
2003, Sine et al. 2003, Liang & Zeger 1986). While an Arellano-Bond test does not find evidence 
of autocorrelation, we are unable to test for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity and thus 
evaluate the GEE model as a robustness check. Finally, we perform a Hausman test to evaluate 
whether fixed- or random-effect negative binomial regression is more appropriate. We find that the 
FE model best fits the data (χ2=104.96, pValue<0.0001) and thus proceed using a FE negative 
binomial regression model to investigate our research hypotheses. 
3.4.2 Results 
Results from FE negative binomial regression analysis are presented in Table 3.2. Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIFs) in all models are at or below 3.4, ameliorating multicollinearity concerns 
(Kutner et al. 2005).  
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Table 3.2 - Negative binomial regression analysis 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Other environmental  -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
controversiest-1 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Firm sizet 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sustainability  -0.09* -0.09* -0.10* -0.10* -0.07+ -0.05 0.00 
commitmentt (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Environmental riskt 0.26* 0.25* 0.27* 0.28* 0.17 0.17 0.15 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27) 
Controversyt-1 
 
-0.08* 
 
0.02 
   
  
(0.03) 
 
(0.04) 
   
Cumulative  
  
-0.07*** -0.07*** -0.04** -0.04* -0.03* 
controversiest-1 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cumulative  
    
-0.05** -0.03* -0.02+ 
controversiest-2 
    
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cumulative  
     
-0.03* -0.01 
controversiest-3 
     
(0.02) (0.01) 
Cumulative  
      
-0.02 
controversiest-4 
      
(0.02) 
Constant -2.08*** -2.20*** -2.39*** -2.38*** -1.55** -1.03+ 0.35 
 
(0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.56) (0.62) (0.71) 
Observations 3015 3004 3004 3004 2577 2159 1765 
chi2 3375.31 3361.10 3394.59 3395.37 2730.23 2104.80 1598.54 
OIM standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Year fixed-effects included in all models, but not shown 
We first include only control variables (column 1) and find that firm size and environmental risk 
are positively associated, while sustainability performance is negatively associated, with the 
number of EMPs a firm adopts. Although not shown, each year dummy is significant and steadily 
increasing in magnitude over time, as observed visually in Figure 3.2. To assess the impact of SP 
controversy on EMP adoption, we first evaluate controversy as a binary variable in period t-1, i.e. 
the firm experienced one or more controversies in the period or zero controversies (column 2). We 
find that prior year controversy is negatively associated with the number of EMPs adopted in the 
current year (β= -0.08). Since firms increase adoption each year in the absence of a controversy 
(Figure 3.2), this does not equate to reduction in EMP adoption from the prior year, but rather de-
escalation in annual increases and a reduction in the number of EMPs the firm would have adopted 
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in the absence of a controversy. We discuss this further in the Discussion section. We next 
evaluate the impact of our count measure of controversy (cumulative controversies) at t-1 on the 
number of EMPs adopted in the current year (column 3). We observe a negative and statistically 
significant relationship (β= -0.07), indicating that as firms incur more controversies they de-
escalate adoption more than if they had experienced only a single controversy. Finally, we 
evaluate the binary and count measures of controversy together in one model (column 4). We find 
that the direction, magnitude, and significance of the beta connected to the count measure is 
relatively unchanged from our prior analysis, while the beta connected to the binary measure has 
lost significance. Variance Inflation Factors for this model are all below 2.9. The results suggest 
that the count measure of controversy better captures firm behavior following a SP controversy, 
with respect to the number of EMPs a firm adopts. As such, we use this measure of controversy in 
all future analyses. In total, the results provide strong support for H1. 
We next assess the persistence of the impact discussed above. To do this, we progressively add 
controversies with longer lags (i.e. prior years) to the model (columns 5-7). In general, we see that 
as older controversies (t-2, t-3, and t-4) are added to the model, the beta associated with 
controversies in period t-1 gets progressively smaller. This suggests that these older controversies 
are contributing to the result we observe for cumulative controversies at t-1 (column 3). Further, 
we see the controversies at t-2 and t-3 remain at least moderately significant in all models. The net 
conclusion is that the impact of a controversy on EMP adoption persists for up to 3 years, 
providing support for H2.  
To assess whether the severity of SP controversy amplifies the de-escalation in adoption we 
observe following a SP controversy, we test for moderation by creating an interaction term 
between each measure of SP controversy severity, cost (severity_cost), scope (severity_scope), 
and settlement (severity_settlement), and our count measure of controversy (cumulative 
controversies). The results are provided in Table 3.3. We first introduce our reference model 
(column 1), then each measure of severity as a main effect (columns 2-4), and finally the 
interaction terms (columns 5-7). The results show that each main effect is negative and highly 
significant, suggesting that as controversies become more severe, de-escalation becomes more 
pronounced. We next observe that each interaction term is insignificant, suggesting that severity 
does not amplify the relationship between SP controversy and the number of EMPs a firm adopts. 
However, because of high correlation between severity_scope, severity_settlement, and 
cumulative controversies, models 8 and 9 have issues with multicollinearity (VIFs > 10, Kutner et 
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al. 2005). We discuss this result in the Discussion section, where we present an alternate approach 
to assess moderation for these two measures of severity. 
Table 3.3 - The impact of the “severity” of the spill or pollution controversy  
 
1 2 3 4 7 8 9 
Other environmental  0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
controversiest-1 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Firm sizet 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sustainability -0.10* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* 
commitmentt (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Environmental riskt 0.27* 0.26* 0.25* 0.26* 0.28* 0.28* 0.27* 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Cumulative  -0.07*** 
   
-0.03 0.04 0.00 
controversiest-1 (0.02) 
   
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
Severity_costt-1 
 
-0.01*** 
  
-0.00 
  
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
Severity_scopet-1 
  
-0.06*** 
  
-0.02 
 
   
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
 
Severity_settlementt-1 
   
-0.04*** 
  
-0.01 
    
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
Cum. controversiest-1 *  
    
-0.00 
  
Severity_costt-1 
    
(0.00) 
  
Cum. controversiest-1 *  
     
-0.04+ 
 
   Severity_scopet-1 
     
(0.02) 
 
Cum. controversiest-1 *  
      
-0.02 
  Severity_settlementt-1 
      
(0.01) 
Constant -2.39*** -2.21*** -2.34*** -2.24*** -2.36*** -2.45*** -2.33*** 
 
(0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53) 
Observations 3004 3003 3003 3003 3003 3003 3003 
chi2 3394.59 3380.71 3378.31 3378.88 3402.38 3407.23 3401.09 
OIM standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Year fixed-effects included, but not shown 
In our final analyses, we investigate the moderating effect of firm size, sustainability 
performance, and industry environmental risk. Because we theorized that the relationship between 
SP controversy and the number of EMPs adopted differs by categories of firm size, sustainability 
performance, and industry environmental risk, we use subgroup analysis (Venkatraman 1989). To 
do so, we create high and low sub-samples of the moderating variable, and conduct regression 
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analysis within each sub-sample (Table 3.4). We then compare the resulting SP controversy beta 
coefficients across sub-samples using a t-test (Bruning & Kintz 1987, pp. 226-228).  
Table 3.4 - Moderators – Firm size, sustainability index, and environmental risk 
Dependent Variable EMPs adoptedt 
Hypothesis Evaluated 
 
Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 5 Hypothesis 6 
  
Firm Size Sust. Performance Env. Risk 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  All Small Large Low High Medium High 
Other environmental 
controversiest-1 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Firm sizet 0.14***   
 
0.13*** 0.03 -0.00 0.26*** 
 
(0.03)   
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Sustainability 
commitmentt -0.10* -0.02 -0.04     -0.06 -0.14** 
 
(0.04) (0.12) (0.04)     (0.06) (0.05) 
Environmental riskt 0.27* -0.37 0.38** 0.34* -0.38 
  
 
(0.11) (0.34) (0.13) (0.14) (403.01) 
  Cumulative 
controversiest-1 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.05** -0.09*** -0.00 -0.13** -0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Constant -2.39*** 0.15 -0.02 -2.57*** 17.39 -0.19 -3.41*** 
 
(0.52) (0.68) (0.23) (0.64) (585.80) (0.76) (0.59) 
Observations 3004 1167 1838 2506 478 1015 1989 
chi2 3394.59 1086.23 2417.97 2900.02 545.31 1124.68 2416.86 
OIM standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Year fixed-effects included, but not shown 
Relative to firm size, the beta coefficient for SP controversy connected to small firms is not 
statistically significant (column 2), while the beta connected to large firms is negative and 
significant (column 3). However, the t-test comparing the betas indicates they are not statistically 
different (t=0.96, pValue=0.34, df=1312) and H4 is not supported. We next observe that the beta 
associated with low sustainability performance is negative and highly significant (column 4), 
while the beta connected to high sustainability performance is not significant (columns 5). The t-
test results provide strong support for H5, implying that high sustainability firms do not de-
escalate adoption following a SP controversy, while low sustainability firms de-escalate (t=3.43, 
pValue<0.001, df=2751). Finally, relative to industry environmental risk, we observe that firms in 
both high and medium environmental risk industries de-escalate adoption following a SP 
controversy (columns 6 and 7), but firms from high environmental risk industries de-escalate 
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adoption less than firms from medium environmental risk industries, a result consistent with H6. 
However, the t-test shows that the difference is not statistically significant (t=1.57, pValue=0.12, 
df=1224) and thus H6 is not supported. 
3.4.3 Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks to ensure that the results relative to H1 are not biased by our 
choice of research method, measure of SP controversy, panel choice or sample (selection bias). 
Results are presented in Table 3.5. For comparison purposes, column 1 includes the results from 
our initial analysis.  
Table 3.5 - Robustness checks – Method, measurement, panel, and sample 
  xtnbreg, fe xtgee ordinal 2002-2012 PSM 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 
Other environmental 
controversiest-1 
0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Firm sizet 0.14*** 0.45*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Sustainability commitmentt -0.10* 0.04 -0.09* -0.04 -0.03 
 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Environmental riskt 0.27* 0.43** 0.27* 0.18 -0.50** 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) 
Industry fixed-effects 
 
X 
   
Firm fixed-effects 
    
X 
Cumulative controversiest-1 -0.07*** -0.08** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.03** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant -2.39*** -6.30*** -2.38*** -3.02*** 0.56 
 
(0.52) (0.66) (0.53) (0.68) (0.63) 
Observations 3004 3117 3004 1605 1979 
chi2 3394.59 1602.27 3388.08 2382.24 4067.39 
OIM standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Year fixed-effects included for each model, but not shown 
aPSM = Propensity Score Matching 
While we initially evaluated H1 using fixed-effect (FE) negative binomial regression, such a 
method can only address within-firm variation (Dobrev et al. 2001). As noted previously, GEE 
models have also been used to evaluate negative binomially distributed count data, such as ours 
(Shah et al. 2016, Hofer et al. 2012). They are attractive because they can accommodate serial 
correlation, allow for robust standard errors, and address potential unobserved cross-sectional 
heterogeneity concerns, a source of latent heterogeneity (Greene 2012, Wowak et al. 2015). 
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Although our data did not exhibit autocorrelation, unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity may 
be present and affect our results. Therefore, we re-evaluate our results using a GEE model with a 
negative binomial distribution, a log linear-link function, and an exchangeable working correlation 
structure (it corrects for potential serial correlation by allowing shared correlation between 
observations within a group). As shown in column 2, the substantive results with the GEE model 
are almost identical to those from our original model (column 1). 
While the majority of firms that experience a controversy, experience only a single 
controversy in a given year, a small number of firms experience multiple controversies (one firm 
experienced as many as 15). To reduce the potential impact of outliers on our results, we repeat 
our analysis using an ordinal measure of SP controversy. For this measure; 0=no controversies, 
1=1 controversy, 2=2 controversies, 3=3 controversies, 4=4 or 5 controversies, and 5=6 or more 
controversies in a single year. The results from this analysis (column 3) are again almost identical 
to the original results, providing support for the conclusion that our results are not driven by 
outliers. Note that we also evaluated a binary measure of SP controversy when investigating H1 
(Table 3.2, column 1) and also found almost identical results. 
The results from the main model included all firms for which data was available. However, the 
behavior of new firms entering the panel each year regarding EMP adoption may systematically 
differ from firms that entered the panel earlier. To ensure that our results are not driven by our 
panel choice, we evaluate a reduced set of 149 firms for which data were available for each year in 
the panel. This resulted in 1605 firm-year observations (as compared to 401 firms and 3004 firm-
year observations in our main model). The results from this smaller sample are virtually identical 
to our original model (column 4). 
As a final robustness check, we investigate the possibility that self-selection bias may be 
contributing to our results. Self-selection bias would occur if firms are predisposed to experience a 
controversy (or not) based on characteristics of the industry in which they compete or attributes of 
the firm itself, such as small or large size. Such characteristics and attributes could then be 
over/under represented in the treated (experienced a controversy) and untreated samples, and 
impact our conclusions. A common method used to address such bias is Propensity Score 
Matching. In this method, firms are first evaluated with regard to their propensity to experience a 
SP controversy. Firms that ‘did’ and ‘did not’ experience a controversy, but had similar 
propensities to experience a controversy, are then matched against each other in the analysis. The 
results from this analysis are shown in column 5. Matching variables include; other environmental 
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controversies, firm size, sustainability performance, environmental risk, and year. The propensity 
score was estimated using Logit. While we observe a smaller beta connected to SP controversy, 
the sign is still negative and highly significant, suggesting that self-selection bias is not responsible 
for the behavioral results we observe. 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
3.5.1 Theoretical implications  
Interest in protecting the natural environment has never been more acute globally. Yet, more and 
more companies are experiencing SP controversies each year. As the first study to evaluate how 
firms respond to such controversies, with respect to the number of EMPs they adopt, it is 
especially timely and relevant since management actions following a controversy can significantly 
affect a firm’s on-going impact on the natural environment. We find that firms which experience a 
SP controversy respond, on average, by de-escalating on-going adoption of EMPs, i.e. they adopt 
fewer EMPs in future years than they would have adopted had the controversy(ies) not occurred 
and may even pause adoption altogether should they experience multiple controversies or more 
severe controversies. The slowdown seems to last for up to three years. Further, a comparison of 
scatterplots for firms who have experienced a controversy and those who haven’t (Figure 3.2) 
suggests that firms don’t recover from the slowdown in future years. We also observe that high 
sustainability firms do not de-escalate adoption following a SP controversy, suggesting that these 
firms take a different approach to resolve the issues underlying the SP event and related 
controversy. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these results next. 
Summarized results from all analyses are presented in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 - Summary of results 
Hypothesis Empirical Test 
Hypothesized 
Sign 
Empirical 
Analysis 
H1 (SP --> EMP) SPt-1 --> EMPt Negative −, Significant 
H2 (time) 
 
Negative 
 
 
SPt-1 --> EMPt 
 
−, Significant 
 
SPt-2 --> EMPt 
 
−, Significant 
 
SPt-3 --> EMPt 
 
−, significant 
 
SPt-4 --> EMPt 
 
Not significant 
H3 (severity as moderation) 
Moderated regression 
analysis 
Positive Not significant 
Moderation 
   
H4 (firm size) Subgroup analysis Positive Not significant 
H5 (sustainability performance) Subgroup analysis Positive +, Significant 
H6 (environmental risk) Subgroup analysis Positive Not significant 
3.5.1.1 Spills and Pollution Controversy and the Adoption of EMPs 
In H1, we hypothesize that most firms de-escalate EMP adoption following a SP controversy. Our 
results support this conclusion. We first show that firms, on average, respond to SP controversy 
(experiencing 1 or more unique controversies) by de-escalating on-going adoption of EMPs (Table 
3.2, column 2, β= -0.08). The observed beta translates into an approximate 8% de-escalation in the 
number of EMPs the firm would have adopted in the absence of a controversy (due to the negative 
binomial model, the effect is interpreted multiplicatively after exponentiation, i.e. 1 - expβ = 1 - 
exp-0.08 = 1 - 0.92 = 0.08 or an 8% reduction; Gardner et al. 1995). This equates to a de-escalation 
of approximately 1.5 EMPs (2013 average EMP adoption from Table 3.1 = 19.5; 8%*19.5=1.5). 
We also observe that each unique controversy can cause a 6% de-escalation (Table 3.2, column 3) 
or about 1.2 EMPs. Considering that firms which do not experience a controversy increase EMP 
adoption annually by about 2.1 EMPs (the slope of the line when regressing EMP adoption on year 
– see Table 3.1), the summary conclusion is that should a firm incur a single controversy, they will 
slow adoption, and should they incur multiple controversies in the same year they will de-escalate 
adoption further, possibly resulting in a complete pause in new adoption. These conclusions are 
robust to the method used for analysis, approach to measuring SP controversy, panel choice, and 
self-selection bias (see Table 3.5). Because EMPs include a broad set of practices which vary 
greatly in intent, scope, resource requirements, and intended performance (Sroufe et al. 2003), we 
conduct a final evaluation where we consider whether the de-escalation effect is universal or 
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focused on a certain type of EMP. Prior researchers have captured EMP differences by using 
various categorization schemes, such as whether the EMP has an operational, tactical or strategic 
focus (Montabon et al. 2007), whether it addresses pollution prevention, pollution control, or 
product stewardship (Hart 1995, Bansal 2005) or whether it is directed externally or internally 
(Matten & Moon 2008). We evaluate each of these categorization schemes, but do not find 
evidence of selective de-escalation (results available upon request). Thus, we conclude that the de-
escalation effect we observe affects all types of EMPs similarly. 
While the magnitude of the de-escalation is significant, we also observe that the slowdown 
seems to persist for up to three years (H2) and more controversies, or more severe controversies, 
cause greater de-escalation. However, while the severity of the controversy has a direct impact on 
the number of EMPs a firm adopts, it does not seem to amplify the impact of simply incurring one 
or more controversies (H3). This conclusion was established definitively for our cost attribute of 
severity, but results evaluating the two other measures of severity, scope and settlement, were 
inconclusive. To further evaluate the moderating impact of these additional severity attributes, we 
calculate the average number of EMPs adopted in the year following a controversy and partition 
the results by degree of severity (results available upon request). While increased severity appears 
to cause increased de-escalation, t-tests do not support that differences exist between subgroups. 
Thus, severity of the controversy (by any measure) does not seem to amplify the effect of a SP 
controversy on the number of EMPs a firm adopts. One final observation is that firms do not 
appear to recover from the slowdown, i.e. they never return to the level of adoption they would 
have realized had they not experienced a controversy. As evidence, simple scatterplots of EMP 
adoption over time show that firms which have experienced a controversy adopt 30% - 66% as 
many EMPs as firms which have not experienced a SP controversy (Figure 3.2). As such, the 
ultimate impact of the controversy on the number of EMPs a firm adopts, and the potential 
associated impact on environmental performance, may persist for the life of the firm. We 
summarize our findings visually in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 - Conceptual schema to represent results 
 
3.5.1.2 Role of firm size, sustainability commitment, and industry environmental risk 
In our final analyses (H4 – H6), we evaluate boundary conditions on the behavioral response we 
observe in H1. To this end, we evaluate the moderating role of two firm attributes, size and 
sustainability performance, and one industry attribute, environmental risk. We find that the 
decision to de-escalate adoption does not depend on the size of the firm or whether a firm 
competes in an industry which presents greater risk to the natural environment. However, we do 
observe that high sustainability firms do not de-escalate adoption following a SP controversy. We 
argue that such firms do not de-escalate adoption in order to demonstrate commitment to their a 
priori beliefs regarding the value of EMPs. This finding is important because it shows that firms 
pursue alternate strategies following a SP controversy. 
Taken together, the results paint a rather nuanced picture of how American manufacturing 
firms prioritize their environmental responsibilities. On one hand, we observe a direct and positive 
relationship between time and the numbers of EMPs firms adopt, and that this relationship is more 
pronounced for firms which have never experienced a SP controversy (Figure 3.2). This is very 
encouraging, as the number of EMPs a firm adopts is positively associated with improved 
environmental performance (Anton et al. 2004, Klassen & Whybark 1999, Potoski & Prakash 
2005, Toffel 2005, King & Lenox 2002). On the other hand, while the observed de-escalation in 
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adoption following a SP controversy may be a conscious and sensible attempt to secure time to 
assess root cause, learn, and develop more impactful environmental strategies, it may also suggest 
tepid senior leader commitment toward their environmental responsibility. If commitment is tepid, 
improved future environmental performance will require stronger environmental stakeholder 
oversight, as opposed to self-generated improvements initiated by responsible firm leaders. 
These results are interesting because previous research has not demonstrated the lingering 
effects of a SP controversy on managerial decision making. Although anecdotal evidence 
suggests long term effects, they have not been studied previously. They are particularly 
interesting because “small, incremental managerial decisions and actions are not easy to observe 
and evaluate objectively” (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996, p. 1204). Our results show that a firm 
which has faced a controversy not only adjusts its decisions accordingly, but also exhibits 
institutional memory where those decisions are concerned. 
3.5.2 Conclusion 
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature. First, we identify and examine 
how spill and pollution controvers(ies) impact the number of EMPs a firm adopts. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine this relationship. We empirically show that, contrary 
to received wisdom, firms de-escalate the adoption of EMPs following a SP controversy. 
Previous researchers have asserted that the patterns of managerial action required for developing 
and maintaining a preventative management system, like that needed to manage environmental 
performance, only evolve over long periods of time. Perhaps previous studies were not able to 
identify these short-term relationships because the measures used to assess EMP adoption were 
high level proxies, such as an environmental award (Klassen & McLaughlin 1996) or ISO 
certification (Gavronski et al. 2008, 2013, Delmas & Toffel 2008, King et al. 2005, King & 
Lenox 2001), which only result from longer term patterns of decision making. Perhaps 
aggregated and lagging proxies of EMP adoption do not provide an accurate estimate of which 
practices firms actually adopt to manage their environmental performance, nor do they allow 
researchers to track changes in the pattern of actions over time. By measuring the actual practices 
firms use to manage their environmental impact, we are able to immediately and accurately 
evaluate how firms respond to various stimuli, such as a SP controversy. 
Second, we evaluate an important driver of EMP adoption which is unrelated to stakeholder 
or institutional pressure. While numerous studies examine the adoption of EMPs, a majority of 
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them, especially at the organizational level, focus on why firms adopt, often using stakeholder and 
institutional theory to hypothesize that firms adopt in response to pressure from various 
stakeholders, both external and internal to the firm (Delmas 2001, Delmas & Toffel 2008, Reuter 
et al. 2010, Sarkis et al. 2010, Foster et al. 2000, Hofer et al. 2012). We have shown that the 
number of EMPs a firm adopts is a function of a SP controversy, which is disconnected from 
stakeholder or institutional theories. Moreover, we assess this relationship over time, lending 
credibility to the cause-effect nature of the relationship.  
Third, we broaden the definitional domain of EMP’s (as first put forth by Sroufe 2003). A 
more robust and nuanced measurement of EMP adoption allows for deeper understanding of the 
relationships connected to adoption. Finally, we provide additional evidence for the viability and 
value of using publicly reported environmental data to conduct environmental research. Such data 
is a valuable complement to the survey methods often used to conduct research in this area. While 
surveys provide specificity, they can be subject to key informant and common method bias (Roth 
2007; Gattiker & Parente 2007) and are difficult to replicate. Our data is gathered from multiple, 
secondary sources, and thus not subject to key informant or common method bias. Also, since it 
is publicly available, replication studies are possible. Further, its panel structure allows us to use 
advanced econometric methods, which provide greater control for rival explanations and the 
ability to investigate lagged relationships. In addition to the afore-mentioned advantages, our 
dataset also allows us to assess a significantly larger set of EMPs, a greater number of industries, 
and a larger set of firms, than prior studies. This improves the generalizability of, and confidence 
in, our conclusions.  
3.5.3 Limitations and venues for future research 
While we believe that our results provide compelling evidence in support of our conclusions, 
several potential limitations deserve mention. While we clearly demonstrate that an average 
firm de-escalates the adoption of EMPs in response to a SP controversy, and that they do not 
seem to recover from the slowdown in future years, we did not examine the impact of such a 
slowdown on future environmental performance. While we do not expect environmental 
performance to drop as a result of a SP controversy, we do expect de-escalation of future 
environmental performance improvements commensurate with the de-escalation in EMP 
adoption. Such an investigation might be a productive avenue for future research.   
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A second limitation is that our decision to focus on U.S. manufacturing firms may limit the 
generalizability of our findings. Future researchers could examine whether our results hold true 
in other countries, specifically in Europe. European countries have been noted to be more 
proactive than the United States with regard to environmental management. Increased 
proactivity might suggest more pressure on European firms to resolve their deficiencies and 
thus impact their response to a SP controversy. Ultimately, understanding how firms respond to 
a SP controversy is important to environmental stakeholders around the globe. 
A third limitation is using annual measures for EMP adoption and SP controversies. More 
granular time slices (such as quarterly or monthly) could help identify the detailed sequence of 
actions and reactions which define the broader firm response to a SP controversy. Our data can 
be thought of as aggregations of these short-term actions and reactions. Given that preventive 
management systems often evolve over time, our aggregated view might in fact provide a better 
understanding of overall management intent than a micro analysis of each individual step 
involved in that transition. 
A final limitation is that some firms may over-report EMP adoption due to socially 
desirable responding (Paulhus 2002). Because we are interested in changes in the number of 
EMPs a firm adopts from one year to the next in response to a SP controversy, reporting biases 
become inconsequential if the firm follows a consistent approach from year-to-year. However, 
should a firm switch from over-reporting to under-reporting, this could contribute to the de-
escalation we observe. However, the desire to over-report may be tempered because, (1) many 
firms have their environmental reports audited, while others leverage external reporting 
standards to ensure consistency in their reporting, and (2) informal auditing by customers, non-
government organizations (NGO’s) or government entities can result is severe consequences for 
firms which provide misleading information (Delmas & Cuerel Burbano 2011). 
Other opportunities to extend our results also exist. For example, it would be interesting to 
assess whether other types of negative firm events, such as a product recall, which may occur 
more frequently, generate firm responses similar to what we observe in the current research. It is 
possible, even likely, that other organizational “shocks” could also trigger a slowdown in the 
adoption of EMPs. It would also be interesting to evaluate whether adopting more EMPs reduces 
the occurrence (risk) of future SP controversies. An answer would be valuable to practitioners 
and researchers alike. 
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Chapter 4 - Do environmental controversies affect 
the product recall decision? 
4.1 Introduction 
On June 4th, 2012, U.S. national news outlets reported that Costco will pay $3.6M in fines for 
“improper storage, handling and disposal of hazardous waste and pharmaceutical waste products 
in many stores”.15  Similar public announcements of firm environmental failures occur regularly 
in many firms across industries, such as Ford, Pfizer, Honeywell, Wal-Mart, and Coca-Cola. 
Undoubtedly, environmental protection has gained greater visibility in the public psyche in recent 
years16 and every spill or pollution event attracts substantive media attention. Negative media 
attention from such events, which we term environmental controversies, has the potential to harm 
firms in a number of different ways. They are socially toxic for firms and can hamper on-going 
firm development (Garbarino 1995). They attract unwanted negative attention from government 
regulators, including fines and penalties (Sarkis et al. 2010, Delmas & Toffel 2004). They result 
in reduced stock prices and market valuations (ex. Klassen & McLaughlin 1996, Flammer 2013, 
Endrikat 2016). Finally, environmental controversies may generate concerns about a firm’s 
operational capability resulting in reputational losses that have uncertain long-term consequences 
(Flammer 2013, Karpoff et al. 2005, Jones & Rubin 2001).  
While market value and reputational losses are relatively obvious consequences of an 
environmental controversy, there may be less discernible, but equally important impacts on 
seemingly-unrelated firm decisions. We contend that the firm management would be in a difficult 
decision-making quandary if, after experiencing an environmental controversy, it is faced with 
another distinct and unrelated failure, albeit one that has similar negative attributes as an 
environmental controversy. Examples of such events include decisions to close or move facilities, 
outsource production, announce financial challenges or layoffs, or announce product quality 
issues, such as a product recall. It is not clear whether firm managers would choose to accelerate 
the release of the subsequent negative news or hold onto it and delay its release as a way to 
minimize additional fallout. In this paper, we focus on one such scenario and examine if the time 
to disclose a second piece of negative information changes if the firm has already had a negative 
experience, such as an environmental controversy. 
                                                          
15 https://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2012/06/04/costco-fined-waste-products-settlement.html 
16 http://www.people-press.org/2018/01/25/economic-issues-decline-among-publics-policy-priorities/ 
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Whether firms couple or decouple two pieces of negative news depends on management’s 
belief about the impact of the second announcement. Firms will accelerate the release of the 
second announcement and couple it with the first announcement if releasing them in relative time 
proximity is likely to reduce the negative impact of the second announcement (Gennotte & 
Trueman 1996). Alternately, firms will delay the second announcement if decoupling them 
reduces the impact of the subsequent failure on the firm (Kothari et al. 2009, Grenadier et al. 
2014, Chattopadhyay et al. 2001). Such coupling and decoupling have been studied previously in 
the context of accounting and financial information disclosures (Segal & Segal 2016, Dye 2010, 
Tse & Tucker 2010, Kothari et al. 2009). However, a vast majority of the papers examine two 
pieces of closely related information in a limited set of industries. We depart from this literature 
in two significant ways: first, we evaluate two unrelated negative news announcements, and 
second, we study them in a diverse set of industries. Specifically, we study whether an 
environmental controversy has an impact on a subsequent, seemingly-unrelated operational 
decision, a product recall, in the five largest recalling industries. Our primary research question 
is: Do prior environmental controversies impact the timing of a future product recall 
announcement? We believe that finding evidence in support of such a relationship will 
demonstrate that public environmental failures impact firms in surprising and important ways. 
We focus on a product recall as the subsequent failure because, like environmental 
controversies, it is socially toxic, raises questions about a firm’s operational capability, and 
attracts scrutiny from regulators. The timing of the recall announcement is of specific interest 
because it has significant potential repercussions for both firms and consumers. For firms, recalls 
are associated with reduced market share (Van Heerde, et al. 2007, Rhee & Haunschild 2006), 
lower share price (Chen, et al. 2009, Davidson & Worrell 1992, Jarrell & Peltzman 1985) and 
tainted public image (Archer & Wesolowsky 1996). For consumers, a delayed recall frequently 
results in inconvenience, personal suffering, and depending on the product, potential safety 
implications (Ball et al. 2017).  
In addition to assessing the nature of the relationship between an environmental controversy 
and the timing of a product recall, we evaluate whether the relationship is contingent upon the 
elapsed time between the controversy and the recall decision. Logically, the relative attention a 
negative or positive event is likely to garner from firm management should reduce with time. 
Thus, how management responds to the second event is likely to depend on the duration of time 
between the two events because management actions are directly related to the amount of 
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attention the event captures (Ocasio 1997). We use this logic to ground our second research 
question: Does the elapsed time between an environmental controversy and a subsequent product 
recall moderate the relationship between the controversy and the timing of a future product recall 
announcement? 
We investigate our research questions using an accelerated failure time model (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) and a 11-year panel data (2002 – 2013) from five industries 
which frequently recall products. These are auto, pharma, medical device, food, and consumer 
products. Our data spans 120 firms, and consists of 154 environmental controversies and 4355 
product recalls. The results show that firms which have experienced environmental controversies 
delay the product recall announcement by almost 50%; that is, they take significantly longer to 
announce a voluntary product recall. We also find that the longer it has been since the most recent 
controversy, the weaker the relationship between an environmental controversy and the timing of 
a recall. Our results are consistent across each recall industry, and robust to reverse causality, 
self-selection bias and the set of firms included in the sample. 
This study makes three important contributions. First, by showing that environmental 
performance affects a firm’s managerial decision making related to product quality, we contribute 
to the environmental management literature. While prior researchers have demonstrated that 
environmental failures that become public controversies result in market share and reputational 
losses, we demonstrate that they also impact important operational decisions, such as the timing 
of a product recall. By linking environment and operations management research, we bridge an 
important gap in the existing literature.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on product recalls. Because we only include recalls 
that are voluntarily initiated by firms, our results show that firms that have experienced an 
environmental controversy delay the product recall announcement when firm management has 
discretion in the timing of a recall. Our results imply that when managers have some discretion, 
they are likely to postpone recalling products when they are experiencing negative environmental 
pressure. This has important implications for product recall research because many studies treat 
recalls as an objective measure of product quality, and future researchers may need to reconsider 
this assumption. In environmental controversies, we also find a common leading indicator of 
recall timing across five industries which capture the vast majority of recalls in the U.S., making 
it the broadest recall study to-date.  
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Finally, we contribute to literature on information disclosures related to how firms manage 
multiple instances of bad news. Existing literature in this area is limited. A handful of studies that 
exist focus on bad news announcements that are related and investigates them in a narrow context 
limited to one or two industries. In contrast, we examine events, which are seemingly unrelated. 
Moreover, our finding that managers tend to delay the release of a second instance of bad news is 
more generalizable because we include multiple industries.   
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
In this section, we first develop a theoretical relationship between an environmental controversy 
and a product recall. In this relationship, the timing of the environmental controversy is assumed 
to be exogenous to the firm and precedes the decision to recall a product. The timing of the 
product recall is a discretionary decision made by firm managers, given knowledge that the firm 
has already experienced an environmental controversy. We subsequently develop formal research 
hypotheses which detail the form of the relationship, i.e. they answer the questions of whether 
firm managers prefer to couple or decouple operational bad news and whether the influence of an 
environmental controversy on firm decision making diminishes over time.  
4.2.1 Environmental controversies and product recalls 
On the surface, a voluntary product recall announcement would seem unrelated to whether a firm 
had recently experienced an environmental controversy. Instead, recall decisions would seem to 
reflect a rational balance between the costs/risks to conduct or forgo a recall. However, while 
seemingly-unrelated, environmental controversies and product recalls share several unique 
characteristics important to firm managers. We describe them briefly below. 
Environmental controversies and product recalls are both socially toxic because they 
constrain on-going firm development (Garbarino 1995). Social toxicity is observed in how 
stakeholders critical to firm development express their disappointment. For instance, customers 
withhold sales leading to market share losses, investors sell shares leading to share price 
reduction, and the general public reduces their opinion of the firm resulting in reputational losses. 
Without the support of customers, investors, and the public (a source of future customers), firms 
are unable to grow and develop. Both failures also generate questions about a firm’s operational 
capability. As such, environmental controversies and product recalls may raise doubts in a firm 
customers’ and investors’ minds about management’s ability to effectively manage their 
operations and prevent future failures. These doubts may explain, in part, the market share and 
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stock price declines associated with environmental controversies and product recalls. Finally, 
environmental controversies and product recalls are uniquely related because both are closely 
monitored by federal and state regulatory agencies, and attract undesirable attention, oftentimes in 
the form of fines and penalties. 
In sum, we conclude that environmental controversies and product recalls are related because 
they share unique characteristics important to firm managers, i.e. they (i) are socially toxic, (ii) 
demonstrate weakness in firm operational capabilities, and (iii) attract attention from government 
regulators. These characteristics may be, at least in part, responsible for the share price, market 
share, and reputational losses associated with these events. As such, we suspect that firm 
managers manipulate the timing of a product recall following an environmental controversy to 
minimize additional fallout from another negative event which shares these characteristics. This 
link between an environmental controversy and a product recall motivates the following 
hypotheses which explore whether firm managers decelerate or accelerate recall announcements 
following an environmental controversy, and whether the influence of an environmental 
controversy on firm decision-making diminishes over time. 
4.2.2 Firm disclosures of bad news 
Our study is informed by the rich literature related to information disclosure in the context of 
finance and accounting information at publicly traded firms. A majority of this literature is 
focused on the content (i.e. what information is released), timing (i.e. when the information is 
released), and motives (i.e. why the information is released) behind information disclosure. In the 
context of timing, most researchers have looked at releasing a single piece of bad news. This set 
of papers shows that firms may couple their release with bad news announcements from other 
firms. This phenomenon is known as blending in with the crowd (Grenadier et al. 2014) or 
herding (Tse & Tucker 2010) and rests on the idea that if multiple firms disclose similar pieces of 
bad news, the root cause of poor performance may not be firm specific. Instead, it could be 
attributed to factors outside firm control, such as a weak economy.  
An emerging sub-stream of information disclosure research specifically examines how one 
firm releases two pieces of bad news. We focus on this set of papers in our review as they are 
most directly related to our research, with one nuance. While most of the previous studies 
examine two pieces of news that are somewhat related in nature, our study focuses on two pieces 
of news which would appear to be unrelated: an exogenous event in the form of environmental 
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controversy and an operational decision in the form of product recall, where the firm has some 
leeway in terms of announcement timing. Notwithstanding this nuance, we believe that the 
lessons generally apply and briefly review this literature in developing our hypotheses below. 
A foundational concept in this literature is that because managers disclose information, not 
firms, timing and content of disclosure is a function of the value managers derive from such 
decisions (Beyer et al. 2010). Value is appropriated due to the information asymmetry that exists 
between managers and investors, and agency theory suggests that the interests of managers and 
investors are not always aligned. When facing the decision to publicly disclose bad news, firm 
management may either accelerate or delay the second piece of news. In making this decision, 
firm management is guided by a desire to reduce the informativeness of the news, thereby 
reducing the negative impact of the bad news on the firm. Informativeness can be described as the 
ability of the news to convey information regarding the capability or quality of the firm’s 
management team (Grenadier et al. 2014). If coupling the current bad news with prior bad news 
reduces informativeness (Gennotte & Trueman 1996), managers may accelerate the 
announcement of bad news. Alternately, if informativeness can be reduced by releasing the news 
when key stakeholders are less attentive (Segal & Segal 2016), they may delay the release of bad 
news.  
Relative to accelerating bad news, Gennotte & Trueman (1996) show that when a firm has 
two pieces of corporate financial information to disclose, managers maximize firm value by 
coupling bad news and decoupling good news. The authors reason that management couples bad 
news because markets can only process so much information in one release. Separating good 
news allows firms to maximize the value of each announcement, while bundling bad news 
reduces the negative impact of each announcement made independently. However, in our context, 
many product recalls may not occur in close-enough time proximity to an environmental 
controversy to realize value from coupling. Thus, while accelerating the product recall 
announcement following an environmental controversy is a theoretical possibility, it is practically 
unrealistic in our context. As such, we focus on the alternate scenario of delaying the product 
recall announcement. 
Here, researchers have shown that firms, on average, delay the release of bad news (Kothari 
et al. 2009) and that bad news is especially withheld if it speaks poorly to the abilities of firm 
managers (Grenadier et al. 2014). Researchers also find that a manager’s desire to withhold bad 
news seems to be a function of career concerns, as subsequent corporate events may allow 
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managers to bury the bad news (Kothari et al 2009, Nagar et al. 2003, Nagar 1999). A variety of 
scandals demonstrate that manager’s personal incentives motivate them to withhold important 
information from stakeholders.17  In sum, it seems clear that firm managers would typically prefer 
to delay the announcement of a product recall, as delay is perceived to be less risky to the firm 
and their careers. However, in our research context, the firm will have already experienced at 
least one environmental controversy prior to the recall decision. We know from the threat-rigidity 
hypothesis that risk aversion increases when managers are confronted with an organizational 
threat (Chattopadhyay et al. 2001). Thus, given an existing threat in the form of an environmental 
controversy, and an understanding that firm managers perceive delay as the least risky decision, 
firm managers will choose to delay the recall. Hypothesis 1 represents this logic: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): An environmental controversy is associated with a delayed time to 
recall.  
4.2.3 Environmental controversies and the passage of time 
Beyond assessing the nature of the relationship between an environmental controversy and the 
timing of a product recall, we are interested in understanding whether the influence of an 
environmental controversy on the timing of a product recall diminishes as the controversy ages, 
i.e. the elapsed time between the controversy and the recall decision increases. We know that 
what decision-makers do is a function of what captures their attention (Ocasio 1997). Those 
issues which capture more managerial attention will have a greater impact on managerial 
decision-making. In our case, environmental controversies which are fresh in a manager’s mind 
should have greater influence on decision making, as expressed through the timing of the recall 
announcement. As controversies age, we would expect their impact on managerial behavior to 
diminish. In sum, we contend that the passage of time since the most recent environmental 
controversy serves to dampen the effect of a controversy on the timing of a recall. If Hypothesis 1 
is true, the passage of time since the most recent controversy will result in less delay. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relationship between environmental controversy and the time to 
recall is moderated by the time since the environmental controversy, such that the longer 
the time since the controversy, the weaker the relationship between controversy and the 
time to recall 
                                                          
17 See Charton (2006), Kothari et al. (2006), Bergstresser & Phillipon (2006), Burns & Kedia (2006), and 
Cheng & Warfield (2005) for examples. 
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4.3 Data and Variables 
4.3.1 Sample and data sources 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between an environmental controversy and a product 
recall. Environmental controversy data was obtained from Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 database. 
ASSET4 has been used in prior studies to examine causes and effects of environmental and 
socially responsible firm practices (Iannou and Serefeim, 2012; Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al. 
2014). We incorporate a novel measure from ASSET4 that to our knowledge has not been used in 
prior studies, that of “spill and pollution controversies”. For convenience, we subsequently refer 
to this measure as “environmental controversies”. This measure captures "events published in the 
media linked to chemical, oil, and fuel spills, as well as controversies related to the overall 
impacts of the company on the environment". They can include "any of the company activities 
which may directly or indirectly pollute the environment or the surrounding area, be it air, water 
or soil, or cause pollution".18  In assembling this data, Thomson Reuters collects news from 
various public and private sources, including company issued press releases, company websites, 
and media publications. Duplicate news reports are removed before making the data available to 
researchers. Note that ASSET4 does not report the date when the event occurred, but instead 
focuses on the date when the firm experienced negative media attention due to an environmental 
event. Environmental controversy data was gathered for years 2002 through 2013. 
Product recall data are obtained through multiple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests and from U.S. regulatory websites. Auto recalls were collected from the National 
Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA). Medical device, pharmaceutical and food 
recalls were collected from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and consumer product 
recall were collected from the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).19  While all the 
agencies provide the firm name and the recall date, they vary greatly in the other details they 
provide. For instance, the FDA includes a recall classification which categorizes recalls into 
different classes based on severity, but the NHTSA and CPSC do not provide severity measures. 
Also, while the NHTSA accurately reports the number of vehicles associated with an automotive 
recall, the FDA and CPSC provide inconsistent measures of recall volume, such as five lots, six 
cartons, or 50 units. Because of this inconsistency, we cannot reliably include recall severity or 
                                                          
18 http://www.trcri.com/index.php?page=asset4 
19 FDA also oversees cosmetic, biologic and veterinary industries. Because of their similarity, we include 
cosmetic and biologic recalls in the pharmaceutical category, and veterinary in the food category. 
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recall volume in this study. Additionally, while the NHTSA mandates approximately 20% of the 
automotive recalls, the FDA and CPSC do not normally force firms to recall their products. We 
therefore only use voluntary recalls in our study because we explore how firms behaviorally 
respond to an environmental controversy. Financial data used to compute control variables was 
obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
In determining the sample frame for our study, our goal was to be as inclusive and 
comprehensive as possible. Thus, we collected data from all industries, and their constituent 
firms, which had the potential to experience both an environmental controversy and a product 
recall. However, while most firms that could experience a recall could also experience an 
environmental controversy, the opposite may not always be true. For example, on April 24, 2012 
the Department of Justice announced that Freeport-McMoRan mining company had agreed to pay 
$6.8M in penalties for environmental damages caused by their copper mining operations in 
Arizona.20 However, since they don’t make products, they do not experience product recalls. To 
develop a list of industries from our data which could experience both a recall and an 
environmental controversy, we began with 4-digit SIC codes for all industries in our recall data. 
We chose 4-digit SIC codes to define industries to be consistent with prior research and to be 
restrictive in our identification of comparable firms which could experience both an 
environmental controversy and a product recall (King et al. 2005, King & Lenox 2001). The 
industries from our recall data were then matched to industries included within our environmental 
controversy data (ASSET4), i.e. industries which could have experienced environmental 
controversy. In this way, we limited our environmental controversy data to only those industries 
in which recalls were possible. In other words, if a 4-digit SIC code from ASSET4 was not 
present in the recalling data, we did not include it in the study.  
After establishing an industry set, we then determined which firms to include from each 
chosen industry. Because the recalling data included all firms within an industry, while the 
controversy data did not, we began by considering only firms tracked in our controversy data. We 
then removed any firms that did not experience either a controversy or a recall, as these firms are 
non-informative. Firms were matched across datasets using stock ticker symbols. The final 
sample included 120 publicly traded firms from 59 industries, 154 environmental controversies, 
and 4355 product recalls representing five recalling industries that account for a vast majority of 
                                                          
20 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/freeport-mcmoran-corp-and-freeport-mcmoran-morenci-inc-will-pay-68-
million-damages-injuries 
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recalls. These are automotive, medical device, pharmaceutical, food, and consumer products.21  
Because ASSET4 data is not available prior to 2002, the timeframe of our sample is from 2002 to 
2013. Table 4.1 provides a summary of our sample, including a count of firms, controversies and 
recalls across the panel time period, broken out by recall industry. 
Table 4.1 - Controversy and recall counts 
 
Auto Pharma Med device Food Consumer Total 
# of controversies 14 13 31 28 68 154 
# of recalls 1055 1230 1756 138 176 4355 
No. of observations 1069 1243 1787 166 244 4509 
# of firms with controversies and no recalls 1 1 9 6 6 23 
# of firms with recalls and no controversies 4 10 26 13 18 71 
# of firms with controversies & recalls 4 4 3 4 11 26 
No. of firms 9 15 38 23 35 120 
Note: The number of controversies and recalls sum to the total number of observations. 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our research is the time to product recall. It is measured as the number 
of days from a firm’s entry in the dataset to the product recall announcement. The time starts 
when the firm is first tracked by ASSET4, as this is the limiting dataset (the recall database 
evaluates a broader timeframe), and ends when the firm files the necessary paperwork with the 
appropriate federal oversight agency. Filing the paperwork and announcing the recall, which 
informs customer, investors, and the public of the intent to recall, generally occur concurrently or 
within very close time proximity. We also evaluate only unique recalls. Duplicates are manually 
removed from the dataset by reading each recall description and using identifiers provided by the 
federal oversight agencies to identify duplicate and closely related recalls.  
4.3.2.2 Independent variables                                                                                                                    
The independent variable in our study is an environmental controversy. We measure 
environmental controversies in two ways. We first capture a rolling count of the number of 
                                                          
21 The 5 recalling industries include the following 4-digit SIC codes: 2000, 2020, 2030, 2033, 2040, 2050, 
2060, 2080, 2086, 2090, 2300, 2400, 2510, 2590, 2621, 2670, 2750, 2810, 2820, 2834, 2836, 2840, 2842, 
2844, 2851, 2860, 2870, 3021, 3089, 3490, 3510, 3523, 3540, 3561, 3570, 3576, 3577, 3578, 3600, 3630, 
3663, 3670, 3674, 3679, 3711, 3714, 3728, 3790, 3812, 3822, 3823, 3826, 3841, 3842, 3844, 3845, 3861, 
3942, 3944 
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controversies a firm experiences across its panel (Cumulative Controversies). We begin counting 
when the firm is first tracked by ASSET4 and zeros are included for observations prior to the first 
recorded controversy. The count is then incremented by one when the next controversy occurs 
and so on. We subsequently create a dichotomous measure of controversy (Dichotomous 
Controversy) to evaluate whether the absence/presence (0/1) of environmental controversy prior 
to the recall impacts the time to recall. To create this measure, all Cumulative Controversy counts 
above 0 were converted to ones. While the cumulative measure was used throughout the analyses, 
including robustness checks and post hoc, evaluating a dichotomous measure allowed us to 
evaluate whether firms respond to a count of controversies differently than to the simple presence 
of prior environmental controversy. 
4.3.2.3 Moderation variables 
Days Since Controversy. To examine Hypothesis 2, we measure for each firm the time in days 
from the most recent controversy. The counter is reset when the same firm experiences a 
subsequent controversy. Observations prior to the first controversy are recorded as zeros. Because 
this variable is positively skewed, we use the natural log of the raw count in the analysis. 
4.3.2.4 Control variables 
Year. Regulatory policies may become more or less strict over time, potentially affecting firm 
decisions regarding recalls (Ball et al. 2017). To control for this, we use an indicator variable for 
each year of the panel and treat 2002 as the reference category.  
Sales revenue. Larger firms likely experience more recalls than smaller firms (Ball et al. 2017). 
This experience may in turn impact recall behavior. To control for this possibility, we include 
sales revenue as a proxy for firm size (Hofer et al. 2012, Delmas & Toffel 2008). Because this 
variable is positively skewed, we use the natural log of annual sales revenue in all analyses 
(Hofer et al. 2012, Delmas & Toffel 2008). 
Return on Sales. Firm profitability has been shown to impact firm behavior (Zhang et al. 2008). 
In the current context, firms that are more efficient and profitable may behave differently when 
considering product recall decisions. To ensure these potential behavioral differences do not 
influence our results, we control for profitability, using return on sales as a proxy (Hofer et al. 
2012). Return on sales is calculated as the net income of a firm for a given year divided by sales. 
R&D intensity. R&D intensity has been shown in past literature to affect the number of recalls 
(Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). We thus control for R&D intensity at the firm level, measuring it as 
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the ratio of R&D expenses to firm sales. Because this variable is positively skewed, we use the 
natural log of this measure in all analyses.  
Firms. There are 120 firms in our sample, all of which may have different propensities to recall 
that do not change over time. To control for heterogeneity across firms, we include 119 indicator 
variables in all analyses. 
Past Recalls. Past recalls could be indicative of future recalls. Following the approach taken by 
Ball et al. (2017), we create a measure of past recalls by counting all recalls experienced by a firm 
over the past 36 months.22  Because this variable is positively skewed, we use the natural log of 
this measure in all analyses. 
4.4 Analysis and Results 
4.4.1 Empirical strategy 
We are interested in identifying the nature of the relationship between environmental controversy 
and the timing of a product recall announcement. More specifically, we want to understand 
whether environmental controversy extends or shortens the time to recall, or perhaps, has no 
impact at all. Given that our dependent variable, the product recall decision, captures time to an 
event, survival analysis is ideal and has been used extensively in similar settings in the literature 
(Ball et al. 2017, Harhoff & Wagner 2009, Ramdas & Randall 2008, Bhattacharjee et al. 2007). 
Two popular categories of methods used to analyze survival data include proportional hazards 
approaches (PH) and accelerated failure time models (AFT). Proportional hazard models use the 
hazard function to model the effect of covariates on an event. Exponentiated beta coefficients 
associated with the covariates yield hazard ratios, which can be interpreted as the instantaneous 
probabilities at a given time that a failure will occur, as compared to the baseline hazard. The 
baseline hazard is the probability of a failure at a given time should all covariates equal zero. 
Hazard ratios greater than 1 are interpreted as an increased probability of an event occurring due 
to the covariate. Alternately, AFT models capture the relationship between covariates and an 
event through a survivor function. Exponentiated beta coefficients associated with the covariates 
yield time ratios, which are interpreted as the expected survival probability at a given time 
compared to the baseline survivor probability at that same time (when all covariates are set at 0). 
A time ratio above 1 suggests that the covariate extends the time to the event. In sum, an 
                                                          
22 We examined our results with 12 and 24 months of past recalls as well and our conclusions remain 
unchanged. 
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advantage of AFT models is the ability to directly interpret coefficients as changes in duration, 
whereas coefficients from PH models relate to changes in risks of exiting the sample at some 
point in time (Harhoff & Wagner 2009). This feature is especially attractive in our research 
context, given our desire to predict whether an environmental controversy extends or contracts 
the time to recall. As such, we analyze our survival data using the AFT model (STREG in Stata).  
Accelerated failure time models have been used in similar studies that investigate the future 
hazard of one event following a different type of event (Harfoff & Wagner 2009, Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). In our setting, we treat each recall as a failure and use the time 
duration from entry to the date of the recall as our dependent variable, the time to recall. Because 
there could be multiple recalls for a given firm across the panel, we use a recurrent event, 
accelerated failure time model, with clustered standard errors at the firm level, and an exponential 
survival distribution.  We chose an exponential survival distribution because this is the most 
commonly used form of an accelerated failure time model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) 
and because the instantaneous risk of a recall occurring should be constant over time; however, 
our results are robust to other distribution choices available in STATA.23  Note that in an 
accelerated failure time model, a positive beta coefficient indicates an extended time to recall, 
while a negative beta coefficient indicates a reduced time to recall. 
4.4.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 4.2. We include time in data (TID) as 
a proxy for our dependent variable, time to recall (TTR). We first notice that all model variables 
are correlated with TID. Revenue, return on sales, cumulative past recalls, cumulative 
controversies (CC), dichotomous controversies, and days since controversy (DSC) are positively 
correlated, while R&D intensity is negatively correlated with TID. We also notice correlation 
between variables in our study, which could indicate potential multicollinearity problems. To 
assess possible multicollinearity concerns, we compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for 
control and independent variables in all models. We find that VIFs are less than 2 for variables in 
each model, indicating a low risk for multicollinearity (Kutner et al. 2005). 
                                                          
23 Exponential, Lognormal, and Gompertz distributions all produced similar results. Weibull, Loglogistic, 
and Generalized Gamma distributions did not converge. 
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Table 4.2 - Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
    Mean Min Max SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Time in data 2,093 5 4,375 1,195 1 
       2 Revenue 44,282 383 274,102 55,087 0.16* 1 
      3 Return on sales 0.10 -1.33 0.85 0.10 0.12* -0.17* 1 
     4 R&D intensity 0.08 0 10.56 0.23 -0.04* -0.13* -0.08* 1 
    5 Cumulative past recalls 48.59 0 186 39.39 0.38* 0.21* 0.02 0.05* 1 
   6 Cumulative controversies 0.52 0 24 1.68 0.14* 0.28* -0.03 -0.08* -0.20* 1 
  7 Dichotomous Controversies 0.16 0 1 0.37 0.05* 0.41* -0.07* -0.07* -0.20* 0.69* 1 
 8 Days since controversy 125.33 0 3332 437.3 0.09* 0.42* -0.06* -0.07* -0.12* 0.61* 0.65* 1 
*p<0.05 
 Note: Variables are non-transformed variables for interpretation purposes 
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Results from evaluating the direct relationship between environmental controversy and time 
to recall are presented in Table 4.3. In Hypothesis 1, we propose that managers will delay the 
product recall to reduce the informativeness of the recall announcement, should it occur, and 
because it is presents the least risk to their careers. We first include all our control variables 
(column 1) and observe that each year dummy is positive and significant, indicating a longer time 
to recall in reference to 2002. We also notice that increased R&D intensity is positively correlated 
with time to recall, suggesting that firms focused on product development are not only more 
likely to experience a recall (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011), but also less likely to initiate a recall. 
In column 2, we include our binary measure of controversy which captures whether a firm 
has experienced environmental controversy (1 or more controversies) prior to the recall. Results 
provide support for Hypothesis 1, as the coefficient for Dichotomous Controversies is positive 
and statistically significant (β= 0.39, p<0.008). As discussed previously, the exponentiated 
coefficient represents a time ratio, which is interpreted as a change in the time to recall resulting 
from a unit change in the independent variable. Thus, a beta of 0.39 corresponds to a time ratio of 
1.48, indicating that firms delay a recall by 48% if they had previously experienced 
environmental controversy. 
We subsequently evaluate whether the impact on time to recall is related to the number of 
environmental controversies a firm has experienced prior to the recall. The results of Cumulative 
Controversy on time to recall is presented in Column 3. The coefficient (β= 0.09, p<0.016) is 
positive and statistically significant. The results suggest that each controversy over the 
measurement window incrementally extends the time to recall by 10%. As a simple robustness 
check of outliers on this result, we remove firms from the sample which conducted the most 
recalls. We observe no noticeable changes to our conclusion. As a set, the results suggest that 
both the presence of environmental controversy and the accumulation of controversies delays the 
time to recall.24  Because the Cumulative Controversy measure provides more information than 
the Dichotomous Controversies measure, we use it in all subsequent models. 
  
                                                          
24 Quadratic effects of controversy do not demonstrate any significance 
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Table 4.3 - Estimation results from AFT models (Time to recall) 
  1 2 3 
2003 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
2004 1.39*** 1.35*** 1.37*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
2005 1.72*** 1.67*** 1.70*** 
 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
2006 2.02*** 1.96*** 1.99*** 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
2007 2.24*** 2.15*** 2.19*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
2008 2.42*** 2.32*** 2.35*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
2009 2.57*** 2.46*** 2.49*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
2010 2.72*** 2.61*** 2.63*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
2011 2.91*** 2.79*** 2.82*** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
2012 3.07*** 2.94*** 2.96*** 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
2013 3.20*** 3.07*** 3.08*** 
 
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
ln(Revenue) -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 
 
(0.19) (0.16) (0.17) 
Return on Sales 0.22+ 0.21+ 0.24+ 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
ln(R&D intensity) 0.30+ 0.31* 0.32* 
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
ln(Past recalls) 0.05 0.05 0.06+ 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Dichotomous Controversy 
 
0.39** 
 
  
(0.15) 
 Cumulative Controversy 
 
 0.09* 
  
 (0.04) 
Constant 23.07*** 22.02*** 21.86*** 
 
(1.90) (1.71) (1.77) 
Number of firms 120 120 120 
Observations 4509 4509 4509 
Wald Chi2 2139.62 2155.33 2158.47 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Firm fixed effects included, not shown. 
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We next evaluate Hypothesis 2, in which we postulated that the impact of a controversy on 
time to recall will diminish as the controversy ages. In Table 4.1 we see that 49 of the total 120 
firms experience a controversy during the time-frame of our study and the remaining 71 firms do 
not. Therefore, these 71 firms do not have values for Days Since Controversy (DSC) and cannot 
be included in the analysis to evaluate Hypothesis 2. As such, in Table 4.4 we provide the results 
of the analysis using the 49 firms. For consistency, we first repeat the analysis used to evaluate 
Hypothesis 1 with our reduced sample (column 1) and find that the results are substantively the 
same as in Table 4.3, column 3. This lends important support for the recall postponement effect 
we observed when evaluating Hypothesis 1. We next include DSC (column 2) and then the 
interaction effect of Cumulative Controversies and DSC (column 3). We observe in column 3 that 
the interaction term is negative and significant (β= -0.02, p<0.01), providing support for 
Hypothesis 2. The results indicate that while the effect of Cumulative Controversies remains 
positive and significant for the set of firms that experience a controversy, this effect is weakened 
as the time from the most recent controversy increases. However, the small beta also suggests that 
environmental controversies release their hold on firm behavior very slowly. 
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Table 4.4 - Estimation results from AFT models (Days since controversy) 
  1 2 3 
2003 1.22*** 1.22*** 1.22*** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
2004 1.69*** 1.72*** 1.70*** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
2005 1.90*** 1.95*** 1.92*** 
 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) 
2006 2.29*** 2.35*** 2.31*** 
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
2007 2.55*** 2.65*** 2.57*** 
 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
2008 2.76*** 2.87*** 2.78*** 
 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
2009 2.77*** 2.89*** 2.83*** 
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
2010 2.83*** 2.97*** 2.93*** 
 
(0.25) (0.21) (0.22) 
2011 3.05*** 3.22*** 3.20*** 
 
(0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
2012 3.23*** 3.39*** 3.38*** 
 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25) 
2013 3.45*** 3.58*** 3.57*** 
 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.26) 
ln(Revenue) -0.15 -0.21 -0.22 
 
(0.40) (0.39) (0.38) 
Return on Sales 0.77 0.81 0.79 
 
(0.55) (0.53) (0.51) 
ln(R&D intensity) 0.43 0.50 0.64 
 
(0.79) (0.81) (0.76) 
ln(Past recalls) -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Cumulative Controversy 0.10** 0.10** 0.22*** 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
ln(Days Since Controversy) 
 
-0.03 -0.00 
  
(0.03) (0.02) 
Cum. Controversy x ln(Days Since Controversy) 
  
-0.02** 
   
(0.01) 
Constant 1.22*** 1.22*** 1.22*** 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Number of firms 49 49 49 
Observations 1014 1014 1014 
Wald Chi2 625.42 626.92 629.83 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Firm fixed effects included, not shown. 
4.5 Robustness checks 
 We perform three important robustness checks to rule out the possibility that sample selection 
bias, reverse causality, and choice of sample are impacting our results. We first address possible 
sample selection bias resulting from differences in firm characteristics which may predispose a 
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firm to experience a controversy or not. If specific characteristics, such as size or profitability, 
increase a firm’s probability to experience an environmental controversy, these characteristics 
will be over-represented in the sample of firms experiencing a controversy. Should these same 
characteristics also impact the timing of a recall, the relationship we observe between an 
environmental controversy and the timing of a recall may actually be due to these characteristics, 
rather than the controversy. One way to control for sample selection bias is to perform a nearest 
neighbor matching analysis (NNMATCH in STATA). In this analysis, firm observations are 
weighted to ensure both the treated (experienced an environmental controversy) and untreated 
groups are equally represented with respect to firm characteristics which may impact the timing 
of a recall. We use recalls over the next 12 months as our dependent variable, our Dichotomous 
Controversy measure as the treatment variable, and our control and independent variables as 
matching variables. Results are shown in Table 4.5. The average treatment effect for this 
matching algorithm is β= -11.5 (p<0.0001), suggesting that experiencing a controversy results in 
significantly fewer recalls in the subsequent 12 months. Fewer recalls can be interpreted as both 
recalls that did not happen and recalls which were delayed beyond the evaluation timeframe and 
thus not counted, providing support for our original conclusion. We conclude that after 
controlling for aspects of a firm which increase its chances of experiencing a controversy, the 
occurrence of a controversy seems to delay the recall decision, i.e. sample selection bias is not 
likely influencing our results. 
Table 4.5 - Robustness check – Sample selection bias 
Specification 
Treatment 
groupa 
Control 
groupb 
Average treatment 
effect on the treated 
Standard 
error 
z-
statistic pValue 
Nearest neighbor 758 3751 -11.46 2.8 -4.10 0.000 
aFirms that experienced a controversy 
bFirms that did not experience a controversy 
We next explore how recalls serve to predict, or not predict, environmental controversies. 
While there is no logical, theoretical reason for a relationship between past recalls and future 
controversies, we needed to test this relationship to ensure that reverse causality is not present. 
The presence of reverse causality might suggest that an omitted variable is at least partially 
responsible for the simultaneous relationship and our conclusions regarding the relationship 
between controversies and recalls would be suspect. We present the output of our test for reverse 
causality in Table 4.6. We again evaluate an AFT model in which we changed the failure from a 
recall to a controversy and the independent variable is now a cumulative count of past recalls. 
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The control variables remain the same, with the exception that we added a count of prior 
controversies as an additional control. In this model, reverse causality would be indicated by a 
significant coefficient connected to Past Recalls. We see no such significance, eliminating 
concern for reverse causality. 
Table 4.6 - Robustness check – Reverse causality (Time to controversy) 
  1 
2003 0.88* 
 
(0.40) 
2004 1.52* 
 
(0.60) 
2005 2.27** 
 
(0.77) 
2006 2.08** 
 
(0.70) 
2007 2.06*** 
 
(0.44) 
2008 2.19*** 
 
(0.56) 
2009 2.57*** 
 
(0.59) 
2010 2.88*** 
 
(0.61) 
2011 3.42*** 
 
(0.72) 
2012 3.76*** 
 
(0.78) 
2013 3.88*** 
 
(0.67) 
ln(Revenue) -0.41 
 
(0.80) 
Return on Sales -0.87 
 
(1.97) 
ln(R&D intensity) 2.99 
 
(2.82) 
Cumulative Controversy -0.08+ 
 
(0.05) 
ln(Past recalls) 0.12 
 
(0.21) 
Constant 6.20 
 
(7.09) 
Number of firms 120 
Observations 4509 
Wald Chi2 910.12 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Firm fixed effects included, not shown. 
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As a final robustness check, we restrict our sample to include only firms which experienced 
both a recall and a controversy. As mentioned previously, our sample includes 3 types of firms; 
(1) those which experienced a controversy but not a recall, (2) those that experienced a recall but 
not a controversy, and (3) those which experienced both a recall and a controversy. Each type was 
included because it provides information important for understanding firm behavior in our 
research setting. While firms from Group 1 did not recall a product, their competitors did recall 
products. While the lack of a recall may suggest high product quality, it is also possible that these 
firms faced quality issues but simply chose not to recall. It was important to capture this unique 
behavioral profile in our model (Ball et al. 2017). Firms from Group 2 were included because 
they helped establish a baseline for how firms conduct recalls in the absence of an environmental 
controversy. However, only Group 3 includes firms which we can be certain experienced both a 
controversy and a recall, and thus directly provides an opportunity to evaluate the behavioral 
response of interest, i.e. how firms conduct product recalls following an environmental 
controversy. We conducted our evaluation exactly as before, but simply limited our sample to 
firms from Group 3. In total, 26 firms experienced both a controversy and a recall, including 103 
controversies and 860 recalls. As observed in Table 4.7, our results did not change. Each 
controversy extends the time to recall by 10%.  
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Table 4.7 - Robustness check – Sample selection (Firms with both recalls and controversies) 
  1 
2003 1.22*** 
 
(0.13) 
2004 1.69*** 
 
(0.15) 
2005 1.90*** 
 
(0.16) 
2006 2.29*** 
 
(0.15) 
2007 2.55*** 
 
(0.19) 
2008 2.76*** 
 
(0.18) 
2009 2.77*** 
 
(0.16) 
2010 2.83*** 
 
(0.25) 
2011 3.05*** 
 
(0.20) 
2012 3.23*** 
 
(0.21) 
2013 3.45*** 
 
(0.21) 
ln(Revenue) -0.15 
 
(0.41) 
Return on Sales 0.77 
 
(0.56) 
ln(R&D intensity) 0.43 
 
(0.80) 
ln(Past recalls) -0.01 
 
(0.08) 
Cumulative Controversy 0.10** 
 
(0.04) 
Constant 6.35 
 
(4.33) 
Number of firms 26 
Observations 963 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Firm fixed effects included, not shown. 
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4.6 Post hoc 
In this analysis, we address the disparate recall industries in our study. Note that while we could 
not include industry fixed-effects in the primary analysis of Table 4.3, because those measures 
would be perfectly collinear with our firm fixed-effects, the current analysis effectively 
accomplishes that objective by testing how our relationships hold, or do not hold, across the 
different recalling industries. A priori, we would expect that firms in industries which may be 
more sensitized to environmental issues may respond differently to an environmental controversy 
than firms from other industries. For example, firms in the automotive industry may be more 
sensitive to environmental issues because while all industries in which a product is manufactured 
must adhere to environmental rules, regulations and expectations related to the manufacturing 
process, the automotive industry is the only one in our sample that also creates a product which 
negatively impacts the natural environment. We observe in Table 4.8 that our results are quite 
consistent across industries, with each recall industry demonstrating a significant or moderately 
significant relationship between Cumulative Controversies and the time to recall. Interestingly, 
the automotive industry and the consumer products industry demonstrate the largest effect sizes, 
with firms in these industries delaying recalls following an environmental controversy by 82% 
and 93% respectively.25 
  
                                                          
25 We are not able to test Hypothesis 2 at an industry specific level because of the low sample size of 
controversies and recalls within each unique industry. 
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Table 4.8 – Post hoc - AFT model - Hazard of a recall (by industry) 
  All Auto Pharma Med Device Food Consumer 
 Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2003 0.97*** 1.25*** 0.58*** 0.60*** 0.81 1.41*** 
 
(0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.17) (0.63) (0.15) 
2004 1.37*** 1.81*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 1.38* 1.93*** 
 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.16) (0.19) (0.54) (0.25) 
2005 1.70*** 1.96*** 1.18*** 1.36*** 1.58** 2.05*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.29) (0.58) (0.20) 
2006 1.99*** 2.41*** 1.46*** 1.63*** 1.99** 2.42*** 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.32) (0.65) (0.31) 
2007 2.19*** 2.72*** 1.64*** 1.81*** 2.03** 2.47*** 
 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.37) (0.76) (0.24) 
2008 2.35*** 2.84*** 1.84*** 1.96*** 2.42** 2.51*** 
 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.38) (0.86) (0.31) 
2009 2.49*** 2.83*** 1.98*** 2.11*** 2.41** 2.94*** 
 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.17) (0.39) (0.86) (0.23) 
2010 2.63*** 2.82*** 2.09*** 2.28*** 2.89** 3.24*** 
 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.40) (1.07) (0.33) 
2011 2.82*** 3.12*** 2.16*** 2.50*** 2.94* 3.54*** 
 
(0.15) (0.13) (0.19) (0.42) (1.20) (0.43) 
2012 2.96*** 3.33*** 2.25*** 2.65*** 2.92* 3.70*** 
 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.44) (1.26) (0.42) 
2013 3.08*** 3.55*** 2.33*** 2.77*** 2.39* 3.53*** 
 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.44) (1.02) (0.44) 
ln(Revenue) -0.04 -0.43+ 0.10 -0.07 -0.85 0.42 
 
(0.17) (0.25) (0.12) (0.31) (1.36) (0.61) 
Return on Sales 0.24+ 1.53* -0.28 0.21 -0.70 1.03 
 
(0.13) (0.72) (0.23) (0.17) (2.89) (0.92) 
ln(R&D intensity) 0.32* 5.65 -0.23 0.11 2.26*** 1.03*** 
 
(0.16) (4.35) (0.76) (0.11) (0.36) (0.21) 
ln(Past recalls) 0.06+ -0.16 0.11* 0.12+ 0.57*** -0.00 
 
(0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) 
Cumulative Controversy 0.09* 0.15* 0.03+ 0.06* 0.11*** 0.16*** 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 21.86*** 10.22*** 2.18* 23.11*** 11.32 -0.16 
 
(1.77) (2.93) (0.95) (2.81) (12.23) (6.10) 
Number of firms 120 9 15 39 23 35 
Observations 4509 1069 1243 1787 166 244 
Wald Chi2 2139.62 2158.47 594.41 474.76 743.28 134.57 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Firm fixed effects included, not shown. 
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4.7 Discussion 
Our study makes three important contributions. First, it bridges an important gap between 
environmental and operations management research. While prior researchers have demonstrated 
that environmental failures which become public controversies result in market share and 
reputational losses, we demonstrate that they also impact important operational decisions, such as 
the timing of a product recall. We find that after controversies occur, or accumulate over time, 
firm managers seem to be inclined to postpone announcing product quality problems, possibly 
due to career concerns. While each additional controversy incrementally adds to the 
postponement, an average firm experiencing negative environmental pressure extends the time to 
recall by almost 50%. Given the significant consequences of a recall, such delays have important 
implications to both firms and consumers. 
Further, while we observe in Hypothesis 2 that the impact of a controversy on firm behavior 
diminishes over time, the pace of this decay is very slow. Interpreting the interaction term 
associated with Hypothesis 2 shows that avoiding a controversy for three years only reduces the 
impact of prior controversies on time to recall by about 20%. Thus, not only do environmental 
controversies significantly impact time to recall, but this influence lasts for many years. Our 
results are robust to sample selection bias, reverse causality, and choice of firms we include in the 
sample.  
One implication of our findings is that regulators should be aware of this postponement 
tendency and be on the lookout for firms experiencing both environmental and product 
challenges. Regulators might need to consider working across traditional boundaries to identify 
and track such companies, such as the EPA working with the FDA, NHTSA or CPSC. These 
findings contribute to the environmental literature by identifying a consequence of poor 
environmental performance not previously studied. They also contribute to the literature on 
product recalls. While many studies have treated recalls as an objective measure of product 
quality, we find evidence for the fact that the timing of when a recall is initiated has some 
discretion, as it appears that managers are likely to postpone recalling products when they are 
experiencing negative environmental pressure. 
Second, our study is the first to find a common leading indicator of recall timing across all 
major recalling industries in the United Sates (auto, pharma, medical device, food, and consumer 
products), making it the broadest recall study to-date. In our post hoc analysis, we observe that 
the desire to postpone recalls after experiencing environmental controversy is prevalent for firms 
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in all recalling industries. We also observe that firms who make products which negatively 
impact the environment, such as automobiles, are especially sensitive to this postponement effect. 
As shown in Table 8, the effect size for the auto recall industry is more than 35% larger than that 
for any other recalling industry, with the exception of the consumer products industry which has a 
similar effect size. The results provide additional support for our earlier recommendation that 
cross-governmental agency collaboration may be required to effectively monitor offending 
companies, as the recall postponement effect is not limited to the jurisdiction of one agency. 
Finally, our study contributes to the body of literature that explores how firms manage 
multiple instances of bad news within the same firm. The limited research in the area examines 
only instances of bad news which are related, such as financial performance, and evaluates them 
in a limited number of industries. In contrast, we evaluate seemingly-unrelated bad news events 
across a broad variety of industries. Our results may also be generalizable to a broader set of 
issues and decisions. While we evaluate one specific issue that sensitizes a firm to additional bad 
news, an environmental controversy, firms experience a broad variety of negative publicity which 
may similarly sensitive them and impact subsequent discretionary decisions. Examples include 
negatively publicity related to corporate misdeeds, such as theft, bribery or accounting scandals, 
or concerns about social policies/performance, such as layoffs, overseas outsourcing, strikes or 
unfavorable labor practices. Further, beyond recalls, firms make a myriad of important decisions 
which face public scrutiny and thus may be biased due to a firm’s existing sensitivity to public 
scrutiny. If biased, the decisions could be flawed, to the detriment of the firm or others. Examples 
include mergers and acquisitions, outsourcing, and labor decisions. While it is difficult to predict 
firm behavior in these myriad of scenarios, an overarching conclusion from our research is that 
when firm managers make decisions which will be scrutinized by the public, and are already 
sensitive to negative publicity, they pursue paths which present the least risk to their careers and 
their firms. 
4.8 Limitations and Venues for Future Research 
While we feel that the results provide convincing evidence of a product recall postponement 
effect for firms experiencing public environmental pressure, our study is not without limitations. 
One limitation is our inability to know when firms first consider a recall so we can more 
accurately capture the time to recall. Lacking this information, we use time in data since the 
initiation of data gathering as a proxy. While our study includes a large volume of recalls, 
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allowing pooling of recall start times across large samples, it is less precise than using actual start 
times when firms first consider a recall. A second limitation is the rather small sample size of 
firms within each recalling industry. While we evaluate 154 controversies, 4355 recalls, and 120 
firms in our study, our sample is spread across five different recalling industries. While we 
evaluate the majority of firms in the auto industry, the same is not true for the remaining recalling 
industries. While the selection of firms for our analysis was random, it is possible that the firms 
we evaluate behave differently than their peers. As a future research opportunity, it would be 
interesting to use case study methods to better understand the mechanism by which firms process 
negative publicity and how this negative publicity translates into decision making. Finally, it 
would have been nice to capture a broader picture of a firm’s positive and negative experiences 
during the study period. While adding such a control would add robustness to our results, it is not 
a serious concern given the large number of firms in our sample and the extensive length of our 
panel. 
Research evaluating how firms respond to multiple incidents of bad news within the same 
firm is sparse. As such, our research setting lends itself to a variety of interesting future research 
opportunities. One opportunity would be to better understand how firms process negative 
publicity. Such an understanding would enable firm managers to understand their own behavioral 
biases and assess their detrimental impact on decision making and firm performance. A related 
line of inquiry could focus on analytical modeling to develop decision models for optimal 
decision making when the same firm experiences multiple incidents of negative publicity. A third 
opportunity for future research would be to empirically understand which other forms of negative 
publicity sensitize firms to additional negative publicity, like environmental controversies. As 
mentioned previously, events which draw negative publicity towards a firm, such as scandals or 
unpopular social practices, seem to be increasingly common. It would also be interesting to study 
if certain forms of good publicity could mitigate or even reverse the behavioral effect we observe 
following an environmental controversy. A final idea for future research is to understand whether 
other important firm decisions may be impacted by events which bring negative publicity to a 
firm, such as mergers and acquisitions, outsourcing, or layoffs. These weaknesses 
notwithstanding, we believe that our research makes an important first step by linking two 
seemingly-unrelated instances of bad news.  
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
Through their operations, firms of all types negatively impact the natural environment. This 
happens through some combination of resource consumption (energy, natural resources, and 
water) and operational waste emission (hazardous and non-hazardous) into the air, land, and 
water. The magnitude of the impact is significant. For example, the consumption of energy 
produced in fossil-fuel powered plants produces enormous quantities of greenhouse gases, which 
in turn contribute to global warming and climate change. Experts estimate that by 2030, global 
warming will result in 250,000 additional deaths annually around the globe and $2 billion - $4 
billion in additional healthcare spending in the United States alone. Further, harmful emissions 
result in 100 million deaths annually around the globe, 3 million of which are children under the 
age of five. Firms reduce the impact of their operations, or their supply chain, on the natural 
environment by adopting operational changes called environmental management practices 
(EMPs). However, while firms “on average” steadily adopt more EMPs each year, across all 
sectors, there is tremendous variation in adoption across firms, even for firms in a common sector 
or industry. My dissertation investigates this variation in adoption from two perspectives; what 
contributes to the variation and how does poor environmental performance resultant from that 
variation impact firm operational decision-making. The answers to these broad questions have the 
potential to substantially inform the development of new or revised approaches to encourage 
firms to be more environmentally responsible and reduce the impact of their operations on the 
natural environment. I conduct the investigations through three (3) essays, each of which 
individually contributes to the broader investigation (see Figure 5.1). Each chapter’s individual 
contribution is summarized below, including areas for future research. I conclude with two 
important themes that can be derived from a holistic examination of the results of this 
dissertation. 
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Figure 5.1 – Dissertation structure 
 
In Chapter 2, I investigate how stakeholders, firm characteristics, and industry attributes 
contribute to variation in EMP adoption. More specifically, I address two questions: (1) which 
stakeholders seem to have greater (or lesser) influence on firm-level decisions regarding the 
adoption of EMPs and (2) which specific firm characteristics and industry attributes support or 
hinder EMP adoption. Using panel data from 2002 to 2013 and Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush 1992), I show that the passage of time, firm-unique choices and 
characteristics, and industry membership account for 40.0%, 25.7%, and 34.3% respectively of 
the aggregate variance in EMP adoption. This suggests that stakeholders that influence firms 
directly (firm explanation - 25.7%) are almost as important to adoption choices as regulators, who 
influence firms through the industry in which the firm competes (34.3%). Such knowledge could 
be valuable in the development of new or revised approaches to incent firms to be more 
environmentally responsible. Results from analyzing firm characteristics show that firm leaders 
beginning the journey toward environmental excellence should be aware of the importance of 
available labor, of the complementary benefit of having already adopted a quality management 
system (such as lean, TQM or Six Sigma), and that much can be done without excess capital. 
Results from analyzing industry attributes show that as environmental uncertainty increases, firms 
adopt fewer EMPs, i.e. firms do not see the adoption of EMPs as necessary to grow the firm, 
address industry instability or handle industry complexity. Avenues for future research include 
examining a more expansive set of firm characteristics and industry attributes, and investigating 
possible interactions between sectors and industry strategic factors. 
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In Chapter 3, I investigate the impact of a spill or pollution controversy on variation in firm 
environmental activity, as measured by the adoption of EMPs. Such controversies are 
increasingly common. Also, given the direct connection between EMP adoption and improved 
firm environmental performance, understanding how firms respond to such controversies 
(escalate or de-escalate adoption) is of importance to both society and regulators. Using a panel 
dataset focused on U.S. manufacturers and spanning from 2002 to 2013, I find that in the absence 
of a spill or pollution controversy firms in all sectors steadily adopt more EMPs each year. 
However, in the year following a spill or pollution controversy they de-escalate annual increases 
in adoption and this effect seems to persist for up to 3 years. I also observe that high sustainability 
firms do not de-escalate adoption following an environmental controversy, suggesting that such 
firms respond differently to spill or pollution controversies than other firms. These results have 
significant negative implications for short- and long-term environmental performance, especially 
since firms do not seem to recover from the slowdown in future years. The results also shed light 
on a commonly held belief that firms increase EMP adoption in response to an environmental 
controversy, perhaps to strengthen their environmental management system or achieve legitimacy 
in their stakeholders’ eyes. Instead, firms (in aggregate) de-escalate annual increases in adoption 
following a controversy and this behavior persists over time, potentially resulting in a complete 
pause in adoption. The results also indicate that factors other than stakeholder or institutional 
pressure, the primary theoretical lenses from which EMP adoption has been studied previously, 
influence firm decisions regarding EMP adoption (Delmas 2001, Delmas & Toffel 2008, Reuter 
et al. 2010, Sarkis et al. 2010, Foster et al. 2000, Hofer et al. 2012). Avenues for future research 
include evaluating whether the de-escalation in adoption results in a slowdown of environmental 
performance improvements as well, evaluating whether firms from other countries behave 
similarly following a spill or pollution controversy, assessing whether other types of negative 
firm events (such as product recalls) impact on-going EMP adoption, and finally, evaluating 
whether adopting more EMPs reduces the frequency of future spill or pollution controversies. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I investigate how EMP adoption choices, and associated environmental 
performance, impact seemingly-unrelated operational decisions. I specifically investigate whether 
firms who have experienced prior environmental controversies, and the associated fallout from 
such socially toxic events, choose to accelerate or decelerate subsequent voluntary product 
recalls, which are also socially toxic events. Using a proprietary dataset which includes 120 
publicly traded firms from 59 4-digit SIC code industries, 154 environmental controversies, 4355 
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product recalls representing all major recall industries, and survivor modeling, I find that a spill 
or pollution controversy causes firms to delay the product recall decision and that the affect 
occurs across all recalling industries. I also find that the impact of the controversy on the recall 
decision diminishes as the time between the controversy and recall increases, although the rate of 
decay is extremely slow. This last result demonstrates that spill and pollution controversies 
impact firm behavior for many years. An implication of the findings is that regulators should be 
aware of this postponement tendency and be on the lookout for firms experiencing both 
environmental and product challenges. Regulators might even consider working across traditional 
boundaries to identify and track such companies, such as the EPA working with the FDA, 
NHTSA or CPSC. Avenues for future research include case studies to understand the mechanism 
by which firm leaders process negative publicity, analytical modeling to develop decision models 
for optimal decision making, and empirical studies to determine which other forms of negative 
publicity sensitize decision-makers like an environmental controversy, and which other firm 
decisions may be influenced by existing negative publicity like a product recall. 
To highlight the similarities and differences across each chapter, I provide an overview of the 
dissertation in Table 5.1. It is worth noting that the dataset used in each essay is unique to that 
essay with the ASSET4 database from Thomson Reuters providing the common platform. The 
ASSET4 database is extremely large (almost 60k rows) and was initially developed for Wall 
Street analysts. Because it is not configured for academic research, downloading, cleaning, and 
combining it with other economic databases (e.g. COMPUSTAT) required extensive effort. I also 
use a broad variety of theories and econometric techniques in my three essays. As to the content 
of the essays, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on identifying the sources of variation in EMP adoption, 
while Chapter 4 investigates the impact of that variation on operational decision-making.  
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Table 5.1 - Dissertation summary 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Title EMP Adoption: 
Explaining heterogeneity 
among firms 
The impact of a spill or 
pollution controversy on 
firm environmental activity 
Do environmental 
controversies affect the 
product recall decision? 
Industry Broad (6 sectors, 103 
unique industries) 
Manufacturing industries Pharma, auto, medical 
device, consumer 
products 
Unit of Analysis Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year 
Data (Years) Secondary (2002 – 2013) Secondary (2002 – 2013) Secondary (2002 – 2013) 
Research 
Question(s) 
* Which stakeholders 
seem to have greater (or 
lesser) influence on firm-
level EMP adoption 
decisions? 
* Which firm & industry 
attributes support or 
hinder EMP adoption? 
What impact does a spill or 
pollution controversy have 
on firm decision making 
regarding the adoption of 
EMPs? 
Does an environmental 
controversy affect the 
timing of a product recall? 
Research 
method 
Hierarchical (Nested) 
Linear model 
Fixed- and random-effect 
negative binomial, OLS, 
Zero-inflated negative 
binomial, Poisson, 
Generalized estimating 
equation, and Propensity 
score matching  
Accelerated Failure Time 
model 
Theoretical 
Lens 
Stakeholder theory, 
institutional theory, 
resource-based view of 
the firm, natural-
resource based view of 
the firm 
Self-justification theory, 
belief persistence & 
escalation of commitment 
theory, status quo bias, 
organizational learning and 
change, attention-based 
view of the firm 
Threat-rigidity 
hypothesis, attention-
based view of the firm, 
prospect theory 
Implications * Stakeholders that 
influence firms directly 
are as important to EMP 
adoption as regulation 
* Critical antecedents to 
EMP adoption include 
available labor and prior 
adoption of a quality 
management system. 
Available capital is NOT 
a requirement. 
* Firms, on-average, adopt 
more EMPs every year 
* Following a spill or 
pollution event, firms 
decelerate annual increases 
and this impact lasts for up 
to 3 years 
* Firms committed to 
sustainability do NOT 
decelerate adoption 
following a spill or 
pollution event 
* A spill or pollution 
controversy causes firms 
to delay a voluntary 
product recall decision, 
i.e. they prefer to separate 
instances of bad news 
* The impact of a 
controversy on the recall 
decision diminishes as the 
time between the 
controversy and the recall 
increases 
It is important to underscore that ASSET4 is relatively unused in academic research and 
could constitute a critical resource for future researchers focused on EMP adoption, as well as 
projects focused on other environmental topics or the broader topic of sustainability. The vast 
majority of existing EMP adoption studies use primary data, including surveys and case studies. 
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Only recently have researchers begun to collect data from various secondary sources such as 
annual reports, 10k filings, corporate sustainability reports, and websites (Hofer et al. 2012, Tate 
2010, Montabon et al. 2007, Sroufe et al. 2003). Conducting environment research using 
secondary data could be a valuable compliment to survey research.  
Given the behavioral complexities underpinning the decisions firm leaders make to adopt 
EMPs (or not), investigating variation in firm environmental activity is a challenging, complex, 
and significant task. This dissertation adds to an already robust, but growing literature in this area. 
Two significant themes emerge from the dissertation. First, factors other than stakeholder and 
institutional pressure impact firm decisions regarding environmental activity. In Essay 2, I find 
that various firm and industry attributes impact such decisions. In Essay 3, I find that 
environmental controversies cause many firms to de-escalate annual increases in adoption 
observed in the absence of a controversy. While the results add to our understanding of 
antecedents to the adoption of EMPs, I believe they also reinforce the conclusion that a full 
understanding of the process by which firm leaders make such decisions is far from complete. A 
second key theme to emerge from this dissertation is that firm decisions regarding EMP adoption 
impact firms in surprising and unexpected ways. In Essay 4, I show that poor environmental 
performance (as measured by an environmental controversy) results in delayed product recalls. 
However, if firm environmental performance is a direct consequence of EMP adoption decisions, 
as many researchers have demonstrated, our results show a surprising and previously unstudied 
link between firm environmental activity and product quality decision making. Given the 
significant ramifications of product recalls for consumers, firms, and regulators, this link is 
critically important for researchers and regulators alike. 
In summary, through this dissertation I provide input to two broad questions regarding 
variation in EMP adoption across firms, i.e. what drives that variation and how that variation 
impacts operational decision-making. Numerous additional questions remain unanswered. 
Beyond examining other antecedents to variation in adoption and the impact of that variation on 
other important firm decisions, Figure 5.1 shows that much needs to be done in understanding the 
process of adoption, as well as the relationship between adoption variation and environmental 
performance. My hope is that this dissertation will spur other researchers to continue the journey 
toward understanding firm behavior regarding their willingness to make the operational changes 
required to reduce the impact of their operations on the natural environment. Such a journey is of 
the highest priority should we desire to preserve the planet for future generations. 
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Appendix A - Environmental Management Practices 
(EMPs) used in research 
Asset4 Code Title/Description Assessment Freq. 
enerdp0011 
Emission Reduction Policy 
Elements/Emissions 
Does the company have a policy to reduce 
emissions? 
1910 
enerdp0012 
Emission Reduction Policy 
Elements/Biodiversity 
Does the company have a policy to reduce its 
impact on biodiversity? 
599 
enerdp0013 
Emission Reduction Policy 
Elements/ Environmental 
Management Systems 
Does the company have a policy to maintain an 
environmental management system? 
1447 
enerdp0051 
Emission Reduction 
Processes/Emissions 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to improve emission 
reduction? 
1464 
enerdp0052 
Emission Reduction 
Processes/Biodiversity 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to reduce its impact on 
biodiversity? 
611 
enerdp0053 
Emission Reduction 
Processes/ Environmental 
Management Systems 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to maintain an 
environmental management system? 
1040 
enerdp006 CERES Valdez Principles 
Is the company endorsing the CERES principles (or 
Valdez principles)? 
74 
enerdp0101 
Emission Reduction KPI 
Monitoring/Emissions 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or the balanced scorecard to 
monitor emission reduction? 
683 
enerdp0102 
Emission Reduction KPI 
Monitoring/Biodiversity 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or the balanced scorecard to 
monitor its impact on biodiversity? 
21 
enerdp0103 
Emission Reduction KPI 
Monitoring/ Environmental 
Management Systems 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or the balanced scorecard to 
monitor its use of an environmental management 
system? 
46 
enerdp020 
Biodiversity Restoration 
Protection 
Does the company report on initiatives to restore or 
protect native ecosystems or the biodiversity of 
protected and sensitive areas? 
690 
enerdp028 
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Reduction Production 
Does the company show an initiative to reduce, 
reuse, recycle, substitute, phased out or compensate 
CO2 equivalents in the production process? 
777 
enerdp029 
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Reduction Transportation 
Does the company show an initiative to reduce, 
reuse, recycle, substitute or phase out CO2 
equivalents in the product transportation process? 
487 
enerdp062 Waste Reduction Total 
Does the company report on initiatives to recycle, 
reduce, reuse, substitute, treat or phase out total 
waste? 
1532 
enerdp063 e-Waste Reduction 
Does the company report on initiatives to recycle, 
reduce, reuse, substitute, treat or phase out e-waste? 
449 
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enerdp067 Production Concentration 
Does the company report on the concentration of 
production locations in order to limit the 
environmental impact during the production 
process? 
70 
enerdp068 Emissions Trading 
Does the company report on its participation in any 
emissions trading initiative? 
369 
enerdp069 New Production Techniques 
Does the company report on new production 
techniques to improve the global environmental 
impact (all emissions) during the production 
process? 
471 
enerdp070 Environmental Partnerships 
Does the company report on partnerships or 
initiatives with specialized NGOs, industry 
organizations, governmental or supra-governmental 
organizations, which are focused on improving 
environmental issues? 
1415 
enerdp076 
Environmental Restoration 
Initiatives 
Does the company report or provide information on 
company-generated initiatives to restore the 
environment? 
721 
enerdp081 
Staff Transportation Impact 
Reduction 
Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the 
environmental impact of transportation used for its 
staff? 
536 
enerdp082 
Logistics and Product 
Transportation Impact 
Reduction 
Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the 
environmental impact of the transportation of its 
products? 
728 
enerdp095 
Environmental Investments 
Initiatives 
Does the company report on making proactive 
environmental investments or expenditures to 
reduce future risks or increase future opportunities? 
400 
enpidp0011 
Product Innovation Policy 
Elements/Life Cycle 
Assessments 
Does the company have a product life-cycle 
assessment policy? 
1007 
enpidp0012 
Product Innovation Policy 
Elements/Eco Design 
Does the company have an eco-design policy? 953 
enpidp0013 
Product Innovation Policy 
Elements/De-materialization 
Does the company have a de-materialization 
policy? 
299 
enpidp0014 
Product Innovation Policy 
Elements/Product 
Innovation 
Does the company have a general, all-purpose 
policy regarding environmental product innovation? 
1233 
enpidp022 Energy Footprint Reduction 
Does the company describe initiatives in place to 
reduce the energy footprint of its products during 
their use? 
848 
enrrdp0011 
Resource Efficiency Policy 
Elements/Water Efficiency 
Does the company have a policy to improve its 
water efficiency? 
1386 
enrrdp0012 
Resource Efficiency Policy 
Elements/Energy Efficiency 
Does the company have a policy to improve its 
energy efficiency? 
1907 
enrrdp0013 
Resource Efficiency Policy 
Elements/Resource 
Efficiency 
Does the company have a general, all-purpose 
policy regarding resource efficiency? 
2096 
enrrdp0015 
Resource Efficiency Policy 
Elements/ Environmental 
Supply Chain 
Does the company have a policy to lessen the 
environmental impact of its supply chain? 
1508 
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enrrdp004 
Environment Management 
Team 
Does the company have an environmental 
management team? 
1365 
enrrdp008 
Environment Management 
Training 
Does the company train its employees on 
environmental issues? 
1414 
enrrdp011 
Environment Management 
Improvement Tools 
Does the company have the appropriate internal 
communication tools (whistle blower, ombudsman, 
suggestion box, hotline, newsletter, intranet, etc.) to 
ensure better environmental management? 
1446 
enrrdp0121 
Resource Efficiency 
Processes/ Water Efficiency 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to improve its water 
efficiency? 
1192 
enrrdp0122 
Resource Efficiency 
Processes/ Energy 
Efficiency 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to improve its energy 
efficiency? 
1593 
enrrdp0123 
Resource Efficiency 
Processes/Resource 
Efficiency 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to improve its resource 
efficiency in general? 
1287 
enrrdp0125 
Resource Efficiency 
Processes/Environmental 
Supply Chain 
Does the company describe, claim to have or 
mention processes in place to include its supply 
chain in the company's efforts to lessen its overall 
environmental impact? 
3573 
enrrdp0131 
Resource Efficiency KPI 
Monitoring/Water 
Efficiency 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or the balanced scorecard to 
monitor water efficiency? 
564 
enrrdp0132 
Resource Efficiency KPI 
Monitoring/Energy 
Efficiency 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or the balanced scorecard to 
monitor energy efficiency? 
634 
enrrdp0133 
Resource Efficiency KPI 
Monitoring/Resource 
Efficiency 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or the balanced scorecard to 
monitor resource efficiency in general? 
274 
enrrdp0135 
Resource Efficiency KPI 
Monitoring/Environmental 
Supply Chain 
Does the company claim to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) or balanced scorecard to monitor 
the environmental impact of its supply chain? 
59 
enrrdp029 
Materials Sourcing 
Environmental Criteria 
Does the company claim to use environmental 
criteria (e.g., life cycle assessment) to source or 
eliminate materials? 
902 
enrrdp046 Renewable Energy Use Does the company make use of renewable energy? 982 
enrrdp052 Green Buildings 
Does the company report about environmentally 
friendly or green sites or offices? 
741 
enrrdp053 
Energy Efficiency 
Initiatives 
Does the company report on specific initiatives to 
improve its energy efficiency? 
1394 
enrrdp057 Water Efficiency Initiatives 
Does the company report on initiatives to reuse or 
recycle water? 
1024 
enrrdp058 
Environmental Supply 
Chain Management 
Does the company use environmental criteria (ISO 
14000, energy consumption, etc.) in the selection 
process of its suppliers or sourcing partners? 
1193 
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enrrdp059 
Environmental Supply 
Chain Partnership 
Termination 
Does the company report or show to be ready to end 
a partnership with a sourcing partner, if 
environmental criteria are not met? 
427 
 
